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California Supreme Court Survey
June 1995 - April 1996
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either an article or
summary format. Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader
with a basic understanding of the legal implications of cases in a concise for-
mat.
ARTICLES
I. ADVERTISING
An attorney whose mailed advertisements offering a
homestead filing service which are false or misleading in
violation of Business and Professions Code section
17537.6 will be subject to discipline, and the supreme
court has discretion to increase the lower court's recom-
mended suspension in light of aggravating circumstanc-
es:
In re M orse . .................................. 252
II. CivIL SERVICE
The time limits imposed on the California State Person-
nel Board by California Government Code section
18671.1 are directory, and although the Board retains
jurisdiction when it fails to decide the appeal within the
statutory time limits, an employee may seek a remedy in
superior court:
California Correctional Peace Officers
Ass'n v. State Personnel Board .................... 256
III. COMMuNrrY PROPERTY
Retroactive application of former Civil Code section
4800.2, which creates a presumption that a spouse has a
right to reimbursement for the separate property he or
she used to acquire community property, unconstitution-
ally deprives the other spouse of a vested property inter-
est without due process of law:
In re Marriage of Heikes ....................... 265
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Damages to property caused by police officers while en-
forcing criminal laws must be recovered under the Tort
Claims Act rather than inverse condemnation:
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento ............... 274
B. Judicial reformation of unconstitutional statutes is per-
missible; however, reformation should only be undertak-
en if it can closely effectuate policy judgments clearly
articulated by the legislative body:
Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Commission ........ 286
V. CRIMINAL LAw
During the execution of a search warrant, if a person ar-
rives during the search and cannot be immediately iden-
tified, officers may constitutionally detain the person in
a manner necessary to protect the safety of all present
during the search:
People v. Glaser ................................ 297
VI. INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Under a commercial general liability insurance policy,
an insurer owes no duty to defend the insured against a
lawsuit that alleges incidental emotional distress caused
by the insured's noncovered acts. Absent specific intent
to the contrary, an insurer does not automatically waive
policy-based coverage defenses that it fails to enumerate
in its initial denial of coverage:
Wailer v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc ........... 301
VII. INSURANCE LAw
In third party liability insurance cases involving contin-
uous or progressively deteriorating losses and successive
comprehensive general liability policy periods, a contin-
uous injury trigger of coverage applies:
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Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co... 315
VIII. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
The statutory five-year period for bringing an action to
trial will be tolled within the last six months of that
period following arbitration if the plaintiff timely noti-
fies the trial court of the impending five-year deadline
date and requests that the trial be set prior to that date:
Howard v. Thrifty Drug and Discount Stores ........ 336
IX. PRODUCTS LIABILIY
The court should only instruct jurors to consider ordi-
nary consumer expectations in products liability cases
where the question of whether the product defectively
designed is within the common experience of the con-
sumer. Additionally, errors in instructing a civil jury do
not lead to automatic reversal; rather, the court must
examine the evidence and the entire cause to determine
whether the error constituted a miscarriage of justice:
Soule v. General Motors Corp ................... 343
X. TORTS
In an action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant engaged in conduct that was
wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the
interference itself:
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc ...... 358
XI. WATERS
Accretion of deposits along shorelines is characterized as
artificial and thus belongs to the state only when it is
directly caused by human activities occurring in the
immediate vicinity of the accreted land:
State ex ret. State Lands Commission v. Superior
Court (Lovelace) ............................... 364
SUMMARIES
I. Appellate Review
An appeal alleging disproportionate sentences in
comparison to those of codefendants following a
negotiated plea bargain directly attacks the plea, not
the sentence, and requires a certificate of probable
cause under California Penal Code section 1237.5
and rule 31(d) of the California Rules of Court.
People v. Panizzon, Supreme Court of California, decided
April 18, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 68, 913 P.2d 1061, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 851 ................................. 374
II. Automobiles and Traffic
In a Department of Motor Vehicles Hearing, a duty to
certify the facts of an apparent contempt and to
transmit the certification to a superior court is im-
posed on the Department by California Vehicle Code
section 11525. The superior court assumes the bur-
den of initiating the contempt proceeding upon re-
ceipt of the certification.
Parris v. Zolin, Supreme Court of California, decided
March 4, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 839, 911 P.2d 9, 50 Cal. Rptr.
2d 109 ..................................... 375
III. Criminal Law
A. Under Penal Code, section 1203.2a, if the defendant
has given written notification of his incarceration to
his probation officer, and the probation officer fails
to notify the court imposing probation that the de-
fendant is incarcerated, the court loses jurisdiction
to impose sentence on the initial offense.
In re Hoddinott, Supreme Court of California, decided
March 25, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 992, 911 P.2d 1381, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 706 ................................. 376
B. A defendant who committed grand theft, but was not
convicted of or sentenced for the offense prior to the
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effective date of the amendment to Penal Code sec-
tion 12022.6, which increases the amount of loss re-
quired for one and two-year sentence enhancements,
is eligible for the lesser enhancement applicable at
the time of defendant's sentencing.
People v. Nasalga, Supreme Court of California, decided
February 29, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 784, 910 P.2d 1380, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 ............................... 378
C. When a defendant has committed multiple offenses
incident to one objective, California Penal Code sec-
tion 654 gives the trial court discretion to sentence
the defendant for any one of such offenses, but does
not provide the trial court with discretion to man-
date the sentence with the greatest potential term of
imprisonment.
People v. Norrell, Supreme Court of California, decided
April 11, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 1, 913 P.2d 458, 51 Cal. Rptr.
2d 429..................................... 379
D. For purposes of California Penal Code, section
192(c)(1), which provides that vehicular man-
slaughter is, among other things, "driving a vehicle in
the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to
a felony, and with gross negligence," the term "un-
lawful act" means any offense that is dangerous ac-
cording to the circumstances under which it was com-
mitted, rather than an act that is intrinsically peril-
ous.
People v. Wells, Supreme Court of California, decided
March 26, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 979, 911 P.2d 1374, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 699 . ..................................... 380
IV. Defenses
A defendant seeking to dismiss charges on the basis
of discriminatory prosecution is not required to show
that the people acted with "specific intent to punish
the defendant for [his/her] membership in a particu-
lar class."
Baluyut v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of California,
decided March 4, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 826, 911 P.2d 1, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 .............................. 381
V. Government Immunity
Government Code section 845.8's grant of immunity
to public entities and employees precluding liability
from injuries "caused by" an escaping prisoner in-
cludes protection from liability when a prisoner self-
inflicts harm during an escape attempt.
Ladd v. County of San Mateo, Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, decided March 7, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 911 P.2d
496, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309 ........................ 383
VI. Interest
The rate of postjudgment interest to be paid by a
local public entity is seven percent per annum, as
provided by the California Constitution, and not ten
percent per annum as prescribed by the California
Code of Civil Procedure.
California Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. City of Los
Angeles, Supreme Court of California, decided October 5,
1995, 11 Cal. 4th 342, 902 P.2d 297, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
2 79 . ......................................... 384
VII. Nuisances
In demonstrating that a nuisance is "temporary"
rather than "permanent," the plaintiff must present
evidence that the contaminated condition is subject
to cleanup and that the cost of the cleanup is "rea-
sonable."
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Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., Supreme Court of
California, decided April 4, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 1087, 912
P.2d 1220, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272 ................... 384
VIII. Preliminary Injunction
A municipal court and an appellate department of
the superior court have jurisdiction over a collateral
attack of the validity of an injunctive order issued by
a superior court.
People v. Gonzalez, Supreme Court of California, decided
February 29, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 804, 910 P.2d 1366, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d. 74 .............................. 386
IX. Public Utilities
California Public Utility Code section 453.5 prevents
the Public Utilities Commission from assessing a rate
refund against a public utility and using the funds
for a purpose other than to reimburse ratepayers.
Assembly of the State of California v. Public Utilities
Commission, Supreme Court of California, decided De-
cember 18, 1996, 12 Cal 4th 87, 906 P.2d 1209, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 54 .................................. 387
I. ADVERTISING
An attorney whose mailed advertisements offering a
homestead filing service which are false or misleading
in violation of Business and Professions Code section
17537.6 will be subject to discipline, and the supreme
court has discretion to increase the lower court's rec-
ommended suspension in light of aggravating circum-
stances: In re Morse.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Morse,' the California Supreme Court addressed the following
issues: (1) whether Business and Professions Code section 17537.62 vio-
lated the First Amendment as a restriction on free commercial speech;
(2) whether the section was unconstitutionally vague as applied to attor-
neys; and (3) whether the sanction imposed on attorney Ivan O.B. Morse
by the Review Department of the State Bar Court ("review department")
was appropriate in light of his violation of the code.3 Answering each of
1. 11 Cal. 4th 184, 900 P.2d 1170, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (1995). The court issued
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter,
George, and Kremer concurred. (Hon. Daniel J. Kremer, Presiding Justice, Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial
Council. Justice Werdegar took no part in this opinion). Id. at 184-213, 900 P.2d at
1170-89, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620-39. Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion. Id.
at 213-14, 900 P.2d at 1189, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice
Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 214-16, 900 P.2d at 1189-90, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 639-40 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. California Business and Professions Code § 17537.6 provides in relevant part:
(a) It is unlawful for any person to make any untrue or misleading state-
ments in any manner in connection with the offering or performance of a
homestead filing service. For the purpose of this section, an 'untrue or mis-
leading statement' means and includes any representation that any of the fol-
lowing is true:
(1) The preparation or recordation of a homestead declaration will in any
manner prevent the forced sale of a judgment debtor's dwelling.
(c) In addition to any other service, every offeror of a homestead filing ser-
vice shall deliver each notarized homestead declaration to the appropriate
county recorder for recordation ...no later than 10 days after the home-
stead declaration is notarized.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17537.6 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
Section 17537.6 also requires several important disclosures, including the statement
that a homeowner need not file a homestead declaration in order to be entitled to a
homestead exemption. Id.
3. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 190, 900 P.2d at 1171, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. For ap-
proximately five years, Ivan Morse engaged in mass mailing advertising offering home-
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the three issues in the negative, the court agreed with both the court of
appeal and the review department that the statute was constitutional as
applied to commercial speech, and that Morse's false and misleading
advertisements were not entitled to First Amendment protection.4 Con-
curring with both lower courts, the supreme court also held that the
statute was not vague as to whether it applied to attorneys in Morse's
position, since the code section's legislative history made clear the
statute's application in mass mailing situations.
The court's central focus, however, was the adequacy of the review
department's recommended sanction of Morse for his ongoing violation
of the statute.6 After considering both the presence of aggravating fac-
tors and the absence of mitigating circumstances, the court found that
the disciplinary action against Morse should be increased to three years
of actual suspension from the practice of law.7
owners assistance in filing homestead declarations on their properties. Id. As a result
of these ads, Morse prepared declarations for nearly 10.0,000 property owners. Id.
Although Morse was familiar with Business and Professions Code § 17537.6, his
mailed ads did not comply with the code's requirements. Id. at 190-93, 900 P.2d at
1171-73, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-23.
In 1992, the superior court, in response to a civil action filed by the California
Attorney General's Office, permanently enjoined Morse from. mailing his unlawful ad-
vertisements. Id. at 193, 900 P.2d at 1173, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623. Additionally, the
court ordered Morse to pay $800,000 in civil penalties and restitution. Id. Morse ap-
pealed, and the court of appeal affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that
"Morse's advertisements were '. . . deceptive and misleading in a number of ways,
and therefore not entitled to First Amendment protection.'" Id. at 193-94, 900 P.2d at
1173-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623-24 (quoting the lower court's opinion, People v.
Morse, 21 Cal. App. 4th 259, 266, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816, 821 (1993)).
In addition to the civil action, the State Bar Court initiated a proceeding against
Morse. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 194, 900 P.2d at 1174, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624. After
finding that Morse violated Rule 1-400(D) of the California Rules of Professional Con-
duct prohibiting misleading advertisements, the court recommended three years proba-
tion, with 15 days of actual suspension. Id. Morse appealed this decision to the Re-
view Department of the State Bar Court. Id. The review department affirmed the
State Bar Court's decision, but increased Morse's actual suspension time to 60 days.
Id. at 198, 900 P.2d at 1177, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
4. Id. at 199-200, 900 P.2d at 1177-78, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
5. Id. at 200, 900 P.2d at 1178, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17537.6 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (outlining requirements for offer of home-
stead filing service).
6. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 205, 900 P.2d at 1181, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
7. Id. The court stated that the suspension could be reduced to two years if
Morse fully complied with the lower court's order to pay restitution and penalties. Id.
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The majority began its opinion with a review of Morse's actions from
1988 to 1992, which consisted of mass mailings to potential clients re-
garding assistance in filing homestead declarations.8 The court then re-
viewed the two separate actions brought against Morse as a result of
those mailings.9 First, a civil action was filed against Morse by the Cali-
fornia Attorney General and the Alameda County District Attorney seek-
ing civil penalties and an injunction.' ° Second, the State Bar Court
brought a disciplinary action against Morse for violating the Rules of
Professional Conduct which prohibit lawyers from engaging in misleading
advertising."
Addressing Morse's contention that enforcement of section 17537.6
violated his First Amendment free speech rights, the court quickly noted
that both the court of appeal in the civil matter and the State Bar Court
found the ads to be misleading, and therefore not protected by the First
Amendment. 2 The supreme court agreed with the court of appeal that
the statute was not ambiguous as to whether it applied to Morse, since
only attorneys filing homestead declarations for preexisting clients were
exempted from the statute's requirements. 3
8. Id. at 190-92, 900 P.2d at 1171-73, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-23. During this time,
Morse mailed approximately four million advertisements offering assistance to home-
owners in filing homestead declarations. Id. at 190, 900 P.2d at 1171, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 621. In response to these mass mailings, Morse prepared homestead declarations
for as many as 100,000 property owners. Id.
9. Id. at 193-99, 900 P.2d at 1173-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623-27.
10. Id. at 193, 900 P.2d at 1173, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-400 (D)(2) (1994) (proscribing false or misleading com-
munications).
11. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 194, 900 P.2d at 1174, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 624. See gener-
ally 1 B.E. WrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys § 423 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (de-
fining false and misleading attorney communications); 7 CAL JUR. 3D Attorneys at
Law § 234 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (describing prohibition against false or misleading
statements to the public).
12. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 199-200, 900 P.2d at 1177-78, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
Morse's ads included the false statement that a recorded homestead declaration could
avert a forced sale of the property, and the misleading inference that only a recorded
homestead was effective. Id. at 201, 900 P.2d at 1178-80, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628-29;
see 7 CAL JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law § 233 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (detailing constitu-
tional limitations on restriction of lawyer advertising). See generally Mylene Brooks,
Lawyer Advertising: Is There Really a Problem?, 15 LoY. LA. ENT. L.J. 1 (1994) (dis-
cussing the history of attorney regulation); Dennis W. Bishop, Note, Building the
House on a Weak Foundation: Edenfield v. Fane and the Current State of the Com-
mercial Speech Doctrine, 22 PEPP. L REv. 1143 (1995) (reviewing the historical back-
ground of commercial speech regulation, including lawyer advertising).
13. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 200-01, 900 P.2d at 1178, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628. Al-
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Turning to what the majority deemed to be "the heart of the case," the
court focused on the adequacy of the discipline recommended by the
review department." The majority reviewed both the presence of aggra-
vating factors and the lack of significant mitigating circumstances which
had been considered by the courts below." Finding the sixty day sus-
pension too minor a sanction for the present circumstances, the court in-
creased Morse's actual suspension to three years.'6 The court explained
that the increased penalty was necessary in light of Morse's serious mis-
conduct over a prolonged period of time, as well as the need "to protect
the public, the courts, and the profession."7
B. Justice Kennards Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote a brief concurring opinion to express her con-
cern over the reference in the majority opinion to Morse's bankruptcy
filing and exhaustive appeals. 8 Justice Kennard asserted that filing for
bankruptcy should not be a factor considered by the court when review-
ing a disciplinary action, nor should the court hold a petitioner's exten-
sive use of non-frivolous appeals against him.' In light of the circum-
stances, however, Justice Kennard agreed with the discipline imposed.2'
though Morse was familiar with the requirements of § 17537.6, he insisted that the
statute did not apply to him, arguing that the section's exemption for a "retained"
attorney was ambiguous. Id.
14. Id. at 205, 900 P.2d at 1181, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
15. Id. at 197-98, 900 P.2d at 1176-77, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626-27. The aggravating
circumstances included Morse's "multiple acts of wrongdoing" which spanned a period
of many years, his denial of any culpability, and his repeated appeals based on the
same previously rejected grounds. Id. The court agreed with the review department
that the only mitigating factor in Morse's favor, his lack of any previous disciplinary
record, was only "entitled to minimal weight because his misconduct began slightly
more than six years after his admission to the bar." Id. at 198, 900 P.2d at 1177, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626.
16. Id. at 210, 900 P.2d at 1184, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634. See generaUy 1 B.E.
WrrIaN, CAIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys § 520 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (describing in-
stances where recommended punishment was increased).
17. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 209-10, 900 P.2d at 1184, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 634. The
court added that Morse could reduce his actual suspension to two years by fully
complying with the order to pay civil penalties. Id. at 210-11, 900 P.2d at 1185, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
18. Id. at 213-14, 900 P.2d at 1189, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring).
19. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
20. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard asserted that the three year sus-
C. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk expressed in his dissent that the discipline imposed by
the majority was too harsh under the given circumstances." Justice
Mosk agreed that Morse's advertisements were, in fact, misleading.'
However, Morse committed no felony and had not acted in bad faith;
therefore, he argued that the three-year suspension was too severe a pun--
ishment.2
Justice Mosk pointed to Morse's "mistaken belief' regarding the appli.-
cation of section 17537.6 to mass mailings as support for the lesser sanc.-
tion.24 He also attacked the majority for the "more than... subtle sug-
gestion that Morse is being severely punished for exercising" his right to
litigate the statute's validity and called the imposed discipline "a draconi-
an penalty."25
Ill. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
The present ruling stands for the proposition that when an attorney
mass mails advertisements containing misleading or false statements, he
or she will receive the appropriate sanctions.26 In addition, the court
stated that a wide range of sanctions may be appropriate in a situation
where ethical violations have occurred.2
Yes the real focal point of the Morse decision was the court's assertion
of its role in reviewing State Bar Court sanctions for lawyer miscon-
pension was "within the appropriate range of discipline" in the present case. Id. at
214, 900 P.2d at 1189, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636 (Kennard, J., concurring).
21. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk agreed with the review department that
"Morse's misconduct merits no more than a 60-day actual suspension." Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
24. Id. at 214-15, 900 P.2d at 1190, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639-40 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
25. Id. at 215-16, 900 P.2d at 1190, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 190, 900 P.2d at 1171, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. See generally Eric L.
Graves, Review of Selected 1993 California Legislation-Business Associations and
Professions, 25 PAc. L.J. 407 (1994) (reviewing recent statutes covering attorney ad-
vertising).
27. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 205-09, 900 P.2d at 1181-84, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631-34.
See generally Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can't A-
ways Get What They Want and What the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25
U.C. DAVIS L REV. 283, 328 (1992) (propounding a consumer point-of-view standard
for what is false and misleading in consumer advertisements). Morton suggests, "In
conjunction with abandoning lawyer regulation of the content of information di-
persed and lawyer-administered sanctions for misconduct, the legal profession mist
do its utmost to educate consumers on what they should expect from an attorney."
Id. at 329.
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duct.' Although the court stressed that each case varied with its specif-
ic form of wrongdoing, as well as individual aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, it sent a clear message: the supreme court will increase
sanctions where circumstances warrant the increase. 9 In addition, this
decision may encourage an attorney to think twice before "having the
temerity to seek review of his State Bar case in this court."'
DEBRA E. BEST
28. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 205-06, 900 P.2d at 1181-82, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631-32.
29. Id. at 206-08, 900 P.2d at 1181-82, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631-32. The court fore-
shadowed its opinion in the "order granting review [which] placed [Morse] on notice
that we would consider ' . . . whether the level of discipline should be increased.'"
Id. For a general review of the history of lawyer advertising, including a discussion
of the concerns surrounding deceptive advertising, and public attitudes toward lawyer
advertisements, see Al H. Ringleb et al., Lawyer Direct Mail Advertisements: Regula-
tory Environment, Economics, and Consumer Perceptions, 17 PAC. UJ. 1199 (1986).
30. Morse, 11 Cal. 4th at 215, 900 P.2d at 1190, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of lawyer advertising regulation in the television context,
see Brae Canlen, Injured? Call Now! California Tries to Get Tough with TV Attor-
neys-and Touches Off a Class War in the Bar, 15 CAL LAw. 48 (1995). The author
ominously portends: "As the number of new lawyers increases and the competition
for business intensifies, attorneys will continue to move in the direction of car deal-
ers, cereal companies, and breweries." Id. at 90.
II. CIVIL SERVICE
The time limits imposed on the California State Per-
sonnel Board by California Government Code section
18671.1 are directory, and although the Board retains
jurisdiction when it fails to decide the appeal within
the statutory time limits, an employee may seek a
remedy in superior court: California Correctional
Peace Officers Ass'n v. State Personnel Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In California Correctional Peace Officers Ass'n v. State Personnel
Board,' the California Supreme Court examined the time provisions that
section 18671.1 of the California Government Code2 imposes on the Cali-
fornia State Personnel Board for dispensing with appeals of departmental
disciplinarian actions.' Reversing the decision of the court of appeal,4
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1133, 899 P.2d 79, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693 (1995). Justice Baxter
wrote the majority opinion, in which, Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices George and
Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1137-57, 899 P.2d at 82-94, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696-708.
Justice Arabian filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kennard and Mosk
joined. Id. at 1157-69, 899 P.2d at 94-102, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708-16 (Arabian, J.,
dissenting).
2. California Government Code § 18671.1 in relevant part states:
Whenever a hearing or investigation is conducted by the board.., the
board shall render its decision within a reasonable time after the conclusion
of the hearing or investigation, except that the period from the filing of the
petition to the decision of the board shall not exceed six months or 90 days
from the time of the submission, whichever time period is less . . . [t]he
provision relating to the six-month or the 90-day periods for a decision may
be waived by the employee but if not so waived a failure to render a timely
decision is an exhaustion of all available, administrative remedies.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 18671.1 (West 1995). See generally 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative
Law § 472 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (explaining time limits for decisions to be made under
various statutes); 2 CAL. JUR. 3D Administrative Law §§ 223-231 (1973 & Supp. 1995)
(imparting the general procedures used for hearings in administrative law courts); Mi-
chael A. Schmitt, How Long is Six Months in California? Enquiring Minds Want to
Know!, 19 Sw. U. L REV. 205 (1990) (discussing the various time limits in statutes and
how they are applied).
3. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1138, 899 P.2d at 82-83, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696-
97. The Department of Corrections and the Department of the Youth Authority
brought disciplinary actions under the Civil Service Act against almost 50 employees.
Id. at 1139, 899 P.2d at 83, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697; see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 19570-
19589 (West 1995) (listing requirements for disciplinary proceedings); see also 15A
AM. JUR. 2D Civil Service § 55 (1976 & Supp. 1995) (discussing suspensions and lay-
offs); 2 B.E. WIrK]N, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment §§ 194-
204 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (giving reasons why employees could have a disciplinary ac-
tion filed against them). Each employee then received a "notice of adverse action."
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the supreme court held that the time restrictions were directory, not
mandatory, with the Board retaining jurisdiction over an appeal even
when failing to render a decision within the statutory time limitation.'
The court further held that an employee may seek a writ either ordering
the Board to decide the appeal by a certain date or setting aside the
adverse action.' Lastly, the court professed that granting a de novo re-
view of an employee's appeal to a superior court when the personnel
board had failed to act within the statutory time limits was constitution-
al. 7
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Time Limits Imposed by Section 18671.1 are Directory
Justice Baxter began with the premise that the time limits imposed by
section 18671.1 served to further the court's previous holding in Skelly v.
State Personnel Board,' which mandated due process for civil service
employees in disciplinary matters.9 He explained that a "directory" or a
Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1139, 899 P.2d at 83, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697; see 52
CAL. JUR. 3D Public Officers and Employees §§ 146, 150 (1979 & Supp. 1995) (dis-
cussing the general procedure for notifying employees of disciplinary hearings). After
receiving the notices, each employee appealed to the Board. Peace Officers, 10 Cal.
4th at 1139, 899 P.2d at 83, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697.
As of May 16, 1991, the Board had not rendered a decision on any of the ap-
peals. Id. The plaintiff, on the same date, filed motions to dismiss all claims against
the employees with the chief administrative law judge on the ground that the Board
had failed to comply with § 18671.1. Id. After the chief administrative judge denied
the motion, the plaintiff filed a writ of mandate with a superior court asking for
various remedies depending on each employee's case. Id. at 1139-40, 899 P.2d at 83,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697. The superior court judge did not grant the relief requested
by the plaintiff. Id. at 1141, 899 P.2d at 84, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
4. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1141, 899 P.2d at 84, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
The court of appeal reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded cer-
tain issues for further deliberations. Id. The appellate court held that time limits
within § 18671.1 were mandatory and jurisdictional. Id. at 1143, 899 P.2d at 85, 43
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699.
5. Id. at 1148, 899 P.2d at 88-89, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702-03.
6. Id. at 1152-53, 899 P.2d at 91-92, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705-06.
7. Id. at 1148-51, 899 P.2d at 88-91, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-05. The court of ap-
peal also held that the employee could seek more then one remedy. Id. at 1143-44,
899 P.2d at 85-86, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699-700.
8. 15 Cal. 3d 194, 539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975).
9. Id. at 1144-45, 899 P.2d at 86, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700. The court stated that
"mandatory"'" classification of a duty delineated whether the lack of
compliance with a procedure would invalidate the governmental action
to which the requirement related." "If the action is invalidated, the re-
quirement will be termed 'mandatory.' If not invalidated, it is 'directory'
only." 2 Generally, time limits within a statute are considered directory
unless "the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent."' 3
To ascertain this intent, Justice Baxter applied the standard that a time
limitation is directory unless it is reinforced by a penalty that would
effectively invalidate the government action.'4 Thus, if there is a penalty
that could invalidate government actions, the time limit is mandatory."
The court noted that an employee may waive the time limits, so failure
to comply with them did not invalidate the Board's future actions regard-
ing an appeal. 6 Further, the statute provides a penalty for noncompli-
ance with the time limits by allowing the employee to seek an alternative
route for challenging the disciplinary action taken against him.'7 Even
so, this penalty did not reflect the requisite legislative intent to end the
Board's jurisdiction over the appeal.'" Therefore, the California Legisla-
ture did not express a clear intent that the time limits be classified as
mandatory. For these reasons, the majority held the time limitations to
be directory. 9
§ 18671.1 was enacted to supplement other statutes in order to ensure that the Board
would make decisions concerning employee appeals within a reasonable time, thus
protecting due process. Id.; see 2 B.E. WrrnUN, SUMMARY OF CAIUFORNIA LAW, Agency
and Employment § 193 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing hearings associated with civil
service disciplinary actions). See generally Michael J. Higgins, Comment, California
Wrongful Discharge Law and the Public Employee, 23 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 117 (1989)
(discussing discharges of civil servants).
10. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1145, 899 P.2d at 87, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701.
Typically, "mandatory" in statutes refers to "a duty that a governmental entity is re-
quired to perform." Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 72 (1983 &
Supp. 1995) (discussing when a statutory duty is mandatory).
13. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1145, 899 P.2d at 87, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701
(citing Edwards v. Steele, 25 Cal. 3d 406, 410, 599 P.2d 1365, 1368, 158 Cal. Rptr.
662, 665 (1979)).
14. Id.; see Morris v. County of Manin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 908, 559 P.2d 606, 610-11,
136 Cal. Rptr. 251, 255-56 (1977) (stating that the difference between directory and
mandatory may be determined by the result of noncompliance).
15. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1145, 899 P.2d at 87, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1145-46, 899 P.2d at 87, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701.
18. Id. at 114748, 899 P.2d at 88-89, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702-03.
19. Id.
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2. Employee's Right to Review by a Superior Court.
Justice Baxter went on to conclude that if the Board failed to render a
decision within the time limits of section 18671.1, an employee could, by
writ of mandate,' seek to compel a Board decision or obtain a de novo
review of the disciplinary action by the superior court.2 The Board ar-
gued that the employee's only remedy was to file a writ of mandate com-
pelling the Board to make a decision on the employee's appealY The
court disagreed, however, stating that the statutory language, "exhaustion
of all administrative remedies," meant that the employee had the right to
bring an appeal of the disciplinary action before a superior court.'
3. Constitutionality of De Novo Review
The court further noted that after the statutory time limits have ex-
pired, an employee may seek by writ either to compel the Board to ren-
der a decision or to obtain a de novo review in superior court. During
this time, the Board may continue to investigate and deliver a decision.25
Once the decision is handed down, the employee may drop the writ pro-
20. See generally 52 Am. JUR. 2D Mandamus §§ 1-13 (1970 & Supp. 1995) (discuss-
ing the nature and purpose of mandamus); 32 CAL JUR. 2D Mandamus §§ 1-5, 33-37
(1956 & Supp. 1978) (defining mandamus); 8 B.E. WTmKN, CALuFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Mandamus §§ 113-116 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (explaining the remedy of mandamus).
21. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1148, 899 P.2d at 89, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703.
22. Id. at 1148-51, 899 P.2d at 89-91, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-05. The court found
that § 18671.1 did not grant a writ of compliance remedy because this was inherently
included within the statute; thus, it was only logical that the remedy granted by the
section was different. Id.; see CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980) (providing for
issuance of writs of mandate). See generally Edward L Barrett, Jr., Recent Decisions,
27 CAL L REV. 738 (1939) (examining cases dealing with review in mandamus); D.O.
McGovney, Administrative Decisions and Court Review Thereof, in California, 29
CAL. L REV. 110 (1941) (discussing procedures that could involve mandamus actions).
23. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1148-52, 899 P.2d at 89-91, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
703-05. For a deeper look into the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 291-96, 109 P.2d 942, 948-51
(1941). See generally 2 B.E. WrrMIN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 69 (1985
& Supp. 1995) (discussing the doctrine of administrative remedies); Willis S. Slusser,
Recent Decision, 29 CAL. L REv. 515 (1941) (examining the AbeUeira court's analysis
of the relationship between judicial review and exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies). Additionally, the court made note of the legislative history of § 18671.1. Peace
Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1148-52, 899 P.2d at 89-91, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-05.
24. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1147-51, 899 P.2d at 88-90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
702-04.
25. Id. at 1150, 899 P.2d at 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
ceedings in superior court,26 wait for the controlling superior court deci-
sion, or dismiss the writ proceeding and appeal the decision of the!
Board.27
Both the Board and the plaintiff contended that allowing a superior
court to conduct a de novo review of a disciplinary action would rob the
State Board of its constitutional authority over civil service disciplinary
actions.' The court refuted this argument by saying that a "constitution--
al grant of authority to an administrative agency does not preclude rea--
sonable regulation of the procedures of the agency by the Legislature.""'
In conclusion, Justice Baxter found that allowing an employee to waive
the right of appeal and seek a judicial remedy when the Board has failed
to comply with time limits is consistent with the California Constitu-
tion.3 Therefore, dismissal of the action is not the sole remedy when
the Board exceeds the section 18671.1 time limits.
31
B. Justice Arabian's Dissenting Opinion
In contrast to the majority, Justice Arabian asserted that the time lim-
its within section 18671.1 were not directory, but mandatory and jurisdic-
tional.2 He premised his opinion on the language of the statute which
contains a consequence for noncompliance with the section's time lim-
26. Id. at 1151, 899 P.2d at 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1152, 899 P.2d at 91, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
29. Id. Justice Baxter pointed out that Article VII of the California Constitution ac-
tually contemplates this type of regulation, as § 3 provides that "the Board is to
enforce the civil service statutes and adopt rules authorized by statute." Id. (citing
CAL CONST. art VII, § 3); see also 52 CAL JUR. 3D Public Officers and Employees
§§ 4, 272 (1979 & Supp. 1995) (discussing enforcement and administration of civil
service statutes by agency boards).
30. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1153, 899 P.2d at 92, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
Justice Baxter also noted that the legislative history of § 18671.1 supported the
court's conclusion. Id.
31. Id. The court added that if the employee chooses to seek review of his claim
in superior court, then the employee will bear the burden of proof. Id. at 1153-56,
899 P.2d at 92-94, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706-07; see also 43 CAL JUR. 3D Mandamus
and Prohibitions §§ 1, 39 (1978 & Supp. 1995) (explaining the pleading burdens of
mandamus writs). This is in contrast to the original agency hearing where the agency
has the burden of proving the employee deserves the disciplinary action taken against
him. Peace Officers, 10 Cal. 4th at 1153-1156, 899 P.2d at 92-94, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
706-08.
32. Id. at 1157-63, 899 P.2d 94-98, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708-12 (Arabian, J., dissent.
ing).
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its.3 He thus argued that the intent of the statute was to impose manda-
tory and jurisdictional time limits on the Board. 4
Justice Arabian agreed with the majority that the employee had the
right to seek judicial relief by writ in superior court when the Board
failed to comply with the statutory time limits.3" He asserted, however,
that as the time limits were mandatory the Board lost jurisdiction when
they expired.' Thus, the only remedy available to an employee who had
not waived the time limits was to seek relief in superior court. 7 Justice
Arabian did not address the constitutionality of the remedy.'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The court's interpretation of section 18671.1 has clarified the fact that
the time limits imposed by the statute are directory.39 Because of this
classification, the State Board retains jurisdiction over an employee's ap-
peal after the time limits have expired, and the Board may still render a
decision on the appeal." Furthermore, an employee has at least two
remedies when the Board fails to comply with statutory time limits."
The employee, by writ, may seek either to compel the Board to make a
decision or to initiate de novo review of the appeal in superior court."
If the Board hands down a decision while the case is on appeal, the em-
ployee may either withdraw the filed writs or wait for the ruling of the
superior court supplanting the decision of the Board.43
While Peace Officers has clarified several aspects of section 18671.1,
the court's use of an intent test may engender confusion. Under the in-
33. Id. at 1159, 899 P.2d at 96-98, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-12 (Arabian, J., dissent-
ing).
34. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1164-69, 899 P.2d at 98-102, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712-16 (Arabian, J., dis-
senting).
36. Id. at 1164-65, 899 P.2d at 99, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713-14 (Arabian, J., dissent-
ing).
37. Id. at 1165-66, 899 P.2d at 99-100, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713-14 (Arabian, J., dis-
senting). Justice Arabian agreed with the majority that if a qualified employee
chooses to seek a remedy in superior court, then the employee will bear the burden
of proof. Id. (Arabian, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1168, 899 P.2d at 101, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1138-39, 899 P.2d at 82-83, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696-97.
40. Id. at 1150, 899 P.2d at 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
41. Id. at 1138-39, 1:151, 899 P.2d at 82-83, 90, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 696-97, 704.
,42. Id.'
43. Id.
tent test, subsequent courts may struggle to interpret what type of duties
the Legislature intended to be mandatory. For example, the court found
that time limits are mandatory if the statute provides a penalty for failure
to comply with the limits 4 Yet the court neither considered the penalty
imposed by section 18671.1 to be the right type of penalty nor clearly de-
fined what type of penalty would qualify."
It remains to be seen how lower courts will interpret the decision. Yet
hopefully the confusion surrounding Peace Officers will prompt the legis-
lature to provide clear language in statutes to ensure that administrative
duties in statutes are mandatory.
WILLIAM ANTHONY BAIRD
44. Id. at 1145-48, 899 P.2d at 87-89, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701-03.
45. Id.
[Vol. 23: 245, 1996] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
III. COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Retroactive application of former Civil Code section
4800.2, which creates a presumption that a spouse has a
right to reimbursement for the separate property he or
she used to acquire community property, unconstitution-
ally deprives the other spouse of a vested property inter-
est without due process of law: In re Marriage of
Heikes.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Marriage of Heikes,' the California Supreme Court revisited
the issue of whether, upon division of community property, the reim-
bursement of a spouse's separate property contribution would deprive
the other spouse of a vested property interest without due process of
law.' Under former Civil Code section 4800.2, a spouse has a presumed
1. 10 Cal. 4th 1211, 899 P.2d 1349, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (1995). Justice Werdegar
authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian,
Baxter, George, Kennard, and Mosk joined. Id. at 1213-25, 899 P.2d at 1349-58, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-64.
2. Id. at 1214, 899 P.2d at 1350, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. Norman Heikes owned a
home and a vacant lot in California. Id. After marrying Rose H. Heikes, he conveyed
both properties to his wife and himself, thereby creating a joint tenancy. Id. The
parties made no agreements whereby the husband would retain a separate property
interest in the properties. Id. In 1990, the parties initiated a dissolution proceeding.
Id. The trial court found that both parcels were community property. Id. at 1214-15,
899 P.2d at 1350, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. Six days later, the California Supreme
Court decided In re Marriage of Hilke. Id. at 1215, 899 P.2d at 1350, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 156 (citing and discussing In re Marriage of Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th 215, 841 P.2d
891, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371 (1992)). In HUke, the court held that Civil Code § 4800.1,
which presumes that "property acquired [during the marriage] in joint tenancy is
community property," was applicable retroactively. Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th at 223, 841 P.2d
at 897, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377 (1992). Based on the argument that Hilke indicated a
new view on the constitutionality of retroactively applying Civil Code §§ 4800.1 and
4800.2, the husband successfully moved for a new trial. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1215,
899 P.2d at 1350-51, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57. The court of appeal affirmed the
new-trial order. Id. at 1215, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. The California
Supreme Court then granted the wife's petition to review the constitutionality of ret-
roactively applying §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2 of the California Civil Code. Id.
Former California Civil Code § 4800.1 provided:
For the purpose of division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint tenancy
form is presumed to be community property. This presumption . . . may be
right to reimbursement for the separate property that he or she contrib-
uted to the acquisition of community property a Only a written waiver of
the reimbursement right rebuts this presumption.' Prior to January 1,
1984' however, all contributions of separate property to the community
rebutted by either of the following:
(a) A clear statement in the deed ...
(b) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the prop
erty is separate property.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1995) (superseded by CAL. FAm. CODE § 258]
(West 1994)).
Former California Civil Code § 4800.1 was amended in 1986 to include "property
acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in ten-
ancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property."
CAL. FAm. CODE § 2581 (West 1994). As amended, former § 4800.1 was recodified with-
out change in California Family Code §§ 2580 and 2581. CAL FAM. CODE §§ 2580-2581
(West 1994). See generally 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community
Property §§ 189, 191 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (citing cases that analyze the pre-
sumption codified in § 4800.1); 11 id., Community Property, § 198 (examining the
problems resulting from retroactive application of § 4800.1); 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family
Law § 433 (1994) (discussing § 4800.1's presumption).
Former California Civil Code § 4800.2 provided:
In the division of community property under this part unless a party has
made a written waiver on the right to reimbursement or signed a writing that
has the effect of a waiver, the party shall be reimbursed for his or her con-
tributions to the acquisition of the property to the extent the party traces the
contributions to a separate property source ....
CAL CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1995) (recodified without substantive change as
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West 1994)). See generally 11 B.E. WrruN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAw, Community Property § 199 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (examining the
problems resulting from retroactive application of § 4800.2); 11 id., Community Proper-
ty, §§ 192, 194, 268 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (discussing spousal reimbursement
rights under § 4800.2); 32 CAL. JUR. 3D Family Law §§ 515, 534, 775 (1994) (analyzing
presumptions relating to spousal reimbursement rights for separate property contribu-
tions); Susan A. Channick, What's in a Name: A Critical Look at California's System
of Characterizing Marital Property, 26 CAL W. L REv. 1 (1989-90) (providing a prole-
gomenon of cases and statutes relating to marital property rights and presumptions);
Harlon S. Roman, The Division of Marital Property Before and After In re Marriage of
Buol and In re Marriage of Fabian, 16 Sw. U. L REV. 563 (1986) (examining cases that
interpret the constitutionality of retroactive application of §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2); Vir-
ginia V. Shue & Sarah S. Velman, California Civil Code §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2: Re-
view, Analysis, and Suggestions for Reform, 12 CoMMUNrrY PROP. J. 5 (1985) (exam-
ining potential problems arising from the application of §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2); Arthur
G. Woodward, Comment, The 1986 Amendments to California Civil Code Sections
4800.1 and 4800.2: Irreconcilable Differences Between the Legislature and the Court?,
20 PAc. L.J. 97 (1988) (tracing the background from which §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2 arose).
3. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1213, 899 P.2d at 1349, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155; CAL Crv.
CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1995) (recodified as CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West 1994)).
4. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1213, 899 P.2d at 1349, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155; CAL Civ.
CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1995) (recodified as CAL FAM. CODE § 2640 (West 1994)).
5. On January 1, 1984, Civil Code § 4800.2 became operative. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th
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were presumed gifts to the community absent a contrary agreement by
the parties.6
Accordingly, when the husband in Heikes conveyed separate property
to himself and his wife as joint tenants in 1976, the wife obtained a vest-
ed property interest, an interest that would be impaired by retroactive
application of the right to reimbursement provision of former Civil Code
section 4800.2.' The state's interest in fostering consistent and uniform
treatment of community property distribution is not sufficient to justify
retroactively applying the right to reimbursement.' Therefore, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court unanimously held that the imposition of the
husband's right of reimbursement for his separate property contribution
to community property acquired before January 1, 1984, would strip the
wife of a vested property interest without due process of law.9
II. TREATMENT
Because section 4800 of the California Civil Code applies only to the
division of community property, the California Supreme Court reviewed
the basis for classifying each of the parcels in question as community
property.'" In 1976, when the husband conveyed the vacant lot and
home to himself and his wife as joint tenants, single family residences
acquired by spouses in joint tenancy were presumed to be community
property for the purposes of dividing the property." This presumption
could be rebutted by an oral or written agreement to the contray.'2
at 1213, 899 P.2d at 1349-50, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-56.
6. Id. at 1213, 899 P.2d at 1349, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155 (citing In re Marriage of
Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980)).
7. Id. at 1222-23, 899 P.2d at 1356, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
8. Id. at 1223, 899 P.2d at 1356, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
9. Id. at 1225, 899 P.2d at 1358, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
10. Id. at 1215, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. California Civil Code
§ 4800.2 expressly provided for a spouse's reimbursement right in "division of com-
munity property." CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (recodified as
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West 1994)) (emphasis added). The continuation of § 4800.2
in California Family Code § 2640 substituted "community estate" for "community
property" in conformity with judicial interpretation of § 4800.2 to embrace quasi-com-
munity property as well. See CAi FAm. CODE § 2640(b) (West 1994); see, e.g., In re
Marriage of Craig, 219 Cal. App. 3d 683, 268 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying
§ 4800.2 to quasi-community property).
11. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1216, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157; In re
Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5110 (West 1983) (superseded by CAL. FAM. CODE § 803 (West 1994)).
12. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1216, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157; Lucas,
Section 4800.1 of the California Civil code, operative on January 1, 1984,
provided that this presumption could be rebutted only by a statement in
the deed or the parties' written agreement. 3 The court noted that there
existed no evidence to rebut this presumption in Heikes.14 Therefore,
the court concluded that the parties' home was properly classified as
community property."5
The court followed a similar analysis in considering whether the va-
cant lot was community property. Section 4800.1 expanded the scope of
property presumably considered divisible community property from sin-
gle family residences to include all property acquired in joint tenancy."
Thus, the presumption of section 4800.1, if applied retroactively, would
embrace the vacant lot. 7 The court distinguished the instant case from
Buol, where it held that retroactive application of the written evidence
provision of section 4800.1 unconstitutionally deprived the wife of a vest-
ed property interest without due process of law."8 The court found that
retroactive application in the instant case of the presumption created by
section 4800.1 would not impair any vested property interest of the hus-
band. 9 The court recognized that the property interest the husband held
as a joint tenant is the same property interest that he would hold under
community property while both spouses remained alive.2" The court rea-
soned that the husband's survivorship interest in the joint tenancy vests
upon the death of the other spouse.2' Therefore, the court held that the
trial court properly considered the vacant lot community property.'
27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980); former CAL CiV. CODE § 5110
(West 1983) (superseded by CAL. FAM. CODE § 803 (West 1994)).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1995) (recodified as CAL FAM. CODE
§ 2580 (West 1994)); Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1216, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 158.
14. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1217, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
15. Id.
16. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.1 (West Supp. 1995) (recodified as CAL FAM. CODE
§ 2580 (West 1994)); Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1217, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 158.
17. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1217, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
18. Id. at 1216-17, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (citing and discussing
In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985)).
19. Id. at 1217, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158.
20. Id.
21. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Hilke, 4 Cal. 4th 215, 222, 841 P.2d 891, 896, 14
Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 376 (1992)). For an analysis of In re Marriage of Hilke, see Mi-
chael E. Murphy, California Supreme Court Survey, 22 PEPP. L REV. 269 (1994).
22. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1218, 899 P.2d at 1352, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158. Because
the husband's complaint sought reimbursement under § 4800.2, which applies only to
divisions of community property, presumably the husband agreed with the court's
characterization of the parcels as community property. Id. at 1218, 899 P.2d at 1352-
53, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158-59.
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The supreme court next examined whether retroactively enforcing
section 4800.2, which reimburses a spouse who contributes separate
property to the acquisition of community property, would impair the
non-contributing spouse's vested property interest without due process
of law.' The court noted that the Legislature expressly intended sec-
tions 4800.1 and 4800.2 to apply in all "proceedings as to the division of
property [that] are not yet final on January 1, 1984. "24 Nevertheless, in
Fabian, the supreme court unanimously concluded that "retroactive
application of section 4800.2 to cases pending on January 1, 1984, im-
pairs vested property interests without due process of law."25 The su-
preme court recognized that prior to January 1, 1984, any contributions
of separate property to the community were considered gifts.26 There-
fore, property rights in the donated property vested in each spouse upon
conveyance of the property in joint tenancy.27 Thus, granting the hus-
band a right to reimbursement in property given to the community, when
no such right existed at the time the property was conveyed, would im-
pair the wife's vested interest in the property."
In considering whether retroactive application of section 4800.2 would
violate due process by impairing a spouse's vested property interest, the
California Supreme Court balanced the state interest and the importance
of applying section 4800.2 retroactively to further that interest, on one
hand, and "reliance considerations" on the other.' The court relied
heavily on its unanimous decision in Fabian, which utilized the same
factors to conclude that retroactive application of section 4800.2 would
strip the wife of a vested property interest without due process of law.'
The court again concluded that each of these factors disfavored retroac-
23. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1218, 899 P.2d at 1353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159.
24. Id. at 1218, 899 P.2d at 1353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (citation omitted).
25. Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 451, 715 P.2d 255, 260,
224 Cal. Rptr. 333, 340 (1986)).
26. Id. at 1218, 899 P.2d at 1353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (quoting Fabian, 41 Cal.
3d at 446, 715 P.2d at 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 336); accord In re Marriage of Lucas, 27
Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
27. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1218, 1223 n.9, 899 P.2d at 1353, 1356 n.9, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 159, 162 n.9.
28. Id. at 1218, 899 P.2d at 1353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159; see Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d
at 446, 715 P.2d at 256, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
29. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1219, 1223, 899 P.2d at 1353, 1356, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
159, 162 (citing In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 427 (1976)).
30. Id. at 1219, 899 P.2d at 1353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (citing Fabian, 41 Cal.
3d at 449, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338).
tive application of the presumptive right to reimbursement codified in
section 4800.2.'
The state's interest represented the first prong of the court's due pro-
cess analysis.32 In Fabian, the court found that the Legislature's policy
of providing consistent and uniform treatment of community property
distribution is an insufficient state interest to justify retroactive appli-
cation of section 4800.2.' The Fabian court; noted that a written or oral
agreement, had the parties so desired, would have been sufficient for the
husband to preserve his interest in the separate property contributed to
the community.' The Heikes court adopted the reasoning from Fabian
and concluded that the status of the law was not patently unfair prior to
the passing of section 4800.2." Therefore, the court found that retroac-
tively applying section 4800.2's presumptive right of reimbursement was
not necessary to further the state's interest.36
"Reliance considerations" represented the second prong of the court's
due process analysis.37 Specifically, the California Supreme Court exam-
ined the extent and legitimacy of reliance on the former status of the law
and the disruptive effect that would flow from retroactive application of
section 4800.2.8 The court recognized that it was clearly legitimate for
the parties to assume, prior to the enactment of section 4800.2, that the
husband's conveyance of property to the community was a gift. 9 After
January 1, 1984, the wife theoretically could have obtained the husband's
written waiver of his right to reimbursement, which section 4800.2 creat-
ed.4" However, the unlikelihood that the wife would successfully extract
such a waiver made this argument an insubstantial factor in the court's
analysis." The court weighed more heavily the policy promoting unifor-
mity and predictability in the application of community property princi-
31. Id. at 1219-25, 899 P.2d at 1353-58, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159-64; see infra notes
33-45 and accompanying text.
32. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1219, 1223, 899 P.2d at 1353, 1356, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
159, 162.
33. Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 449, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
34. Id.
35. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1219, 1223, 899 P.2d at 1353, 1356, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
159, 162 (citing Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 449, 715 P.2d at 258, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338).
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 449-50, 715 P.2d at 258-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at
338-39).
38. Id. at 1219, 1223, 899 P.2d at 1353-54, 1356, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159-60 (citing
Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d at 449-50, 715 P.2d at 258-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39).
39. Id. at 1223-24, 899 P.2d at 1357, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163 (citing Fabian, 41 Cal.
3d at 449-50, 715 P.2d at 258-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39).
40. Id. at 1224, 899 P.2d at 1357, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at, 163.
41. Id. at 1214, 1224, 899 P.2d at 1350, 1357, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156, 163.
[Vol. 23: 245, 1996] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
ples over the parties' actual reliance on the prior state of the law." The
court reiterated that "[ilt is difficult to imagine greater disruption than
retroactive application of an about-face in the law, which directly alters
substantial property rights, to parties who are completely incapable of
complying with the dictates of the new law."43 Therefore, the supreme
court held that retroactively imposing a spouse's right to reimbursement
of separate property used to acquire community property prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1984 would unconstitutionally deprive the other spouse of a vested
property interest without due process of law.'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Classification of property interests in community assets upon dissolu-
tion of the community has been fertile territory for disagreement and
dispute." Heikes is the most recent judicial statement in the dialogue
regarding separate property interests in community property.
Before 1965, ownership interests stated in the deed were presumed to
control the classification of the parties' property rights.4" Evidence, in-
cluding oral agreements, that the parties understood or otherwise agreed
to a different title than was expressed in the deed, could rebut the pre-
sumption.47 In 1965, the Legislature amended the statutory scheme to
provide that a single family residence acquired in joint tenancy by a hus-
band and wife during marriage was presumed to be community property
for purposes of property division.48 Through the Family Law Act of
1969, the legislature recodified this presumption in section 5110 of the
Civil Code.49
42. Id. at 1224-25, 899 P.2d at 1357-58, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-64.
43. Id. at 1224, 899 P.2d at 1357, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163 (quoting Fabian, 41 Cal.
3d at 450, 715 P.2d at 259, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 339).
44. Id. at 1225, 899 P.2d at 1358, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
45. See Arthur G. Woodward, Comment, The 1986 Amendments to California Civil
Code Sections 4800.1 and 4800.2: Irreconcilable Differences Between the Legislature
and the Court?, 20 PAc. UJ. 97 (1988) (tracing the background from which §§ 4800.1
and 4800.2 arose).
46. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1215, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (quoting
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 813, 614 P.2d 285, 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853,
856 (1980)).
47. Id.; Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d at 813, 614 P.2d at 287, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
48. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1216, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (citing
1965 Cal. Stat. 1710).
49. Id. (citing 1969 Cal. Stat. 1608).
In 1980, the California Supreme Court decided Lucas which held that
all separate property contributions were presumed gifts and that a con-
trary agreement by the parties could rebut this presumption.'
In response to Lucas, the Legislature enacted Civil Code sections
4800.1 and 4800.2 in 1983.' Section 4800.1. expanded the presumption
that a single family residence that the spouses acquire during marriage in
joint tenancy is community property for purposes of property division. 2
Specifically, section 4800.1 made the presumption applicable to all prop-
erty acquired during the marriage in joint tenancy.' In addition, section
4800.1 provided that only a contrary statement in the deed or a written
agreement of the parties could rebut this presumption.'
In 1985 and 1986, the California Supreme Court unanimously conclud-
ed, in two separate decisions, that retroactive application of sections
4800.1 and 4800.2 was unconstitutional.'
Less than a month after the court's pronouncement in Fabian, the
Governor issued emergency legislation purporting to make sections
4800.1 and 4800.2 applicable to all proceedings not yet final on January 1,
1984, regardless of when the community acquired the property.'
The unanimous opinion in Heikes once again established that the Su-
preme Court of California is unwilling to apply these statutes retroac-
tively, despite the fact that the Legislature labeled the state interests
"compelling." As a result, January 1, 1984 becomes a pivotal date. Courts
presume that community property acquired in joint tenancy before Janu-
ary 1, 1984 and traceable to separate property is a gift. Oral or written
evidence of a contrary agreement by the spouses can rebut this presump-
tion. In contrast, courts presume that community property acquired in
50. Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815-16, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857-58
(1980).
51. Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1216, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (citing
1983 Cal: Stat. 1539); CAL CIV. CODE §§ 4800.1, 480,0.2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (su-
perseded by CAL. FAM. CODE § 2581 (West 1994)).
52. See Heikes, 10 Cal. 4th at 1216, 899 P.2d at 1351, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995) (superseded by CAL FAM.
CODE § 2581 (West 1994)).
54. Id.
55. In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 7(3-64, 705 P.2d 354, 362, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 31, 39 (1985) (holding that retroactive application of § 4800.1 is unconstitution-
al); In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 451, 715 P.2d 253, 260, 224 Cal. Rptr.
333, 340 (1986) (holding that retroactive application of § 4800.2 is unconstitutional).
56. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2580(c) (West 1994) (formerly CAL Civ. CODE §
4800.1(a)(3)).
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joint tenancy after January 1, 1984 and traceable to separate property is
subject to the right of reimbursement absent a written agreement to the
contrary.
KIRK ALAN WALTON
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Damages to property caused by police officers while
enforcing criminal laws must be recovered under
the Tort Claims Act rather than inverse condemna-
tion: Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento,' the California Supreme Court
considered whether an inverse condemnation action could be brought
against governmental entities whose police officers severely damaged pri-
vate property in the course of enforcing criminal laws.2 The superior
1. 10 Cal. 4th 368, 895 P.2d 900, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 920 (1996). Justice George delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief
Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard and Werdegar joined. Id. at 370-93, 895 P.2d at
901-17, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660-75. Justice Kennard also filed a separate concurring
opinion. Id. at 393-404, 895 P.2d at 917-24, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675-82 (Kennard, J.,
concurring). Justice Baxter wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Mosk and
Arabian joined. Id. at 404-23, 895 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924-36, 41 Cal. Rpti. 2d at 682-95
(Baxter, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 371, 895 P.2d at 901, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660. On June 22, 1987, under-
cover police officers followed Christopher Nash and his girlfriend in their stolen auto-
mobile into a convenience store parking lot. Id. at 372, 895 P.2d at 902, 41 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 660. The officers knew that Nash, who had warrants for a series of armed
robberies, "always" carried a semiautomatic pistol, and that he preferred to "shoot it
out with police officers" rather than be apprehended. Id. Without informing the dis-
patcher that their pursuit was covert, the officers requested assistance. Id. Soon
thereafter, four street-clothed officers driving unmarked vehicles joined the original
officers in the parking lot. Two marked vehicles-one with its emergency lights flash-
ing-entered the parking lot in response to the assistance request. Id. at 372, 895
P.2d at 902, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661. Nash tried to escape through a rear exit, but
retreated into the store when he realized the building was surrounded. Id. The store
was vacated, and Nash's girlfriend confirmed that only Nash remained inside. Id. at
373, 895 P.2d at 902, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661. She informed the officers that there
were two firearms in the vehicle, but assured the police that Nash was not armed.
Id. The officers seized a handgun and a shotgun from the stolen vehicle. Id. After
police evacuated the vicinity, paramedics, the fire department, additional police, and a
SWAT team were summoned. Id. at 373, 895 P.2d at 903, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 661.
Three hours after Nash entered the store and after numerous attempts to persuade
him to surrender had failed, gas masks were distributed and the store's utilities were
shut off. Id. The officers then fired 12 or 13 canisters of tear gas into the store over
a course of 30 minutes, and mace was sprayed into its ventilation system. Id. at 375,
895 P.2d at 904, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 662. Nearly five hours after he was first ordered
to leave the building, Nash was discovered "burrowed under insulation" and "unable
to offer resistance." Id. The convenience store sustained approximately $275,000 in
damages, including $90,000 in contaminated inventory and $18,000 in building repairs.
Id. It cost nearly $150,000 to dispose of the hazardous byproduct from the tear gas.
Id.
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court had granted each of the governments' motions for summary
judgment and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.' Because Cus-
tomer expressly waived its right to relief under the Tort Claims Act' and
did not base its claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,6 the California Supreme Court granted
review to consider its claim solely under the "just compensation" clause
of the California Constitution.' In a 4-3 decision, the court held that re-
Customer Co. (Customer) sued the City of Sacramento and Sacramento County
alleging negligence and inverse condemnation. Id. at 371, 895 P.2d at 901-02, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 659.
3. Id. at 371-72, 895 P.2d at 902, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660. The superior court
granted the governments' motions for summary judgment on the negligence claim on
grounds of immunity pursuant to Government Code § 820. Id. at 371, 895 P.2d at
902, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660. The court granted the governments' motion for summary
judgment with respect to the inverse condemnation claim on the ground that the
officers' actions were legitimate exercises of the sovereign's police power. Id. at 371-
72, 895 P.2d at 902, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660.
4. Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154 (1993), affd, 10 Cal.
4th 368, 895 P.2d 900, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920
(1996).
5. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 372, 895 P.2d at 901, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660. In
its supplemental brief, Customer stated that it had already expended $360,000 in
attorneys' fees, and it was not willing to incur further costs to litigate another claim.
Id. at 392, 895 P.2d at 915, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674. Furthermore, Customer acknowl-
edged that it would not be awarded attorneys' fees under the Tort Claims Act even
if it were to prevail. Id.; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810, et seq. (West 1989 & Supp.
1995) (stating provisions of the Tort Claims Act); see also infra notes 27-33 and ac-
companying text (comparing remedies available under the Tort Claims Act and under
an inverse condemnation claim).
6. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 376 n.2, 895 P.2d at 905 n.2, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
663 n.2. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part, "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (enumerating the "rough proportionality" prong to
the test for unconstitutional conditions in a takings context); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020-31 (1992) (holding that a prohibition on home
construction on beachfront property constituted a per se taking, and reviewing the
Court's history regarding realty and the police power of government); Nollan v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that conditioning a building
permit upon the conveyance of a beach easement constitutes a taking). See generally
Chauncey L. Walker & Scott D. Avitabile, Symposium, Regulatory Takings, Historic
Preservation and Property Rights Since Penn Central: The Move Toward Greater
Protection, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL L.J. 819 (1995) (charting the Court's recent approach
that is more protective of property ownership rights); Paul F. Haffner, Note, Regulato-
ry Takings-A New Categorical Rule: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 61 U.
CIN. L REV. 1035 (199:3).
7. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 372, 895 P.2d at 902, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660.
covery under inverse condemnation principles was improper,8 that the
city's actions fell within the emergency exception to the just compensa-
tion clause even if an inverse condemnation action could be brought,"
and that public entities could only be held liable in a negligence action
filed pursuant to the Tort Claims Act.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court examined whether public entities could be held liable under
an inverse condemnation theory when their employees caused substantial
damage to commercial property while enforcing criminal laws." The
court was split over whether this question was one of first impression in
California. 2 In its opinion, the majority determined that Customer could
not prevail on an inverse condemnation claim and reasoned that the Tort
Claims Act would be a more appropriate remedy.'3
Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution states:
Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or
into court for, the owner. The Legislature may provide for possession by the
condemnor following commencement of eminent domain proceedings upon
deposit in court and prompt release to the owner of money determined by
the court to be the probable amount of just compensation.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. See generally Sharon L. Browne, California Practicum, Admin-
istrative Mandamus as a Prerequisite to Inverse Condemnation: "Healing" California's
Confused Takings Law, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 99 (1994) (tracing California's application of
takings clause principles); 8 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMA1Y OF CAIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law § 918 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing eminent domain generally); 29 CAL.
JUR. 3D Eminent Domain § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (discussing same).
8. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 376-83, 895 P.2d at 905-09, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
663-68; see infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (explaining inverse condemnation
claim).
9. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 383-89, 895 P.2d at 909-14, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
668-72; see infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text (discussing emergency exception
to the just compensation clause).
10. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 389-93, 895 P.2d at 914-16, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
672-75; see infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (discussing Tort Claims Act).
11. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 371, 895 P.2d at 901, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 660.
12. Compare id. at 383 n.7, 895 P.2d 909 n.7, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667 n.7 ("[Our]
authorities make it clear that [the just compensation clause] has been interpreted,
consistently and repeatedly over the past century, not to apply to property damage
caused by [this] type of governmental activity.") with id. at 406, 895 P.2d at 925, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (question presented "is [one] of first im-
pression in this state and unsettled elsewhere," because "decisions from other juris-
dictions contain no consistent reasoning or result").
13. Id. at 375-93, 895 P.2d at 904-17, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663-75.
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1. Propriety of an Inverse Condemnation Claim
Writing for the majority, Justice George began by stating that the just
compensation clause exists to guarantee prompt compensation to prop-
erty owners when the government exercises its power under eminent
domain. 4 Although the court acknowledged that the just compensation
clause had been broadly construed in the past, it emphasized that the
language of the clause had never been stretched to require the govern-
ment to compensate private owners when its employees damaged prop-
erty while engaged in law enforcement. 5 The court criticized
Customer's literal reading of the just compensation clause as being "over-
ly simplistic"" and declared that Customer's construction "'pressed [the
clause] to its grammatical extreme.'"'7 The court reasoned that the
clause had never been extended to encompass personal injuries because
tort law was traditionally and consistently regulated by the legislature.'
The court ruled that the phrase "or damaged" in the just compensation
clause was added to emphasize that physical invasion of property was
not required if damage was caused by the construction of public im-
provements. 9 Additionally, the phrase was not intended to extend gov-
14. Id. at 376-77, 895 P.2d at 905, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663. "'Eminent domain is the
right of the people or government to take private property for public use.'" Id. at 377
n.3, 895 P.2d at 905 n.3, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 n.3 (quoting 8 B.E. WrrmN, SUMMARY
OF CAuFORNA LAW, Constitutioal Law § 918 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995)). The
majority noted that eminent domain and inverse condemnation share the same sub-
stantive principles, but that their names differ depending upon who brings the action.
Id. at 377 nn.3-4, 895 P.2d at 905 nn.3-4, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 663 nn.3-4 (stating that
eminent domain is brought by the state or on behalf of the people; inverse condem-
nation is brought by property owners after a "taking" by the government).
15. Id. at 377-78, 895 P.2d at 905-06, 41 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 663-64.
16. Id. at 378, 895 P.2d at 906, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664. Customer contended that
their property was "damaged for public use" and that their claim fell within the pa-
rameters of the just compensation clause. Id.
17. Id. (quoting Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes,
J., dissenting)).
18. Id. The majority added that the clause had only been extended to encompass
takings of property for public use or damage to private property when constructing
public works. Id.
19. Id. at 379, 895 P.2d at 906-07, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665 (citing 2 & 2A NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN, §§ 6.22-.26 (3d ed. 1990) (reviewing origin of "or damaged"
clauses in various state constitutional provisions)). See Reardon v. San Francisco, 66
Cal. 492, 501, 6 P. 317, 323 (1885) (finding liability where sewer construction de-
stroyed the foundation of private property and reasoning "[ijf the word 'damaged'
only embraced physical invasions of property, the right secured by this word would
add nothing to the guaranty as it formerly stood.").
ernmental liability beyond the narrow parameters of eminent domain."
The majority held that the damage caused by police to Customer's store
was not related to any kind of "public improvement" or "public work"
and that it could be more properly compensable under traditional tort
theories.2'
2. The "Emergency Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause
Assuming that the "or damaged" phrase permitted Customer to recover
under a claim of inverse condemnation, the court stated that actions by
law enforcement agents while enforcing criminal laws fell within the
"emergency exception" to the just compensation clause. 2 The majority
stated that the threshold query in every case is whether the acts giving
rise to a claim were undertaken within the "legitimate purview and scope
of the police power. "' If the exercise of police power is legitimate, then
20. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 379, 895 P.2d at 906, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665. The
majority cited several cases to support its ruling that inverse condemnation actions
are improper under the "or damaged" phrase of the just compensation clause unless
the damage is somehow caused by the construction of a public improvement. Id. at
380-83, 895 P.2d at 907-09, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 665-67. See Albers v. County of Los
Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965) (stating principle);
Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) (holding that damages
suffered by property owners caused by floods from public drainage system could not
be recovered under inverse condemnation claim); Miller v. City of Palo Alto, 208 Cal.
74, 280 P. 108 (1929) (holding that city's negligent destruction of property during
garbage incineration did not constitute a taking for public use); Gray v. Reclamation
Dist. No. 1500, 174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917) (stating that damages resulting from
the state's legitimate exercise of its police power does not give rise to a cause of
action for inverse condemnation); Brown v. San Francisco Bd. of Supervisors, 124
Cal. 274, 57 P. 82 (1899) (finding no liability when property value diminished by
changes made to city street).
21. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 383, 895 P.2d at 909, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 667.
22. Id. at 383, 895 P.2d at 909, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 668. For more discussion about
the police power defense to inverse condemnation recovery in California, see general-
ly 8 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 950 (9th ed.
1988) (discussing exercise of police power); 29 CAL. JuR. 3D Eminent Domain § 325
(1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing same). For a general discussion of the police power
defense to inverse condemnation, see Scott R. Ferguson, Note, The Evolution of the
"Nuisance Exception" to the Just Compensation Clause: From Myth to Reality, 45
HASTINGS LJ. 1539 (1994) (criticizing the categorical application of the nuisance ex-
ception and suggesting a balancing approach); see also 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Do-
main §-41 (1966 & Supp. 1993); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 8 (1992 & Supp.
1995). For a distinction between the police power and other powers of government,
see 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 10 (1966 & Supp. 1995).
23. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 383, 895 P.2d at 910, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 668
(quoting Gray, 174 Cal. at 639, 163 P. at 1031). '[Me court listed numerous examples
of acts undertaken within this legitimate purview, including the demolition of
buildings to prevent the spread of a fire and the destruction of vegetation or live-
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the particular loss in each case becomes irrelevant because the owner
would suffer a damage without injury. The majority reasoned that per-
mitting Customer to recover on a constitutional claim would have. the
future effect of discouraging police officers "from acting swiftly and
effectively to protect public safety in emergency situations."" The court
concluded its "emergency exception" analysis by declining to follow
"poorly reasoned and internally inconsistent" decisions from other juris-
dictions."
stock to protect the public welfare. Id. (quoting Gray, 174 Cal. at 638-39, 163 P. at
1031).
24. Id. (quoting Gray, 174 Cal. at 638-39, 163 P. at 1031). "[T]he injury inflicted
[by government in the legitimate exercise of its police power] is without damage, and
the damage without injury.... The right of the owner of the property, who has
sustained such damage, must yield to the promotion and advancement of the public
good." Id. at 381 n.6, 895 P.2d at 908 n.6, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 666 n.6 (quoting
Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 504, 6 P. 317, 325 (1885)).
. The majority discussed numerous cases stating the proposition that the rights of
private owners were deemed subservient to the public's rights during emergencies. Id.
at 384, 895 P.2d at 910, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 668. See United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344
U.S. 149 (1952) (holding that there was no taking when an offshore oil facility was
blown up prior to invasion of the Philippine Islands because it deprived the Japanese
of a valuable weapon); United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227 (1887) (holding that
there was no taking where bridges were destroyed by Union soldiers during Civil
War because the destruction prevented a Confederate advance); Holtz v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 415 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970) (stating the proposition
but holding that subway evacuLtion is not an emergency); House v. Los Angeles
County Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 391, 153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944) ("[Plrivate
interests must be held wholly subservient to the right of the state to proceed in such
manner as it deems appropriate for the protection of the public health or safety.").
25. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 384-85, 895 P.2d at 910-11, 41 Cal.. Rptr. 2d at
669. The majority failed to explain why recovery under the Tort Claims Act would
not have a similar inhibiting effect on the police. Id. at 391, 895 P.2d at 915, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 673.
26. Id. at 388, 895 P.2d at 912-13, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 671. Customer 'relied on
Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (finding liability un-
der an inverse condemnation analysis when police caused $71,000 in damages by
firing tear gas and "flashbang" grenades into plaintiffs home) and Steele v. City of
Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980) (finding liability when police set fire to
plaintiffs home in order to flush out escaped prisoners who sought refuge there).
The majority criticized these cases because Wegner relied heavily upon Steele, which
in turn cited no authority other than a bare reading of Texas' just compensation
clause, and which made inconsistent findings regarding the emergency exception.
Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 386-88, 895 P.2d at 912-13, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 670-71.
3. Remedial Anomalies and California's Tort Claims Act
While the majority recognized that innocent individuals should be com-
pensated for injury inflicted by the government, it emphasized that in-
verse condemnation was "not designed for such a purpose."27 The ma-
jority emphasized that the remedies available under inverse condemna-
tion actions are "unusually generous" in many respects.28 Unlike provi-
sions of the Tort Claims Act, prevailing plaintiffs are statutorily entitled
to attorneys' fees, appraisal fees, engineering costs, and prejudgment in-
terest which accrues from the time of injury." The majority reasoned
that an inverse condemnation action would result not only in the proper-
ty owner being able to "trump" governmental immunity provisions in the
Tort Claims Act,' but also could result in monetary awards far greater
than the original property damage.3 Because the Tort Claims Act served
27. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 389, 895 P.2d at 913, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672.
Specifically, the court expressed its inability to justify Customer's approach because
the result would be that people injured by law enforcement would have no constitu-
tional remedy while property would gain full protection. Id. at 389, 895 P.2d at 914,
41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672. At oral argument, Customer conceded that if one of the
store's employees had sustained injury by tear gas, he or she could not recover un-
der inverse condemnation principles. Id.
28. Id. at 390, 895 P.2d at 914, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672.
29. Id. at 390, 895 P.2d at 914, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2:d at 672-73. Civil Procedure Code
§ 1036 states:
[Iln any inverse condemnation proceeding brought for the taldng of any inter-
est in real property, the court rendering judgment for the plaintiff by award-
ing compensation for such taking, or the attorney representing the public
entity who effects a settlement of such proceeding, shall determine and
award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement,
such sum as will, in the opinion of the court or such attorney, reimburse
such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including
reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because
of such proceeding.
CAL. CIV. PROC. -CODE § 1036 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996). "[Ilnterest must be computed
from the date the taling or damaging was sustained in order to fulfill the constitution-
al mandate for just compensation." Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
Dist., 17 Cal. 3d 648, 657, 552 P.2d 430, 437, 131 Cal. Rptr. 646, 653 (1976).
30. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 391, 895 P.2d at 915, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673-74.
The majority suggested that the government's conduct might have been protected
under Government Code § 820.2 as well. Id. at 392, 895 P.2d at 915, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 674. However, because Customer did not contest the lower courts' findings that
the police officers were immune under the Act, and because Customer expressly
waived its right to recovery under the Act in its supplemental brief, the supreme
court did not decide whether the officers were actually protected by sovereign immu-
nity. Id. at 391-93, 895 P.2d at 915-16, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674.
31. Id. at 391, 895 P.2d at 915, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673. The court pointed out that
Customer's $360,000 in attorneys' fees and $185,784 in prejudgment interest "far
eclipse[d]" their actual damages of $275,000. Id.
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as a more appropriate means to a remedy, the California Supreme Court
found the superior court's grant of summary judgment was proper and
affirmed the court of appeal. 2
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
In her concurrence, Justice Kennard stated that even though the ma-
jority showed that the words "taken or damaged" have never encom-
passed property destroyed by police activities,' the majority merely
added confusion to "a field of doctrinal incoherence littered with differ-
ing and inconsistent rationales." ' She questioned why the court focused
on the words "take" and "damage" instead of "use"' and opined that the
majority obscured what should have been a clear case' by neglecting
one of the clause's fundamental requirements." Citing several cases re-
ferred to by the majority, Justice Kennard illustrated that the government
did not "use" Customer's property within the meaning of the just com-
pensation clause because the destroyed property was not put to any
"utility or advantage."' She concluded by emphasizing that the Tort
32. Id. at 393, 895 P.2d at 916-17, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675.
33. Id. at 394, 895 P.2d at 917, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675 (Kennard, J., concurring).
34. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring) (citing Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077
(1993) ("[Only the right of privacy can compete seriously with takings law for the
doctrine-in-most-need-of-a-principle prize.")).
35. Id. at 396, 895 P.2d at 918, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676 (Kennard, J., concurring).
36. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 396, 895 P.2d at 918, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676-77 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring). Justice Kennard explained that the majority's reading of the just compensation
clause rendered it a "facially open-ended right to compensation for any government
action that affects the value or use of private property" while her construction con-
stituted a "self-limiting constitutional provision." Id. at 399-400, 895 P.2d at 921, 41
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679 (Kennard, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 397-98, 895 P.2d at 919, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677-78 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Miller v. City of Palo Alto, 208 Cal. 74, 77, 280 P. 108, 109 (1929)).
Justice Kennard reasoned that Customer's windows, doors, ceiling, and inventory were
not "used" by the government because the police "did not exploit any productive
attribute or capacity of the property that they damaged or destroyed." Id. at 398, 895
P.2d at 920, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678 (Kennard, J., concurring); see United States v.
Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (holding that offshore oil facility destroyed prior to
Japanese invasion of Philippine Islands was not a taking because it was not appropri-
ated for subsequent use); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (stating that destruc-
tion of cedar trees which were spreading disease to nearby apple orchards did not
constitute a taking because state did not put trees to any use); Mi/ler, 208 Cal. at 77,
280 P. at 109 (1929) (ruling that city's negligent destruction of home during garbage
incineration did not constitute a taldng because home was not put to any "utility or
Claims Act is not the only means of recovering property damages from
the government.3
C. Justice Baxter's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Baxter stated that both the plain language and
the public purpose of article I, section 19 mandated just compensation to
Customer.4" Justice Baxter criticized the majority for parroting "tru-
ism[s]" instead of applying constitutional principles to novel questions of
law.4 He found no support in any of the majority's cited cases for the
.outmoded view" that the just compensation clause compensated only
damages that resulted from public improvements.42 Justice Baxter rea-
soned that the clause should be guided by fairness to landowners who
advantage").
39. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 402, 895 P.2d at 922-23, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681
(Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Kennard explained that federal civil rights statutes
provided a statutory remedy for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the [United States] Constitution." Id, (Kennard, J., concurring) (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 & Supp. 1995)). Justice Kennard reasoned that police
activities that unreasonably damage or destroy property could constitute a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 403, 895 P.2d at 923, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 681-82
(Kennard, J., concurring); see Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, (1992) (holding. that
mobile home owner may bring a § 1983 claim when home was damaged in the pro-
cess of towing because it had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment). Justice Kennard also pointed out that attorneys' fees would be awarded
to the prevailing party under such a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Customer
Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 402 n.5, 895 P.2d at 922 n.5, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681 n.5 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
40. Id. at 406-17, 895 P.2d at 924-32, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682-91 (Baxter, J., dis-
senting).
41. Id. at 407, 895 P.2d at 926, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
While he recognized that the just compensation clause "obviously appl[ied] to
'traditional' exercises of eminent domain," Justice Baxter stated that nothing prevent-
ed a reading of the clause which would compensate property owners who suffered
nontraditional losses. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 408, 895 P.2d at 926, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684-85 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Justice Baxter stated that the plain language of the words "take," "damage," and
.public use" should apply without regard to the government's purpose or the author-
ity the government uses to justify its actions. Id. at 406, 895 P.2d at 925, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 684 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
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are forced to shoulder public hardships43 and not by the "arbitrary cat-
egories and labels" employed by the majority.".
Justice Baxter criticized Justice Kennard's concurrence for relying on
"[i]solated snippets of caselaw" to determine that the police officers'
actions did not constitute a public use of Customer's property." Justice
Baxter referred to several cases to support his conclusion that property
is taken for public use whenever it is damaged as a "consequence of
deliberate government action in furtherance of public purposes."4"
Justice Baxter also assailed the majority's application of the "emer-
gency exception."47 He concluded that it was illogical for the govern-
ment to escape liability on a necessity rationale when the very emergen-
cy acted upon was the "direct result of the time, place, and manner in
43. Id. at 409, 895 P.2d at 927, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685 (Baxter, J., dissenting). The
just compensation clause should prevent "[giovernment from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole." Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting) (quoting First Lutheran Church v.
Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987)); see Daniel R. Mandelker, Inverse
Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L REV.
3 (1966) (discussing the socialization-of-loss objective of inverse condemnation pro-
ceedings).
44. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 408, 895 P.2d at 926, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 685
(Baxter, J., dissenting). Justice Baxter explained that, unlike the majority, the United
States Supreme Court has avoided delineated rules to determine when government ac-
tion constitutes a taking. Id. at 410, 895 P.2d at 928, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686 (Baxter,
J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).
45. Id. at 415 n.7, 895 P.2d at 931 n.7, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689 n.7 (Baxter, J.,
dissenting).
46. Id. (Baxter, J., dissenting). See Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 7 Cal. 4th 327, 867
P.2d 724, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1994) (holding that land flooded by public improve-
ments entitled landowner to compensation); Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296,
475 P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970) (holding that property undermined by excava-
tion for public transportation was actionable under inverse condemnation); Albers v.
County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965) (holding
county liable under inverse condemnation for landslide caused by road construction);
Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) (permitting inverse
condemnation action for property flooded by public drainage system); Rose v. City of
Coalinga, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1627, 236 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1987) (holding city responsible
under inverse condemnation for demolishing an unsafe building for public safety rea-
sons absent an emergency).
Justice Baxter reasoned that when police tactics result in physical invasion or
damage to land, a public use logically occurs because damage is being inflicted on
behalf of the public's well-being. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 414-15, 895 P.2d at
931, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at, 689 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
47. Id. 10 Cal. 4th at 404, 895 F'.2d at 924, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682.
which [the police] themselves decided to achieve the capture of a public
enemy."'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
In the wake of a "tear gas barrage"49 lies a decision that leaves both
private and commercial California landowners guessing as to how thick
or how thin their bundle of property rights remains.5 ° While the United
States Supreme Court has gone to great lengths in order to protect indi-
vidual landowners in recent years,5 Customer Co. likely keeps Califor-
nia a leader among those states that are "most hostile to private owner-
ship rights."5" To be sure, the court's decision limits the possible theo-
ries of recovery for landowners whose property is damaged by the negli-
gence of police officers or other public employees acting on behalf of the
public welfare.' The court's decision will likely .have no inhibitive effect
upon the conduct of police officers or the means by which they choose
to enforce the law on private land.' Although the court addressed the
question whether police officers who destroy property while enforcing
48. Id. at 421, 895 P.2d at 935, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Justice Baxter stated that each of the emergencies in the cases cited by the majority
were distinguishable from Customer's because the existence of the emergency was
.external" rather than one "of the government's own making." Id. at 421, 895 P.2d at
935, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 693 (Baxter, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). "[Wihen [the
police power] passes beyond proper bounds in its invasion of property rights, it in
effect comes within the purview of the law of eminent domain and its exercise
requires compensation." Id. at 411 n.3, 895 P.2d at 928 n.3, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 686 n.3
(Baxter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting House v. Los Angeles County
Flood Control Dist., 25 Cal. 2d 384, 388, 153 P.2d 950, 952 (1944)).
49. Id. at 405, 895 P.2d at 924, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
50. As Justice Kennard observed, the majority did a better job confusing the prin-
ciples of inverse condemnation than clarifying them. Id. at 394, 895 P.2d at 917, 4]
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675 (Kennard, J., concurring).
51. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482
U.S. 304 (1987), the High Court reversed decisions by the California Supreme Court
regarding the rights of landowners.
52. Browne, supra note 7, at 101 n.15 (citing work labeling California as the "'near
unanimous' choice of land use specialists as the state least likely to protect owners
constitutional rights"); see also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 8
Cal. 4th 361, 878 P.2d 1275, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63 (1994) (holding condominium
association's restriction against pets enforceable against individual condominium own-
er); Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23
PEPP. L REV. 1 (1995) (criticizing the court's decision in Nahrstedt and proposing
legislation to protect the rights of homeowners).
53. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 389-93, 895 P.2d at 914-16, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
672-75; see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
54. See Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 385, 895 P.2d at 911, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 669.
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the law are protected by statutory immunity, it did not decide the is-
sue or provide substantial guidance to lower courts.' Thus, whether
police officers can ever be liable to landowners for negligently damaging
private property is an issue that awaits resolution.
JONATHAN SIMONDS PYATr
55. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing statutory immunity).
56. Customer Co., 10 Cal. 4th at 385, 895 P.2d at 911, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 669.
While the court observed that government officials are immunized from the results of
their "basic policy decisions" under Government Code § 820.2, it recognized that it
had not resolved whether strategies implemented while effectuating an arrest fit with-
in such a protected purview. Id. at 392, 895 P.2d at 916, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674.
B. Judicial reformation of unconstitutional statutes is permis-
sible; however, reformation should only be undertaken if it
can closely effectuate policy judgments clearly articulated by
the legislative body: Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Com-
mission.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Commission,' the California Su-
preme Court considered whether judicial reformation was proper in a
case involving a statute limiting campaign contributions which was de-
clared invalid under the United States Constitution.2 In reaching its deci-
1. 11 Cal. 4th 607, 905 P.2d 1248, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (1995). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 613-71, 905 P.2d at 1250-91, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
110-50. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 671-75, 905 P.2d at 1291-93,
47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150-52 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Werdegar wrote a separate
concurring opinion. Id. at 675-78, 905 P.2d at, 1293-95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-55
(Werdegar, J., concurring). Justice Kennard concurred in the judgment. Id. at 678-85,
905 P.2d at 1295-300, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-60 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice
Baxter concurred and wrote a separate opinion in which Justices Arabian and George
joined. Id. at 685-93, 905 P.2d at 1300-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-65 (Baxter, J., con-
curring).
2. Id. at 613-16, 905 P.2d at 1250-52, 47 Ca]. Rptr. 2d at 110-12.
In 1988, citizens of California passed Proposition 73 in an attempt to reform
state and local political campaign financing. Id. at 613, 905 P.2d at 1250, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 110; see CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 82041.5, 85100-85400, 89001 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1996). The following five provisions of that measure were at issue in this case:
Section 85301(a), which provides that:
No person shall make, and no candidate for elective office, or campaign trea-
surer, shall solicit or accept any contribution or loan which would cause the
total amount contributed or loaned by that person to that candidate, includ-
ing contributions or loans to all committees controlled by the candidate, to
exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) in any fiscal year.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85301(a) (West 1993).
Section 85302, which provides that:
No person shall make and no political committee, broad based political com-
mittee, or political party shall solicit or accept, any contribution or loan from
a person which would cause the total amount contributed or loaned by that
person to the same political committee, broad based political committee, or
political party to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2;500) in any
fiscal year to make contributions to candidates for elective office.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85302 (West 1993).
Section 85303(a), which provides that:
No political committee shall make, and no candidate or campaign treasurer
shall solicit or accept, any contribution or loan which would cause the total
amount contributed or loaned by that committee to that candidate for elec-
tive office or any committee controlled by that candidate to exceed two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in any fiscal year.
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sion, the court addressed three central issues. First, the supreme court
found that the "public interest" exception to the doctrine of res judicata
allowed the court to consider previous federal court determinations.3
CAL GOV'T CODE § 85303(a) (West 11)93).
Section 85303(b), which provides that:
No broad based political committee or political party shall make and no can-
didate or campaign treasurer shall solicit or accept, any contribution or loan
which would cause the total amount contributed or loaned by that committee
or political party to that candidate to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) in
any fiscal year.
CAL GOV'T CODE § 85303(b) (West 1993).
Section 85304, which provides that: "[no candidate for elective office or committee
controlled by that candidate or candidates for elective office shall transfer any con-
tribution to any other candidate for elective office. Transfers of funds between can-
didates or their controlled committees are prohibited." CAL GOV'T CODE § 85304 (West
1993); see 7 B.E. WrrnN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 212-214
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (enumerating limits on campaign expenditures, funds, and
practices); 28 CAL. JUR. 3D Elections §§ 102-104 (1986 & Supp. 1995) (discussing elec-
tion campaign contributions and expenditures in general).
In 1990, State Senator Kopp and Assemblyman Johnson intervened in a lawsuit on
behalf of defendant Fair Political Practices Commission. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 614, 905
P.2d at 1251, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110. The federal district court enjoined enforcement
of California Government Code §§ 85301-85304, ruling that the "fiscal year" measures in
§§ 85301-85303 were unconstitutional because they unfairly discriminated in favor of in-
cumbents. Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 747 F.
Supp. 580, 590 (E.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 955 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.). The court reasoned that
most incumbents begin their campaigns for re-election as soon as they get elected,
which is usually more than one year before their challengers begin campaigning. Id. at
588. In addition to other advantages benefitting incumbents, the statute provided at
least one more "fiscal year" of fundraising for incumbents than their challengers. Id.
The court found that because the statute impacted free speech and the electoral pro-
cess, such a "fiscal year" provision failed strict scrutiny and was therefore unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 587-90; see Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the
First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL L REV. 1045 (1985) (dis-
cussing first amendment ramifications of campaign finance laws); James L Ross, Regu-
lation of Campaign Contributions: Maintaining the Integrity of the Political Process
Through an Appearance of Fairness, 56 S. CAL L REV. 669 (1983) (evaluating regula-
tion of local campaign contributions).
State Senator Kopp and Assemblyman Johnson, who cosponsored Proposition 73,
brought the original proceeding in the California Supreme Court. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at
614, 905 P.2d at 1251, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110-11. The supreme court issued an alterna-
tive writ of mandate to the Fair Political Practices Commission directing the commis-
sion to show why the court should not issue a peremptory writ of mandate to enforce
the sections in question. Id. When the commission responded neutrally, the California
Legislature and four legislators intervened on their behalf. Id
3. Id. at 621, 905 P.2d at 1256, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
Second, the supreme court found that numerous decisions allowed refor-
mation of unconstitutional statutes.4 Third, the supreme court chose to
refrain from using its reformation power because it was not possible to
make the statute constitutional and still effectuate the policy judgments
clearly articulated by the electorate.5 Accordingly, the supreme court
denied the petitioners' request that the statute be enforced as written.6
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. The Court's Authority to Consider the Issues Raised in the
Petition
After recounting a brief background of both the case and the statutes
in question,7 Chief Justice Lucas examined the legislators', argument that
the supreme court was precluded from considering whether to reform
the statutes.8
The legislators' first argument was based on res judicata,9 which pre-
cludes courts from hearing actions that have been finally determined by
a court of competent jurisdiction.'0 The, intervenors on the petitioner's
behalf argued that because the petitioners received a final judgment in a
prior lawsuit in federal court on the same issues, the California Supreme
Court was precluded from hearing the case." The majority found that
res judicata did not apply to the present case because public interest re-
quired relitigation of the cause of action.'2 The court stopped short of
holding that federal courts lack authority to construe or reform state
laws, concluding only that the facts of this case allowed it to fall under
the "public interest" exception to res judicata."
The court then addressed the legislatures' second preclusion argument
that since the statutes ceased to exist when the federal court declared
them unconstitutional, there was nothing left to reform.'4 The court re-
jected this argument noting that the federal courts never "invalidated"
4. Id. at 660-61, 905 P.2d at 1283-84, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143.
5. Id. at 671, 905 P.2d at 1290, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 613-20, 905 P.2d at 1250-54, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110-14.
8. Id. at 620-26, 905 P.2d at 1255-59, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114-19.
9. See generally 40 CAL. JUR. 3D Judgments §§ 120-124 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (dis-
cussing the effect of res judicata on relitigating a cause of action).
10. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 620-22, 905 P.2d at L[255-56, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114-16.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 621-22, 905 P.2d at 1256, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115-16.
13. Id. at 621, 905 P.2d at 1256, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
14. Id. at 623-25, 905 P.2d at 1257-59, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117-18.
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the laws but simply enjoined the enforcement of statutes as written. 5
The majority concluded that a "constitutionally invalid" statute should be
treated "as if it had never been passed."6
After rejecting both preclusion arguments, the majority considered
whether the California Supreme Court could reform the unconstitutional
statute. 7
2. The Court's Authority to Reform a Statute in Order to Preserve
its Constitutionality
a. Reformation by the United States Supreme Court and other
courts
Noting that much of the California Supreme Court's precedent is pro-
vided by the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lucas began his
analysis by discussing the United States Supreme Court's reformation
cases. 
8
The court based the judicial power to reform a statute on Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States9 which contem-
plated the use of judicial reform in preserving the constitutionality of a
statute. In Welsh, the Court discussed three general categories of cases in
which reformation occurs: (1) cases involving procedural safeguards
required by the First Amendment or due process;0 (2) cases involving
classifications that were held to be underinclusive under the equal pro-
tection clause;2' and (3) cases involving otherwise vague or overbroad
15. Id. at 624, 905 P.2d at 1258, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117-18.
16. Id. at 624-25, 905 P.2d at 1258-59, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. In rendering its
decision, the court found Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965), persua-
sive. Id.
17. Id. at 62-62, 905 P.2d at 1259-84, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119-44. See generally 7
B.E. Wrr3N, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 88-89 (9th ed. 1988
& Supp. 1995) (discussing judicial power to sever unconstitutional portions of stat-
utes); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law Pt. 1 § 78-82 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (de-
tailing how a court treats partial unconstitutionality).
18. Kopp, 11 Cal 4th at 627-41, 905 P.2d at 1260-69, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119-29.
19. Id. at 627-29, 905 P.2d at 1260-61, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119-21 (citing Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344-67 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
20. Id. at 629-32, 905 P.2d at 1261-63, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121-22; see, e.g., United
States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (reforming an unconstitutional
obscenity statute).
21. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 632-37, 905 P.2d at 1263-67, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122-26.
There has been a series of Supreme Court cases in which the Court has extended or
criminal statutes." Thus, the California Supreme Court determined that
the United States Supreme Court reformed or rewrote statutes in order
to preserve their constitutionality in these three categories.23
b. Reformation by California Courts
In turning to state courts' power to reform a statute in order to pre-
serve its constitutionality, the majority recited several classifications of
cases in which reformation by state courts occurs: (1) cases involving
procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment or due pro-
cess;25 (2) cases involving classifications that are held to be
allowed the extension of benefit statutes to improperly excluded groups. See Wengler
v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (extending workers' compensation
benefits to widowers where statute provided more benefits to widows); Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (extending aid
to families that had been denied relief due to mother's unemployment where the
same statute granted aid to families with unemployed fathers); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (eliminating the gender-based distinction between
widows and widowers as it pertains to social security survivor benefits); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (eliminating the gender-based distinction
contained in the part of the Social Security Act governing "Mother's insurance bene-
fits"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (extending. state welfare laws to
legal aliens); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (extending right to recover, in
wrongful death cases to illegitimate children of the deceased); Glona v. American
Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co, 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (same).
22. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 638-41, 905 P.2d at 1267-69, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127-29
(citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) (reforming a state
criminal statute in which the term "lust" was contained in a definition of regulated
obscene matter)).
23. Id. at 626-41, 905 P.2d at 1259-69, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119-29. See generally
Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional
Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301 (1979).
24. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 643-53, 905 P.2d at 1271-78, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130-37.
25. Id. at 643-46, 905 P.2d at 1271-73, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130-32. The California
Supreme Court reformed or allowed the reformation of statutes to avoid vagueness,
overbreadth, or procedural due process problems on several occasions. See People v.
Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1988) (reforming pan-
dering statute such that the hiring of actors to perform non-obscene motion pictures
containing sexually explicit acts would be legal); Pryor v. Municipal Court, 25 Cal. 3d
238, 559 P.2d 636, 158 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1979) ('reforming disorderly conduct statute
with respect to lewd or dissolute conduct so as to only pertain to conduct occurring
in a public place or otherwise exposed to public view); Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16
Cal. 3d 71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1976) (reforming obscenity statute so as
to only forbid "patently offensive representations or descriptions of specific 'hard
core' sexual conduct"); Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109
Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973) (reforming overbroad statute which allowed the summary bar-
ring of any person from a college or university campus for any reason); Barrows v.
Municipal Court, 1 Cal. 3d 821, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1970) (reforming
obscenity statute so as not to apply to live performances in a theater before a live
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underinclusive under the equal protection clause;2 6 (3) cases involving
otherwise vague or overbroad criminal statutes;" and (4) cases involv-
ing statutes 'that violate the state constitution.'
The intervenors cited case law broadly stating that courts lack authori-
ty to "rewrite" statutes in order to preserve their constitutionality.' The
court distinguished all except one of the cases. Most of the cases in-
volved situations where it was inappropriate to reform the statutes be-
cause it was impossible to do so in a way that closely effectuated the
policy judgments clearly articulated by the legislature or other enacting
body."° The court distinguished the remainder of the intervenors' cases
because they either had an enacting body's intent that was clearly incon-
sistent with reformation,3' d:id not violate the state constitution,32 or
audience).
26. See In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 537 P.2d 406, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1975)
(reforming a statute which permitted a juvenile referee's decision declaring a minor a
ward of the court to be binding without any action by a trial court).
27. San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Adver., 192 Cal. App. 3d 643, 237 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1987) (reforming a statute which regulated commercial and non-commercial signs in
which signs regarding certain subjects were exempted)
28. See Hayes v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 216, 490 P.2d 1137, 98 Cal. Rptr 449
(1971) (reforming a statute that discriminated against defendants convicted in Cali-
fornia and imprisoned out of state).
29. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 653, 905 P.2d at 1278, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137-38; see
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180, 649 P.2d 902, 185 Cal. Rptr. 260.
30. See Bayscene Resident Negotiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park, 15 Cal. App.
4th 119, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626 (1993) (city ordinance requiring binding arbitration for
mobile home park rent disputes); Lesher Communications, Inc. v. Walnut Creek, 52
Cal. 3d 531, 802 P.2d 317, 277 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990) (municipal initiative establishing a
building moratorium to fight traffic congestion); Spiritual Psychic Science Church v.
Azuza, 39 Cal. 3d 501, 703 P.2d 1119, 217 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985) (city ordinance ban-
ning fortune telling); Flood v. Riggs, 80 Cal. App. 3d 138, 145 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1978)
(election code in conflict with the constitutional provision banning ex-felons from vot-
ing); Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal. 3d 860, 484 P.2d 945, 94 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1971)
(ordinance allowing for prosection of persons engaging in a parade without a permit
where city has uncontrolled discretion to grant or deny permits); In re King, 3 Cal.
3d 226, 474 P.2d 983, 90 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1970) (provision of welfare statute making it
a felony for nonsupporting father to remain out of state for 30 days while only a
misdemeanor for a nonsupporting father who remains in-state).
31. See Mills v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 951, 728 P.2d 211, 232 Cal. Rptr. 141
(1986) (statute requiring accused to initiate "reasonable efforts" to secure a witness'
appearance at a preliminary hearing in order to avoid the admission of written
statements by that witness); McLaughlin v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 3d 473, 189
Cal. Rptr. 479 (1983) (statute requiring prehearing mediation of both child custody
and visitation disputes in divorce cases); Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d. 420,
556 P.2d 1101, 134 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1976) (statute requiring capital punishment for
supported the court's power to reform statutes in order to preserve con-
stitutionality. 3 Unable to distinguish one case that was more than 100
years old,' the majority ignored the lone case because its result con-
flicted with the numerous holdings of the courts in the last twenty years
which allowed reformation."
The court concluded this section by summarizing the existing state of
the law: courts may reform an unconstitutional statute in order to effec-
tuate policy judgments clearly articulated by the legislature or other en-
acting body if invalidating the statute would be far more destructive of
the will of the electorate.
36
3. Reformation of the Statute
The court reiterated the federal courts' view that, by its very nature,
section 85302 is unenforceable if sections 85301(a), 85303(a), and
85303(b) are unenforceable." Because the court later found these stat-
utes to be unenforceable, there was no analysis as to whether section
85302 could be reformed.38
In addition, the majority determined that section 85304 was not at
issue in the litigation because the federal courts invalidated it, and the
section did not involve the "fiscal year" measure laid out in sections
85301 and 85303."9 Section 85304 therefore remained enjoined. 9
The court then examined the ways in which sections 85301 and 85303
could be reformed in order to preserve their constitutionality while
closely effectuating the policy judgments of the electorate. 4' The majori-
first-degree murder with special circumstances without regard for mitigating circum-
stances or other considerations).
32. See Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 561 P.2d 1148, 137 Cal. Rptr.
460 (1977) (solicitation statute); People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe, 36 Cal. 2d 471,
224 P.2d 677 (1950) (seizure of property used in illegal activities); Eureka v. Diaz, 89
Cal. 467, 26 P. 961 (1891) (statute regarding illegal sale of intoxicating liquor).
33. See San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Adver., 192 Cal. App. 3d 643, 237 Cal. Rptr.
815 (1987); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal. 3d 765, 704 P.2d 752, 217 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1985)
(statute restoring the M'Naghten test for criminal insanity).
34. People v. Perry, 79 Cal. 105, 21 P. 423 (1889).
35. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 658-60, 905 P.2d at 1282-83, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141-43.
36. Id. at 660-62, 905 P.2d at 1283-84, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143-44.
37. Id. at 663, 905 P.2d at 1285, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 663, 905 P.2d at 1285, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144-45.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 663-70, 905 P.2d at 1285-90, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-49; see Andrew P.
Buchsbaum, Comment, Campaign Finance Re-Reform: The Regulation of Independent
Political Committees, 71 CAL. L. REv. 673 (19K.") (discussing the problems arising
from independent political committees); Matthew J. Geyer, Note, Statutory Limita-
tions on Corporate Spending in Ballot Measure Campaigns: The Case for Constitu-
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ty noted three key policy judgments reflected in the statutes: (1) "estab-
lish[ing] a maximum dollar amount for particular contributions... (2)
regulat[ing] the pace at which those contributions may be made...
[and] (3) establish[ing] the rights to contribute and to accept a theoreti-
cal maximum aggregate amount of funds."
4 2
The court first looked at reforming the statutes by striking the word
"fiscal" from the phrase "fiscal year."' Unfortunately, such reformation
would maintain the unconstitutional result of an annual limit that dis-
criminated against non-incumbents."
The court then considered reforming the statutes by replacing the
words "per fiscal year" with "per election."45 Although this manner of
reformation would have the advantage of retaining the maximum
amounts for certain contributions as well as effectuating the pacing re-
quirement," such a reformation would reduce the theoretical maximum
amount of funds that, could be contributed to and accepted by candidates
for all offices except those with two-year terms.47 Therefore, "such a
reformation would not closely effectuate policy judgments... [of] the
electorate."'
Finally, the court examined the reformation proposed by Justice
Baxter in which Justices Arabian and George joined.49 This proposal
tionality, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 433 (1985) (offering arguments in favor of allowing restric-
tions on corporate spending in certain campaigns); Mark Weinberg, Public Officials
Soliciting Campaign Contributions Beware, 15 WmTrIER L REV. 1075 (1994) (provid-
ing information on the Hobbs Act and its use to defeat corrupt campaign contribu-
tions).
42. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 664, 905 P.2d at 1286, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court rejected replacement of "fiscal year" with the words "elections
cycle" because that would create uncertainty as to what the limitation amount would
be. Id.
45. Id. at 664-67, 905 P.2d at 1286-88, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-47.
46. Id. at 664-65, 905 P.2d at 1286, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
47. Id. at 665, 905 P.2d at 1286-87, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. Section 85301(a) allows
a Senate or local nonpartisan office candidate to accept and solicit individual contri-
butions totaling $4000 ($1000 per "fiscal year"). Conversely, under the "per election"
reformation, Senate candidates could accept and solicit only $2000 ($1000 for the pri-
mary and $1000 for the election), and a local nonpartisan office candidate could
accept and solicit only $1000. Id at 665 n.64, 905 P.2d at 1287 n.64, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 146 n.64.
48. Id. at 664-65, 905 P.2d at 1286, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46.
49. Id. at 667, 905 P.2d at 1288, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147; see id. at 685-93, 905
P.2d at 1300-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-65 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
required changing monetary figures in the statute along with incorporat-
ing a "per election" mechanism to preserve the theoretical maximum
amount of funds set forth in the statute as written.'" Such a reformation
would conflict with the voters' intent to restrict the size of particular
contributions."'
Although the supreme court acknowledged that it had the power to
reform the statutes, the court refrained from exercising that power be-
cause the statutes could not be reformed in a way that closely effectuat-
ed the policy judgments of the electorate. 52 Therefore, the court invali-
dated the statutes by denying the petitioners relief.'
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion,' Justice Mosk stated that the California
Supreme Court lacked the power to reform the statute." Justice Mosk
reasoned that the California Constitution provides for the separation of
the powers of government and that any reformation undertaken by the
courts without the authorization of the legislative body would infringe
upon the power of the legislative branch. Thus, a court can only strike
down a statute, not reform it."7
C. Justice Werdegar's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Werdegar cautioned that the role of
the judicial branch of government is to interpret laws, not to write
them. Thus, although the act of reformation is within the court's au-
thority, it should be undertaken sparingly and cautiously.'" Justice
Werdegar concluded that, absent compelling circumstances, the court.
50. Id. at 667-70, 905 P.2d at 1288-90, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14749.
51. Id. at 669, 905 P.2d at 1289, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14849.
52. Id. at 669-71, 905 P.2d at 1289-90, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-50.
53. Id. at 670-71, 905 P.2d at 1290-91, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-50.
54. Id. at 671-75, 905 P.2d at 1293-95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-55 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
55. Id. at 671-75, 905 P.2d at 1291-93, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150-52 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
56. Id. at 671-72, 905 P.2d at 1291, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150-51 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
57. Id. at 673, 905 P.2d at 1292, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151 (Mosk, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 675-78, 905 P.2d at 1293-95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-55 (Werdegar, J.,
concurring).
59. Id. at 675, 905 P.2d at 1293, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Werdegar, J., concurring).
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must refrain from making "an unwarranted departure.from [its] normal
judicial duties.""
D. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
In her concurring and dissenting opinion,' Justice Kennard agreed
that the statute should not have been amended, but differed with the
majority's rationale.' According to Justice Kennard, full faith and credit
should have been given to the federal courts' final ruling, and the doc-
trine of res judicata should have precluded the California Supreme Court
from hearing the case.'
Justice Kennard noted that federal law does not recognize a "public
interest" exception to res judicata and California only recognizes the
"public interest" exception in the rare circumstance where the earlier
judicial determination was erroneous.' The exception could not apply
and the supreme court should have been precluded from hearing the
case where the majority found that the federal court's determination was
correct.'
E. Justice Baxter's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
In a separate concurring and dissenting opinion," Justice Baxter stat-
ed that because it would be extremely difficult to cure a constitutional
defect in a subsequent initiative measure considering the conflict be-
tween the interests of the people and the interests of the lawmakers, a
court should exert a greater effort to reform a constitutionally invalid
statute.' Furthermore, Justice Baxter noted that a modified "election
cycle" method could have been implemented that would have closely
effectuated the policy judgments of the electorate.'
61. Id. at 678, 905 P.2d at 1295, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 678-85, 905 P.2d at 1295-1300, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-60 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
63. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
64. Id. at 681-83, 905 P.2d at 1297-98, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157-58 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
65. Id. at 683-84, 905 P.2d at 1299, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158-59 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
66. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
67. Id. at 685-93, 905 P.2d at 1300-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-65 (Baxter, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
68. Id. at 685-87, 905 P.2d at 1300-02, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-61 (Baxter, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
69. Id. at 687-93, 905 P.2d at 1302-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-65 (Baxter, J., con-
In the present case, the California Supreme Court upheld a court's
power to reform an unconstitutional statute."0 The power of reformation
in the hands of the judicial branch of government risks crossing the line
between interpreting laws and creating them.7 The supreme court at-
tempted to limit this danger by stating that a court can only reform a
statute if it is possible to do so in a way that closely effectuates the poli-
cy judgments of the legislative body and if "the enacting body would
have preferred such a reformed version of the statute to invalidation of
the statute."' Without a bright-line test, it is still possible for a court to
cross the line between the judicial branch and the legislative branch.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it is within a court's power, to reform an unconstitutional
statute to preserve its constitutionality, such action should only be un-
dertaken if it can be done in a way that closely effectuates the intent of
the electorate or other legislative body. If that cannot be done, the court
should simply invalidate the statute.
MARC S. HANISH
curring and dissenting).
70. Id. at 615, 905 P.2d at 1251, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
71. See id. at 675-78, 905 P.2d at 1293-95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152-55 (Werdegar, J.,
concurring).
72. Id. at 670-71, 905 P.2d at 1290-91, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149-50.
111. IMPA(:r
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V. CRIMINAL LAW
During the execution of a search warrant, if a person ar-
rives during the search and cannot be immediately iden-
tified, officers may constitutionally detain the person in
a manner necessary to protect the safety of all present
during the search: People v. Glaser.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Glaser,' the California Supreme Court considered whether
it is reasonable for officers to detain an unknown individual whom they
encounter while executing a search warrant at a private residence for
illegal drugs.2 Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that an officer may constitutionally detain a person encoun-
tered during a lawful search of a residence in order to identify the per-
son, determine that person's connection with the premises, and protect
1. 11 Cal. 4th 354, 902 P.2d 729, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425 (1995). Justice Werdegar
wrote the unanimous opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Kennard, Arabian, Baxter and George concurred. Id. at 359-75, 902 P.2d at 730-
40, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426-36.
2. Id. at 362, 902 P.2d at 732, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 428. On the evening of February
19, 1993, officers from various agencies executed a search warrant at the residence
of Gregory Wagenman. Id. at 360, 902 P.2d at 730, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426. Ronnie
Glaser arrived at the Wagenman residence seconds before the officers. Id. at 360, 902
P.2d at 730-31, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 426-27. When Glaser was at the gate he observed
a plain clothed officer calling out to him. Id. at 360-61, 902 P.2d at 731, 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 427. Once Glaser understood the orders of the officer, he complied by lying
face down on the driveway and was then handcuffed. Id. at 361, 902 P.2d at 731, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427. After being detained at gunpoint for several minutes, Glaser was
eventually led into the house. Id. Another officer recognized Glaser from a previous
search of the Wagenman residence, which had resulted in Glaser being arrested on
narcotics and weapon, charges. The officers searched Glaser and his vehicle. Id. The
search produced drugs, a pipe, syringes, and a police scanner. Id. Glaser was charged
with possession and use of methamphetanine and use of a police scanner. Id. Al-
though he moved to suppress the evidence, the superior court held that the initial
detention and the searches were proper, Glaser pleaded no contest to the possession
charge. Id. at 361-62, 902 P.2d at 731, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427. Glaser appealed his
conviction and the court of appeal reversed, stating that because the initial detention
was not supported by articulable suspicion, the subsequent searches were tainted. Id.
at 362, 902 P.2d at 731-32, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427-28. The California Supreme Court
granted review solely to decide the legality of the initial detention. Id. at 362, 902
P.2d at 732, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 428. See Bob Egelko, Police Can Hold Visitors at
Homes Being Searched for Drugs, ORANGE CoUNTY REG., Oct. 13, 1995, at Al0.
the safety of those present during the search. If the person is only a
visitor, the court ruled that further detention is reasonable only if there
is evidence connecting the person to criminal activity or if the person
poses a danger to the officers.'
II. TREATMENT
Justice Werdegar, writing for a unanimous court, began by examining
the landmark decision reached by the United States Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio.' The Glaser court explained that Terry requires specific
and articulable facts which create a reasonable suspicion to justify an
intrusion by police.' Terry states that government interests such as ef-
fective crime prevention and ensuring the safety of the officers reason-
ably warrant a limited seizure and search for weapons.7 The court next
examined the application of Terry in the case of Michigan v. Summers.'
Summers involved a detention during the search of a private residence.'
The Summers court held that a search warrant gives officers limited
authority to detain occupants while the search is conducted."
3. Glaser, II Cal. 4th at 374, 902 P.2d at 740, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436.
4. Id.
5. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (cited in Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 363, 902 P.2d at 732, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 428).
6. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 363, 902 P.2d at 733, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429 (citing Ter-
ry, 392 U.S. at 21).
7. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-24 (cited in Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 364, 902 P.2d at 733,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429).
8. 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (cited in Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 364, 902 P.2d at 733, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429).
9. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693 (cited in Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 364, 902 P.2d at 733,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 429); see 4 B.E. WITuGN AND NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL LAW, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2362 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996)
(summarizing the Glaser and Summers decisions, and explaining detentions during
search under a search warrant).
10. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 365, 902 P.2d at 7:34, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430 (citing
Summers, 452 U.S. at 703); see David J. Krauss, Comment, Reasonable Suspicion
Authorizes Detention of Occupants of Validly Searched Premises, 59 WASH. U. L.Q.
1393 (1982) (discussing the holding of Summers). Glaser's argument that he was
merely a visitor and therefore not subject to detention under Summers was found
unpersuasive by the court. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 370, 902 P.2d at 737, 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 433. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.9(e), at 309-10 (2d ed. 1987) (stating that the word "occupant" should
be interpreted literally); 4 B.E. WITKIN AND NORMAN,4 L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
LAw, Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence § 2458 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing search and seizure as applied to visitors); Charles L. Cantrell, Search
Warrants: A View of the Process, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing de-
tention or search of persons on or near premises being searched).
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The California Supreme Court then applied the principles of Terry and
Summers to the present case." The court stated that to determine the
reasonableness of the initial detention, the character and extent of the
intrusion must be balanced against the government interests justifying
it. 2 First, the court stated that although Glaser was detained at gun-
point, the detention was extremely brief and out of the public's eye;
therefore, the intrusiveness of the detention was diminished. 3 Next, the
court cited the officers' concern for safety and their interest in deter-
mining the identity of Glaser and his connection with the premises as
legitimate government interests justifying the detention. 4 Finally, the
court weighed the government interests against the intrusiveness of the
detention." The court emphasized that the police must point to specific
and articulable facts in order to justify the detention. 6 After analyzing
the facts of the present case, the court determined that the officers acted
reasonably when they briefly detained Glaser for purposes of identifica-
tion and safety. 7
III. IMPACT
Prior to the supreme court's decision in Glaser, it was unclear when
and if nonoccupants could be detained during the execution of a search
warrant.'8 The rule established in Summers seemed only to apply to
11. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 365, 902 P.2d at 734, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 366-67, 902 P.2d at 734-35, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 430-31.
14. Id. at 367-68, 902 P.2d at 735-36, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431-32. The court noted
that when narcotics are the subject of the search warrant, there is a heightened
potential for danger because firearms are commonly present. Id. at 367-68, 902 P.2d
at 735, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 431.
15. Id. at 368-69, 902 P.2d at 736, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432; see 20 CAL. JUR. 3D
Searches and Seizures § 2492 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (discussing how to determine the
validity of a temporary detention).
16. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 369, 902 P.2d at 736, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 432 (citing Ter-
ry, 392 U.S. at 21).
17. Id. The court noted that Glaser's familiarity with the premises and his unre-
sponsiveness to the officers' attempts to communicate with him gave the officers no
practical choice but to briefly detain him. Id.; see also 20 CAL JUR. 3D Searches and
Seizures § 2567 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (discussing an officer's right to conduct a lim-
ited search of someone who acts like an occupant).
18. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 209 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (discuss-
ing persons who may be searched during the execution of a search warrant); 79
C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 210 (1995) (same); Angela S. Overgaard, Comment,
People, Places, and Fourth Amendment Protection: The Application of Ybarra v. Illi-
residents. The Glaser court, however, explained that Summers does not
prohibit the detention of nonresidents if there is reasonable suspicion
under Terry.9 Therefore, officers may now briefly detain any suspicious
person they encounter during a search under a warrant for drugs. ' Fur-
ther detention, beyond what is necessary to determine the identity of the
detainee and protect the safety of the officers, is still justified only if
there is a connection between the person and the premises or if criminal
activity is suspected.2
The supreme court made a point to emphasize that the holding of
Glaser applied to searches for illegal drugs or related items." Whether
or not officers may briefly detain an individual encountered during the
execution of a search warrant for non-drug related items remains to be
determined.
IV. 'CONCLUSI)N
In Glaser, the California Supreme Court held that officers may detain
any person encountered while executing a warranted search for drugs at
a private residence if the person's identity and connection with the
premises are unknown and there is a need to protect the safety of the
officers.23 The court also held that further detention of a nonoccupant
must be justified by specific facts linking the detainee to the criminal
activity suspected on the premises. The individual may also be de-
tained further if he or she poses a danger to the officers.25
WENDY M. HUNTER
nois to Searches of People Present During the Execution of Search Warrants on Pri-
vate Premises, 25 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 243 (1994); Jeffrey D. Winter, Comment, Ponder-
ing the Scope of Premises Search Warrants After Ybarra v. Illinois, 26 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 661 (1989).
19. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 370, 902 P.2d at 737, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 433. See gener-
ally Gretchen Slosser, Note, Unreasonable Suspicion: The Minnesota Supreme Court
Extends Terry to Nonsuspects Arriving at Premises Being Searched Under Warrant:
State v. Gobely, 70 MNN. L REV. 1208 (1986).
20. Glaser, 11 Cal. 4th at 374-75, 902 P.2d at 740, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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VI. INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Under a commercial general liability insurance policy,
an insurer owes no duty to defend the insured against a
lawsuit that alleges incidental emotional distress caused
by the insured's noncovered acts. Absent specific intent
to the contrary, an insurer does not automatically waive
policy-based coverage defenses that it fails to enumerate
in its initial denial of coverage:
Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.,' the California Supreme
Court addressed whether an insurer owes a duty under a commercial
general liability (CGL) policy to defend a suit against the insured that
alleges emotional and physical distress resulting from economic losses
caused by the insured's noncovered acts.2 The appellate court, reversing
1. 11 Cal. 4th 1, 900 P.2d 619, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 370 (1995). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the opinion of the court which Justices Mosk, Arabian, Baxter, George, and
Werdegar joined. Id. at 1-37, 900 P.2d at 619-39, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370-90. Justice
Kennard filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 37-49, 900 P.2d at 639-48, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390-99 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 10, 900 P.2d at 621, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372. In 1985, Marmac, Inc., pur-
chased a CGL policy from Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc. (T.I.E.). Id. at 10-11, 900
P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. Marmac renewed the policy in 1986 without
substantial change. Id. The policy identified Marmac as the named insured, and in-
cluded Lester Amey as one of the named insured in an attached endorsement letter.
Id. at 11, 900 P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. The policy language was standard,
providing liability for "all damages which the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay because of ... bodily injury to any person, and . . . damage to property . . . to
which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence." Id. The policy defined an
"occurrence" as "an event, or series of events ... proximately caused by an act or
omission of the insured . . . which results . . . in bodily injury or property damage,
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id. T.I.E.'s policy
also contained definitions common in the industry for bodily injury (any "sickness or
disease") and property damage ("physical injury or destruction of tangible property").
Id. at 19-20, 900 P.2d at 628, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379. The policy excluded coverage
for personal injury to Marmac's directors and officers as well as bodily inury to any
named insured. Id. at 11, 900 P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. The policy also
excluded coverage for an employee's "bodily injury ... arising out of and in the
course of his employment by the insured." Id. at 20, 900 P.2d at 628, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 379.
the trial court, held that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend, and
In 1986, Lester Amey, a former executive vice president of Marmac, filed a law-
suit against Marmac, its former president James R. Waller, and its four chief officers.
Id. at 11-12, 900 P.2d at 622-23, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373-74. The complaint alleged
eleven causes of actions including the following: (1) involuntary dissolution, (2)
breach of fiduciary duty, (3) breach of statutory duty of good faith, (4) interference
with prospective economic advantage, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (7) breach of duty of good faith and fair
dealing, (8) inducing breach of contract, (9) conspiracy, (10) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and (11) injunctive relief. Id. Amey later amended his complaint
to include a cause of action for wrongful termination. Id. at 12, 900 P.2d at 623, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. In the complaint, Amey described the conduct of Waller and the
other officers as "outrageous ... intentional and malicious and ... done for the
purpose of causing [Amey] to suffer ... emotional and physical distress." Id. at 12,
900 P.2d at 623, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
One week after filing suit, Marmac's corporate attorney sent a tender letter to
T.I.E., requesting that the insurer defend the lawsuit. Id. Farmers Insurance Exchange,
acting as T.I.E.'s adjuster, handled the claims filed by T.I.E.'s insured. Id. at 11, 900
P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. A claims representative from Farmers' Anaheim
branch (William Vaughter), advised one of Marmac's officers that the claim would be
processed for payment. Id. at 12, 900 P.2d at 623, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. On De-
cember 29, Marmac sent Vaughter a billing for attorneys' fees incurred in defending
the lawsuit totaling $54,000. Id. at 12-13, 900 P.2d at 623, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374. In
January 1987, the regional claims manager instructed the Farmers' Anaheim branch
office manager to deny Marmac's request for coverage. Id. at 13, 900 P.2d at 623-24,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75. The office manager sent a letter denying coverage. Id.
Based on a review of the policy and all the information submitted, he concluded,
"the claim against Marmac [was] essentially a shareholder dispute regarding intention-
al Acts committed by Marmac and their principles [sic]. Intentional Acts are not cov-
ered under your ... policy." Id. at 13, 900 P.2d at 624, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375.
Marmac's requests for reconsideration were also denied. Id. at 13-14, 900 P.2d at 624,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375.
After successfully defending Amey's suit, Waller, Marmac, and Marmac's officers
filed separate lawsuits against T.I.E. and Farmers alleging, inter alia, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 14, 900 P.2d at 624, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 375. Waller's suit also alleged a cause of action for statutory bad faith
under California Insurance Code § 790.03(h). Id. These suits were later consolidated.
Id. The trial court held: (1) Amey's first amended complaint alleged "facts potentially
within bodily injury coverage" of the policy; (2) the occurrence clause of the policy
obligated the insurer to defend the suit as a matter of law; (3) T.I.E.'s denial letter
waived all "policy-based defenses not specified therein;" and (4) T.I.E. was not ex-
cused from its duty to defend under the policy notwithstanding statutory prohibition
against insurance coverage for an insured's intentional acts. Id. The jury found that
T.I.E. and Farmers violated Insurance Code '§ 790.03 and awarded aggregate damages
in excess of $61,000,000. Id. at 14-15, 900 P.2d at 624-25, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375-76.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that there was no potential basis for coverage
under the policy, and therefore, no duty to defend. Id. at 15, 900 P.2d at 625, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 376. The court reasoned that there was no duty in light of the fact that
Amey's complaint alleged only uncovered business lorts and because the alleged emo-
tional and physical distress were "clearly derivative of and caused by" Amey's
noncovered economic losses. Id.
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the supreme court affirmed.3
Under a CGL policy (formerly known as a "comprehensive" general
liability policy), the insurer owes a duty to defend a third party lawsuit
against an insured that alleges any potential basis for liability.4 The in-
sured has the burden of establishing the existence of this potential basis
for coverage.5 To determine if any potential basis for coverage exists,
the insurer must compare the policy terms with the facts alleged and
extrinsic evidence.'
The CGL in Waler, as is typical in the industry, provided coverage for
bodily injury or damage to tangible property.7 Thus, suits based on intan-
gible property losses fall outside the scope of coverage.8 In Waller, the
supreme court affirmed the rule that claims of alleged emotional and
physical distress, caused by economic loss, are insufficient to bring a
claim under the bodily injury provision of the policy.9
The court also addressed collateral issues in Wa/ler. Specifically, the
court held that appellate courts may rely on case law published after
trial but before appeal."° The court also held that waiver of coverage de-
fenses can only be made intentionally and cannot be inferred from an
insurer's failure to assert all possible defenses to coverage in its initial
denial letter." Additionally, the court held that where an insurer justifi-
ably denies coverage under a policy, there can be no independent cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, although the statutory duty under section 790.03 applies to all
claims. 2
3. Id. at 37, 900 P.2d at 63), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391.
4. Id. at 19, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378.
5. Id. at 16, 900 P.2d at 625-26, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376-77.
6. Id. at 19, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378.
7. Id. at 19-20, 900 P.2d at 628, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; see ifra notes 13-41 and
accompanying text.
10. Wai/er, 11 Cal. 4th at 23-24, 900 P.2d at 630-31, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381-82; see
infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
11. Wailer, 11 Cal. 4th at 31-.32, 900 P.2d at 635-36, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386-87; see
infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
12. Wailer, 11 Cal 4th at 36, 900 P.2d at 639, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390; see infra
notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Lucas began the majority opinion by generally discussing
the nature of CGL insurance policies and the fundamental principles that
guided the court's interpretation of the policy. 3 The court noted that
the insured bears the burden of proving that a covered claim exists,
thereby triggering the insurer's duty to defend by demonstrating from the
allegations in the suit and extrinsic evidence that there has been an "oc-
currence" as defined in the policy. 4 The typical CGL policy provides
coverage for an occurrence that is neither intentional nor expected by
the insured, which causes "bodily injury" or tangible property loss to a
third party.'" Exclusions may also remove from coverage risks that
would otherwise be covered; but, if a risk falls outside the initial scope
of the coverage, it need not be specifically excluded. 6 An insurer owes
no duty to defend suits that have no potential basis for coverage.'"
13. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 16-19, 900 P.2d at 625-28, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376-79.
14. Id. at 16, 900 P.2d at 625-26, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376-77 (citing Collin v. Ameri-
can Empire Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 787, 803, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391, 398 (1994)). An
.occurrence" was defined in T.I.E.'s policy as "an event, or series of events...
proximately caused by an act or omission of the insured . . . which results . .. . in
bodily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured." Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 11, 900 P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373.
15. Id. at 11, 900 P.2d at 622, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. Bodily injury was defined
in the policy as any "sickness or disease." Id. The property damage provision covers
"physical injury or destruction of tangible property," and does not include economic
losses or contractual obligations. Id. at 17, 900 P.2d at 626, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377;
see Gulf Ins. Co. v. LA. Effects Group, Inc., 827 F.2d 574, 577 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing no coverage under CGL for alleged nonperformance of contractual obligations);
Lassen Canyon Nursery, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 720 F.2d 1016, 1017 (9th Cir.
1983) (finding no coverage under CGL for economic losses caused by insured's al-
leged antitrust violations); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287,
303, 861 P.2d 1153, 1162-63, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 476-77 (1993) (holding that CGL
does not cover suits alleging damages caused by intangible property losses); Chatton
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 4th E46, 867, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 332
(1992) (holding no coverage under CGL for emotional distress flowing from invest-
ment losses caused by insured's negligent misrepresentation); Giddings v. Industrial
Indem. Co., 112 Cal. App. 3d 213, 219, 169 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281 (1980) (finding no
coverage under CGL for damage to intangible property caused by alleged fraud and
securities laws violation). The definition reflects that both statute and public policy
prohibit insurers from providing coverage for intentional injuries to third parties.
Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 18, 900 P.2d at 626-27, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377-78; CAL. INS.
CODE § 533 (West 1985) ("An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the willful
act of the insured."). See generally James A. Fischer, The Exclusion From Insurance
Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in
Search of a Justification, 30 SANTA CLARA L REV. 95 (1990) (discussing policies re-
garding insurance exclusions for intentional acts).
16. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 16, 900 P.2d at 626, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377.
17. Id. at 19, 900 P.2d at 628, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378 (citing Fire Ins. Exch. v.
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Next, the court outlined its methods of insurance policy interpreta-
tion. 8 The majority noted that the determination of an existence of a
duty to defend under an insurance contract is a question of law'9 and
that the parties' expressed mutual intent will govern what risks are cov-
ered.2" Ambiguity arises only when a portion of a contract is capable of
being reasonably construed in two or more ways, but courts should "not
strain to create ambiguity where none exists."2' The insurer must com-
pare the terms in the policy with the facts alleged and with extrinsic
evidence in order to determine whether any potential basis for coverage
exists.2
Abbott, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1029, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 630 (1988)); State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 74, 77, 236 Cal. Rptr. 216, 218 (1987)
("[W]here there is no possibility of coverage, there is no duty to defend.").
18. Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 18-19, 900 P.2d at 627-28, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378-79. See
generally 1 B.E. WITIsIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 681-690 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1995) (collecting cases analyzing the principles of contract interpreta-
tion); id. §§ 699-700 (collecting sources discussing the interpretation of insurance
contracts); 14 CAL. JUR. 3D Contracts §§ 160-167 (1974 & Supp. 1995) (reviewing the
precepts governing contract interpretation).
19. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 18, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378; AIU Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1990).
20. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 18, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378; Bank of the
'West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 833 P.2d 545, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538 (1992);
AIU, 51 Cal. 3d 807, 799 P.2d 1253, 274 Cal. Rptr. 820; see also CAL. Cry. CODE
§ 1636 (West 1985) (stating that the mutual intent of the contracting parties should
be given effect); id. § 1638 (noting the clear language of a contract governs its inter-
pretation); id. § 1639 (explaining "the intention of the parties is to be ascertained
from [the written contract alone, if possible]"); id. § 1644 (stating that the ordinary
meaning of the words of a contract controls, unless given a special meaning by the
parties). See generally John L Romaker & Virgil B. Prieto, Expectations Lost: -Bank
of the West v. Superior Court Places the Fox in Charge of the Henhouse, 29 CAL W.
L REV. 83 (1992) (discussing the history of insurance contract interpretation).
21. Walter, 11 Cal. 4th at 18, 900 P.2d at 627, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378 (citing Re-
serve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal. 3d 800, 807, 640 P.2d 764, 767-68, 180 Cal. Rptr.
628, 631-32 (1982)). See generally William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations:
Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L REV. 267 (1986) (discussing the treat-
ment of ambiguities in contracts); David S. Miller, Comment, Insurance as Contract:
The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849
(1988) (criticizing the contract interpretation doctrine of contra proferentem as ap-
plied to insurance companies).
22. Walter, 11 Cal. 4th at 19, 900 P.2d at 627-28, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 378-79; La
Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 9 Cal. 4th 27, 44, 884 P.2d
1048, 1057, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 109 (1994); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263,
419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). See generally Daniel A. Miller, Note, The
Insurer's Duty to Dqfend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1328
The majority then applied these fundamental precepts of insurance
contract interpretation to the facts presented in the instant case in order
to determine whether T.I.E. owed a duty to defend the insured against
Amey's lawsuit.23 The majority dismissed plaintiffs' argument that the
insured must always defend suits where a. judicial authority has not de-
finitively construed a specific provision of the policy.24 The supreme
court clarified that CNA Casualty v. Seaboard Surety Co.,25 which plain-
tiffs "misinterpreted" in making their claim, merely restated the funda-
mental rule that an insurer may properly deny coverage where the com-
plaint and extrinsic evidence demonstrate that no potential basis for
coverage exists.26 Thus, the court declared that there is no duty to de-
fend where the only potential basis for coverage turns on the resolution
of a question of law.27
Of paramount importance to the majority in concluding that T.I.E.
owed no duty to defend Amey's suit wa,; the fact that Amey's alleged
injuries were, in the majority's view, solely the result of economic loss-
es.' The majority noted that the CGL policy provided no coverage for
damage to intangible property.' The court stated that the "occurrence"
in a complaint that alleges emotional or physical distress caused by eco-
nomic losses" is the intangible property loss, not the resulting emotion-
al or physical distress.31 Therefore, any incidental emotional or physical
distress that was caused by the noncovered economic loss also falls out-
side the scope of coverage.32 The Waller court of appeal had found that
(1967) (discussing the insurer's broad duty to defend).
23. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 19-30, 900 P.2d at 628-35, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379-86; see
infra notes 24-51 and accompanying text. For a statement of the relevant facts see
supra note 2.
24. Wa/ler, 11 Cal. 4th at 25, 900 P.2d at 632, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383.
25. 176 Cal. App. 3d 598, 222 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1986).
26. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 25, 900 P.2d at 632, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383; CNA Casu-
alty, 176 Cal. App. 3d 598, 605, 222 Cal. Rptr. 276, 277-79.
27. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 25-26, 900 P.2d at 631, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382; see, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 1152, 29 Cal. Rptr.
2d 559, 570 (1994); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Peoples Church, 985 F.2d 446,
448-51 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying case law decided during litigation to relieve insurers
of duty to defend); Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th
1595, 1608-09, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 701 (1993) (relying on cases decided after the
insurer denied coverage).
28. Wa/ler, 11 Cal. 4th at 20-23, 900 P.2d at 628-30, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379-81.
29. Id. at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
30. This was the case in Waller, as well as Keating v. National Union Fire Ins.
Co., 995 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1993); Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 4th 846, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318 (1992); and McLaughlin, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d 559. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 27, 900 P.2d at 633, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
31. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 27, 900 P.2d at 633, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
32. Id. at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382; Keating, 995 F.2d at 156
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the gravamen of Amey's co:mplaint was damage to intangible property
interests and, therefore, held that T.I.E. owed no duty to defend.' The
majority affirmed this line of reasoning, emphasizing that the "occur-
rence" for which coverage was sought was based entirely on economic
losses.' Therefore, there was "no potential [basis] for coverage and no
corresponding duty to defend under the policy, regardless of the damag-
es allegedly suffered by Amey as a result of that [economic] loss.""5 In
the majority's view, the fact that an uncovered event causes emotional
distress will not transform the emotional distress into a separate occur-
rence under the bodily injury clause of the policy.3 6
The majority found additional justification for T.I.E.'s denial of cover-
age, stating that the parties could not have reasonably expected that
their CGL policy would require T.I.E. to defend a third party suit alleging
bodily injury caused by economic losses.3" The court stated that CGL
"policies were never intended to include emotional distress damages that
flow from an uncovered 'occurrence.'" ' Moreover, because of the well-
established rule that CGL policies do not cover economic losses,' a par-
(applying California law and affmiring that a CGL insurer owed no duty to defend a
suit based on emotional and physical distress resulting from economic losses caused
by an insured's alleged securities fraud); Chatton, 10 Cal. App. 4th 846, 857, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 318, 325 (denying coverage under CGL policy for emotional distress induced
by economic losses caused by an insured's negligent misrepresentations); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Interbank Fin. Servs., 215 Cal. App. 3d 825, 827, 264 Cal. Rptr. 25, 25 (1989)
(holding an insurer owed no duty under a CGL policy to defend a suit alleging bodi-
ly injury flowing from economic losses caused by an insured's poor investment ad-
vice); McLaughlin, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 1150, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 569 (holding
that a CGL policy does not cover emotional or physical distress induced by economic
losses caused by an insured's negligence).
33. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 20, 900 P.2d at 628, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 379.
34. Id. at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
35. Id. at 27, 900 P.2d at 633, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384.
36. Id. at 30, 900 P.2d at 635, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386.
37. Id. at 21, 900 P.2d at 629, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Interbank Fin. Servs., 215 Cal. App. 3d. 825, 830-31, 264 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28 (1989)); see
also McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 1151, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 559, 569 (1994) ("It wouh:l expand coverage of [CGL] policies far beyond any
reasonable expectation of the parties to sweep within their potential coverage any
alleged emotional or physical distress that might result from economic loss that is
itself clearly outside the scope of the policy.") (quoting Keating v. National Union
Fire Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 154, 156 (9th Cir. 1993)).
38. Walter, 11 Cal. 4th at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; Keating,
995 F.2d at 157 n.l.
39. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; see relevant
cases cited supra note 32.
ty could not reasonably expect that coverage would expand to include a
suit merely because it alleges emotional or physical distress caused by
intangible property loss.4° Thus, the supreme court held that there is no
potential basis for coverage under the bodily injury provision of the CGL
policy for any alleged physical or emotional distress flowing from eco-
nomic losses.4
The court in Waller also addressed the issue of whether a party on
appeal may rely on case law published after the close of the trial but
before the appeal.42 The supreme court observed that it is routine for
appellate courts to rely on newly published case law,' and supplemen-
tal briefs are properly utilized in this context.' Moreover, the supreme
court reaffirmed the well-settled principle that it is within the appellate
court's discretion to address an issue raised for the first time on appeal
involving a question of law regarding undisputed facts in the record.4"
The supreme court also noted that, as a general rule, civil decisions ap-
ply retroactively.46 Thus, the court held it was proper for the court of
appeal in Waller to consider cases, specifically, Keating and McLaughlin,
which were decided after the trial.47
The supreme court next addressed the issue of whether all unmen-
tioned coverage defenses are implicitly waived if not raised when cover-
age is declined.48 The majority refused to expand the doctrine of waiver
40. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 23-24, 900 P.2d at 630-31, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381-82.
43. Id. at 23-24, 900 P.2d at 631, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382; see, e.g., Hattersly v.
American Nucleonics Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 397, 402, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 331, 333 (1992)
(allowing appellant to rely on a newly decided opinion in litigating its appeal).
44. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; Meier v.
Ross Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 423, 445 P.2d 519, 522, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903, 906
(1968); see CAL. R. CT. 29.3(a) ("When a party desires to present new authorities ...
not available in time to have been included in the party's brief on the merits, the
party may serve and file a supplemental brief. .. ").
45. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 24, 900 P.2d at 631, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382; see, e.g.,
Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 742, 336 P.2d 634, 537 (1959). See generally 9 B.E.
WITICN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 323 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1995) (collecting
cases discussing questions of law raised on appeal).
46. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 24, 900 P.2d at 631, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382; see, e.g.,
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1993); Newman v. Emer-
son Radio Corp., 48 Cal. 3d 973, 978-82, 772 P.2d 1059, 1062-65, 258 Cal. Rptr. 592,
595-98 (1989); Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1207, 753 P.2d 585,
596, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 640 (1988).
47. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 24-25, 900 P.2d at. 631, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. The
court, relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Harper, also dismissed
the plaintiffs' contention that Keating should not be applied retroactively because
they relied on "pre-Keating law in deciding what facts needed to be explored." Id.;
see Harper, 113 S. Ct. at 2517 (holding that generally civil decisions "must be given
full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review").
48. Walter, 11 Cal. 4th at 30-31, 900 P.2d at 635, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386. The trial
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to provide coverage where none existed under the terms of the policy.49
The court stated that relinquishment of a right by waiver must be inten-
tional, and such intent must be shown by clear and convincing evidence
by the party asserting waiver as a defense.' Therefore, the court reject-
ed the "automatic waiver doctrine," holding instead that the insurer re-
tains the right to assert all applicable coverage defenses until they are
intentionally waived, unless the insured can show either misconduct by
the insurer or detrimental reliance by the insured."
court ruled that T.I.E.'s denial letter "waived policy based defenses not specified
therein." Id. The court of appeal did not address the issue. Id.
49. Id. at 31, 900 P.2d at 635, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386.
50. Id. at 31, 900 P.2d at 636, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387 (quoting City of Uldah v.
Fones, 64 Cal. 2d 104, 107-08, 410 P.2d 369, 370-71, 48 Cal. Rptr. 865, 866-67 (1962));
see, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1559-60 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that under California law an insurer retains the right to assert
coverage defenses not asserted when denying coverage unless the insured establishes
misconduct by the insurer or detrimental reliance by the insured); Aceves v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1473, 1476-77 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that an insurer may
raise all available coverage defenses unless the insured establishes detrimental reli-
ance); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Siliconix Inc., 726 F. Supp. 264, 270 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (holding that there is no waiver where there is no evidence of insurer's inten-
tional relinquishment of right to contest coverage); DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v.
Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe and Takeout Ill, Ltd., 30 Cal. App. 4th 54, 60, 35 Cal. Rptr.
2d 515, 518 (1994) (stating "waiver always rests upon intent"); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Jioras, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1619, 1628, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 840, 845 (1994)
(same); Velasquez v. Truck Ins. Exch., 1 Cal. App. 4th 712, 722, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6
(1991) (holding that failure to raise the limitations provision in a letter denying cover-
age does not evidence intent to waive the provision); Brookview Condominium
Owners' Ass'n v. Heltzer Enterprises-Brookview, 218 Cal. App. 3d 502, 513, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 76, 82 (1990) (stating waiver rests upon waiving party's intent). But see
McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 451 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(dictum) (stating "an insurance company which relies on specified grounds for deny-
ing a claim thereby waives the right to rely in a subsequent litigation on any other
grounds which a reasonable investigation would have uncovered"); Alta Cal. Regional
Ctr. v. Fremont Indem. Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th 455, 466, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 845
(1994) (dictum) (stating that an insurer automatically waives coverage defenses it fails
to assert when denying coverage). See generally 1 B.E. WrrIuN, SUMMARY OF CAIFOR-
NiA LAW, Contracts §§ 767-769 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (collecting sources dis-
cussing waiver of contractual rights); 11 B.E. WrrON, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW,
Equity § 178 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (distinguishing estoppel from waiver); 30
CAL. JUR. 3D Estoppel and Waiver §§ 22-26 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (collecting cases
analyzing estoppel and waiver); Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiv-
er, 28 UCLA L REV. 478 (1981) (discussing the doctrine of waiver).
51. Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 31-32, 900 P.2d at 636, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387. The ma-
jority observed that of the 33 states to consider the issue, only Vermont recognizes
the rule of automatic waiver. Id. at 32, 900 P.2d at 636, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 387 (cita-
The court stated that no waiver occurred in the instant case because
neither T.I.E.'s initial denial letter nor its subsequent acts revealed a
clear intent to waive defenses to coverage. 2 Additionally, the court re-
jected plaintiffs' estoppel argument, stating that it would have been un-
reasonable for the insured to rely on a belief that T.I.E. intended to
waive coverage defense in its denial letter.' Therefore, T.I.E. retained
the right to rely on the fact that Amey's complaint alleged emotional and
physical distress caused only by losses to intangible property as a de-
fense to coverage.'
The supreme court also affirmed the ruling that no cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith exists where an insurer
properly denies coverage under the policy135 The court emphasized that
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on the contractual
relationship of the parties.' Thus, a bad faith claim cannot be main-
tained where no policy benefits are due."
Finally, the majority addressed the alleged violations of California
Insurance Code section 790.03 which imposes on insurers an indepen-
dent duty to process all claims in a reasonable manner and with reason-
able efficiency, even when no coverage applies to the claim.' An insur-
er may be liable for unfair practices that are independent of the insur-
ance contract; however, the majority held that the record in Waller could
not establish that T.I.E. mishandled the processing of the request for
coverage.'
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard criticized the majority for failing to closely analyze
and uphold the "ordinary and unambiguous meaning of the policy lan-
guage."'M Justice Kennard would, however, affirm the appellate court's
decision because the policy specifically excluded coverage for the inju-
ries that the insured intended or expected, and the third party suit
against the insured alleged bodily injury caused only by "intentional" acts
tions omitted).
52. Id. at 34, 900 P.2d at 637, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388.
53. Id. at 34, 900 P.2d at 637-38, 44 Cal. Rptr. 12d at 388-89.
54. Id. at 31, 900 P.2d at 635-36, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386-37.
55. Id. at 36, 900 P.2d at 639, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390; see Love v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1153, 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 256 (1990).
56. Wa//er, 11 Cal. 4th at 36, 900 P.2d at 639, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
57. Id.; see Love, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1153, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (holding that
"bad faith claim cannot be maintained unless policy benefits are due").
58. Wailer, 11 Cal. 4th at 36, 900 P.2d at 639, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
59. Id. at 36-37, 900 P.2d at 639, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
60. Id. at 37, 900 P.2d at 640, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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"done for the purpose of causing [Amey] ... emotional and physical dis-
tress."6
Justice Kennard stated that the mutual intent of the parties in Waler,
as revealed by the terms of the policy, indicates coverage would apply to
bodily injury even if caused by intangible property damage. z In her
view, there was no evidence of the parties' intent to exclude from cov-
erage bodily injuries resulting from harm to intangible property.' In-
stead, she stated, the majority fashioned the parties' intent out of how it
believed insurance policies should be drafted.' Justice Kennard, in con-
trast, would follow the plain meaning of the insurance contract where, as
in Waler, the parties' intent is clearly and unambiguously expressed.'
Justice Kennard criticized the majority's blanket rule that the bodily
injury provision of the policy does not provide coverage if the bodily
injury is "related to" property damage not covered by the policy.' Jus-
tice Kennard interpreted T.I.E.'s policy to provide bodily injury coverage
to any event that "result[ed] in bodily injury."67 She stated that "[ain oc-
currence does not become a nonoccurrence simply because the event
causes both bodily injury and economic loss."' Thus, in contrast to the
majority, which relied on the interdependence between the property and
bodily injury provisions in the CGL policy,' Justice Kennard viewed the
bodily injury and property damage clauses as independent bases for
coverage. 6 She emphasized that a duty to defend is triggered when any
61. Id. at 37-38, 900 P.2d at 640, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 391 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
62. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
63. Id. at 43-44, 900 P.2d at 644, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
64. Id. at 43-44, 900 P.2d at 644-45, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395-96 (Kennard, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
65. Id. at 48, 900 P.2d at 647, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
66. Id. at 43-44, 900 P.2d at 644, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
67. Id. at 44, 900 P.2d at 645, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 396 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
68. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
69. Id. at 26-27, 900 P.2d at 632-33, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383-84; see supra notes 28-
41 and accompanying text.
70. Waller, 11 Cal. 4th at 45, 900 P.2d at 645, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 396 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard, in support of her view of the indepen-
dence between the bodily injury clause and the property damage clause of the CGL
policy, noted that the types of coverage "are subject to different exclusions, can be
potential basis for liability under the policy is alleged.7' Justice Kennard
noted that in the instant case, in contrast to Chatton,7 Keating,73 and
McLaughlin,7" where emotional or physical distress flowed successively
from intangible property losses, the insured concurrently caused the
bodily injury and economic losses.7 '5 Thus, the complaint alleged some
potential basis for coverage. 6 Finally, Justice Kennard noted that T.I.E.,
as drafter of the policy, could have included in the policy an exclusion
for bodily injury resulting from economic losses if that had been the
parties' intent.
77
Justice Kennard concurred in the majority's resolution of the case
because the CGL policy in Waller provided no coverage for intentionally
caused injuries.' In light of the fact that Amey's complaint only alleged
injuries intentionally caused by the insured, the insurer was justified in
denying coverage.79 Based on this ground, Justice Kennard would affirm
the appellate court's decision."0
separately purchased, and can be subject to different liability limits." Id. (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. at 47, 900 P.2d at 646, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 1084, 846
P.2d 792, 797, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 215 (1993).
72. Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 4th 846, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d
318 (1992).
73. Keating v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1993).
74. McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 23 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 559 (1989).
75. WaUer, 11 Cal 4th at 47, 900 P.2d at 646-47, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397-98
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
76. Id. at 4748 n.8, 900 P.2d at 647 n.8, 44 Ca. Rptr. 2d at 398 n.8 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Illustrating her view of the flaws in the majority's ruling,
Justice Kennard opined that where a policy covered bodily injury but not property
damage, an insurer could avoid coverage under the majority's rule "if the insured's
car strikes and damages a tree that falls and injures someone." Id. at 48, 900 P.2d at
647, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
77. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. Id. at 42, 900 P.2d at 643, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
79. Id. at 43, 900 P.2d at 643-44, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394-95 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
80. Id. at 49, 900 P.2d at 648, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 399 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Waller represents a clear victory for insurance companies."' Waller
holds that for the insurer's duty to defend to be triggered under the bodi-
ly injury provision of a CGL policy, a lawsuit or other evidence must
show that the alleged "bodily injury" flows from some source other than
intangible property losses. 2 Although the third party complaint at the
heart of Waller alleged bodily injuries resulting from both the insured's
intentional acts as well as from economic losses,' nevertheless, the ma-
jority stated that all of the injuries were "directly related to" the intangi-
ble property losses which were not covered under the policy.' Under
the majority's view, the bodily injury and property damage clauses of a
CGL are interdependent. Thus, to obtain coverage, a complaint must
allege bodily injury that is not directly related to the noncovered proper-
ty damage.' In this manner, Wa/ler will decrease the bodily injury cov-
erage provided by a typical CGL policy that, on its face, covers bodily
injury independent of whether any related property damage is covered by
the policy. 7
However, the majority's "directly related to" language in Waller may
pose problems for courts in the future.' In Horace Mann, the California
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the argument that a duty to defend
under a CGL would hinge on whether the policy provided coverage for
the "dominant factor" of a lawsuit, reaffirming instead that any potential
basis for coverage will trigger the insurer's duty to defend. " The line
81. T.I.E. itself avoided a $60,000,000 judgment. Id. at 14-15, 900 P.2d at 624-25, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375-76. More significantly, Waler relieves an insurer of the duty to
defend under a CGL policy in those cases where the alleged bodily injuries, which
on the face of the CGL policy are covered, are directly related to an uncovered in-
tangible property loss. Id. at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; see supra
notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
82. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 23, 900 P.2d at 630, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; see supra
notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
83. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 47 n.8, 900 P.2d at 646-47 n.8, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397-98
n.8 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
84. Id. at 30, 900 P.2d at 635, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386.
85. See supra notes 28-41, 66-77 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
87. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 45, 49, 900 P.2d at 645, 648, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397, 398
(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying
text.
88. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
89. Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 1084, 846 P.2d 792, 797,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 215 (1993).
between Wa//er and Horace Mann is a thin one.' Certainly, if a lawsuit
alleges several causes of action of which at least one alleges a potentially
covered risk, as in Horace Mann, the insurer owes a duty to defend."
Just as clearly, an insurer owes no duty to defend, and the "directly-relat-
ed" language in Waler is satisfied, where the alleged bodily injury is so
incidental to the noncovered acts as to be solely caused by them.' Yet,
it remains unclear after Waler at what point the insurer's duty to defend
is triggered where the insured's acts concurrently induce both potentially
covered bodily injury as well as noncovered damages.
Justice Kennard opined that if the parties had intended, T.I.E., as the
drafter of the policy, could have specifically excluded from coverage,
under the bodily injury provision, emotional or physical distress damages
resulting from uncovered intangible property losses." Given that courts
tend to follow the doctrine of contra proferentem, construing insurance
policies against the insurers, the prudent drafter of CGL insurance poli-
cies will see this caveat in Justice Kennard's concurrence as a factor to
consider when drafting CGL policies.'
KIRK ALAN WALTON
90. In Waler, Amey's complaint alleged bodily injuries caused concurrently by the
economic losses and by the insured's intentional acts. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 47 n.8,
900 P.2d at 646-47 n.8, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397-98 n.8 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting). The majority in Waler based its holding on its view that the alleged
bodily injury was caused by the "identical business and contract transgressions" com-
prising the rest of the complaint and thus was so "directly related" to the
noncovered intangible property damage that the "noncovered acts ... comprised the
entire complaint." Id. at 29, 900 P.2d at 634, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385; see supra notes
28-36 and accompanying text. In Horace Mann, a sexual misconduct complaint al-
leged at least one potentially covered risk, i.e., the negligent acts of the insured.
Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1084, 846 P.2d at 798, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 216.
91. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1084, 846 P.2d at 797, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215.
92. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
93. Waler, 11 Cal. 4th at 48, 900 P.2d at 647, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398.
94. Id.
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VII. INSURANCE LAW
In third party liability insurance cases involving contin-
uous or progressively deteriorating losses and successive
comprehensive general liability policy periods, a contin-
uous injury trigger of coverage applies: Montrose
Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,' the California
Supreme Court grappled with the issue of "whether four comprehensive
general liability (CGL) policies issued by... Admiral Insurance Company
(Admiral) to ... Montrose Chemical Corporation of California
(Montrose) obligate Admiral to defend Montrose in lawsuits seeking
damages for continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily injury and
property damage that occurred during the successive policy periods."'
The court unanimously adopted a continuous trigger of coverage which
obligates insurers to defend their policy holders against continuous and
progressive damage claims that might have arisen before the issuance of
the policy.3 The court granted review on this issue to resolve a conflict
between the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One and the Sev-
enth District, Division Two.' This case also raised the issue of the degree
of knowledge necessary to invoke the loss-in-progress doctrine and
1. 10 Cal. 4th 645, 897 P.2d 1, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324 (1995). Chief Justice Lucas
wrote the majority opinion of the court, in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Arabian,
George, and Werdegar joined. Id. at 654-94, 897 P.2d at 3-30, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326-
53. Justice Baxter wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 695-97, 897 P.2d at 30-32, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 353-55 (Baxter, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 654, 897 P.2d at 3, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326.
3. Id. at 654-55, 897 P.2d at 3-4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326-27. In the context of third-
party continuous claims, therefore, all insurance policies that take effect at any time
during the contamination period potentially provide coverage. Id.
4. Compare Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 4th 335, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 358 (1992) (using a continuous trigger) with Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1990) (adopting a manifes-
tation of damage trigger in a construction defect context) and Pines of La Jolla Home-
owners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 5 Cal. App. 4th 714, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (1992) (fol-
lowing Fireman's Fund and using a manifestation of damage trigger). See infra notes
74-89 and accompanying text for an explanation of the evolution of the conflict in
California law. See also Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d at
674, 679, 694, 798 P.2d at 1230, 1233, 1243, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 390, 400 (1990) (re-
serving this issue).
whether the receipt of a "potentially responsible party" (PRP) letter
crossed that threshold.' In holding that "as long as there remains uncer-
tainty about damage... and the imposition of liability... and no legal
obligation to pay third party claims has been established, there is a po-
tentially insurable risk," the court concluded that a PRP letter alone is
insufficient to trigger the loss-in-progress doctrine.6
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between the years 1947 and 1982, Montrose manufactured dichloro-
diphenyl-trichlorethane (DDT)7 and over the period from 1960 to 1986,
seven different carriers issued CGL polices to Montrose.' Admiral fur-
nished four consecutive policies9 covering Montrose from October 13,
1982 to March 20, 1986.1"
Five individual actions required Admiral to defend Montrose, which
were divided into two distinct groups: the Stringfellow cases and the
Levin Metals cases.1' The first line of Stringfellow cases involved an.
action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA)'2 brought by the United States and Cal-
ifornia against Montrose and various other businesses for "reim.-
bursement for response costs incurred... at and near the... waste
disposal site known as the Stringfellow acid pits."" Montrose had
5. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 689-93, 897 P.2d at 27-31, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350-54.
See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for discussion of the loss-in-progress is-
sue; see also infra'note 17 for discussion of the implications of a PRP letter.
6. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 693, 897 P.2d at 29, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352.
7. Id. at 655, 897 P.2d at 4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 327. DDT contains "a suspected hu-
man carcinogen." Id. at 658, 897 P.2d at 5, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328.
8. Id. at 656, 897 P.2d at 4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 327.
9. The policy language specifically obligated Admiral to "'pay on behalf of the in-
sured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of ... bodily injury, or . . .property damage to which the insurance applies,
caused by an occurrence.'" Id. The policy defined an occurrence as "'an accident, in-
cluding continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury
or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.'"
Id. All four Admiral policies reflected standa-d 1986 CGL Insurance Services Office
(ISO) language. Id. at 668-69, 897 P.2d at 12-13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335-36; see also
RONALD B. ROME ET AL., CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION § 5:9
(1993) (describing the major changes made to CGL policies in 1966, 1973, and 1986).
10. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 656, 897 P.2d at 4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 327.
11. Id. at 656-59, 897 P.2d at 4-6, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 327-29.
12. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995). The primary purposes of CERCLA
are to clean up the nation's hazardous waste sites and ultimately to cause the re-
sponsible parties to pay for the damage sustained by natural resources. Kevin M. Ward,
Recovery of Natural Resource Damages Under" CERCLA, 25 TORT & INS. LJ. 559
(1990); see also ROBIE, supra note 9, §§ 3:1, 3:2.
13. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 656-51, 897 P.2d at 5, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328.
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dumped byproducts from its DDT manufacturing process at this site
between 1968 and 1972." The complaint alleged that toxic wastes had
been seeping from the acid pits beginning in 1956.15 The other part of
the Stringfellow cases involved set of lawsuits brought by numerous
private plaintiffs seeking damages for bodily injury and property dam-
age."6 Of particular interest is that "[o]n August 31, 1982, six weeks prior
to commencement of the policy term under the first of Admiral's policies
issued to Montrose, Montrose was notified by the federal Environmental
Protection Agency... that it considered Montrose a potentially responsi-
ble party" for the costs incurred in the cleanup at the Stringfellow acid
pits.1
7
The second group of cases involved an action "brought by Levin Met-
als against Parr-Richmond, alleging that real property sold by Parr-Rich-
mond to Levin Metals... was contaminated by hazardous wastes."
S
Montrose's liability in the present case related to chemicals shipped by
them to that site. 9
Naturally, Montrose tendered its defense to all of its insurers, including
Admiral." Montrose brought a declaratory relief action to establish that
all the insurers had both a duty to defend and -a duty to indemnify.2'
Admiral alone moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there
was duty to either defend or indemnify.' The trial court granted the
14. Id. at 657, 897 P.2d at 5, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328. The government's CERCLA
action did not allege bodily injury. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The complaint alleged that 27 deaths resulted from the release of tri-
chlorethylene. Id.
17. Id. at 658, 897 P.2d at 5-6, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328-29. See infra notes 97-101
and accompanying text for a discussion of the implications of a PRP letter and the
known loss rule. In order to be held liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA, a party
must be identified as a potentially responsible party. ROBIE, supra note 9, § 3:3. The
implications of a PRP letter are enormous because the party may be found responsible
for. (1) all costs of removal and remediation; (2) any other necessary cost; (3) damag-
es; and (4) cost of health assessment. Id. Additionally, if these expenses are indivisible,
the PRPs are jointly and severally liable. Id. § 3:18.
18. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 658, 897 P.2d at 6, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329.
19. Id. at 658-59, 897 P.2d at 6, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329. More accurately, the
chemicals shipped by Montrose were in turn processed by a third party and the re-
sulting by products caused the contamination. Id.
20. Id. Six other insurers also issued CGL policies to Montrose. Id.
21. Id. The court carefully limited this case to the duty to defend and not the duty
to indemnify. Id. at n.9, 897 P.2d at 6 n.9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 329 n.9.
22. Id. at 659-60, 897 P.2d at 7, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330. The other remaining insur-
ers agreed to defend, subject to a reservation of rights. Id. at 659, 897 P.2d at 7, 42
motion and dismissed the action as to Admiral.' The court of appeal re-
versed the trial court and "remanded Admiral's affirmative defense, and
declined "to address [Admiral's] argument... that coverage for progres-
sive damage at the Stringfellow site is also barred."4 The California Su-
preme Court granted review.25
III. TREATMENT OF CASE
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Trigger of Coverage in Third Party Progressive Loss Cases
As noted above, the California Supreme Court adopted a continuous
trigger of coverage supported by: (1) the specific policy language;2" (2)
settled California case law;2" (3) the drafting history of CGL policies;'
and (4) various policy considerations.29
a. Preliminary considerations
Before addressing the trigger of coverage issue and to accurately set
the context of the decision, the court explored several preliminary con-
siderations. In reaching its decision, the court placed great emphasis on:
(1) the differences between third party and first party insurance; (2) the
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330. Admiral argued on two grounds: (1) that the circumstances trig-
gering coverage in the Levin Metals cases "did not occur during the policy periods;"
and (2) the contamination alleged in the Stringfellow cases was "an uninsurable loss-in-
progress." Id. The court noted that "Admiral did not advance the loss-in-progress theo-
ry in the Levin Metals cases." Id. at n.ll, 897 P.2d at 9 n.l, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332
n.11.
23. Id. at 660, 897 P.2d at 7, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330. The trial court applied a mani-
festation trigger and reasoned that there was no possibility for coverage because the
contamination in the Levin Metals cases was discovered before the commencement of
the first Admiral policy. Id. For a discussion of the manifestation trigger of coverage,
see infra note 70 and accompanying text. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the StringfeUow cases, reasoning that the loss-in-progress rule barred liability under
Admiral's policies because the a PRP letter implied that Montrose knew its liability for
the contamination was "likely." Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 660, 897 P.2d at 7, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 330. For a discussion of the loss-in-progress rule, see infra notes 97-101
and accompanying text.
24. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 660, 897 P.2d at 7, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330; see
Montrose, 35 Cal. App. 4th 335, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358.
25. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 661, 897 P.2d at 7-8, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330-31.
26. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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differences between bodily injury and property damage; and (3) the rele-
vance of the facts surrounding the actual event.'
First-party insurance policies generally cover loss or damage sustained
by the insured, and the insured is paid when the event happens.3' In
contrast, third party insurance "provides coverage for liability of the
insured to a 'third party,'" and the insurer pays on the policy only when
the insured becomes "legally obligated" for damages.' The court distin-
guished third-party liability insurance from first-party property insur-
ance:' by noting four inherent differences: (1) causation; (2) parties' ex-
pectations; (3) conditions of coverage; and (4) required party actions.'
First-party policies raise different causation issues as opposed to those
raised in third-party policies.' Coverage under a first-party policy is trig-
gered when a loss is caused by "certain enumerated perils." ' Under a
third-party liability policy, coverage is predicated on "'traditional tort
concepts of fault, proximate cause, and duty.'"37 Thus the key difference
30. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 663, 897 P.2d at 9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332. The court
made these distinctions primarily to clearly explain the proper factors to consider in
deciding a trigger of coverage issue and to differentiate the manifestation trigger adopt-
ed in Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 678-79, 798
P.2d 1230, 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 389 (1990) (holding "in first party property damag-
es casels] ... the carrier insuring the property at the time of manifestation of proper-
ty damage is solely responsible for indemnification once coverage is found to exist").
31. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 663, 897 P.2d at 9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332. Under a
first party policy, the insurer will compensate the insured for all covered losses up to
the specified policy limit. See 1 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
LAW § 1.61 (2d ed. 1984).
32. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 663, 897 P.2d at 9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332; see also
Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 399, 770 P.2d 704, 705,
257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293 (1989) (discussing coverage under a first-party homeowner's
insurance policy). Third-party policies are set up to cover all liability actions except
those specifically excluded. See also Chandra Lantz, Note, Triggering Coverage of Pro-
gressive Property Loss: Preserving the Distinctions Between First-and Third-Party
Insurance Polices, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801, 1801-02 n.4 (1994) (citing 1 WARREN
FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON INSURANCE § 4:7 (6th ed. 1990)).
33. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 665, 897 P.2d at 10-11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333-34; see
also Lantz, supra note 32, at 1801-02 n.4 (reviewing the policy reasons and precedents
involved in trigger of coverage issues).
34. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 663-65, 897 P.2d at 9-11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332-34.
35. Id. at 663-64, 897 P.2d at 9-10, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332-33.
36. Id. at 663, 897 P.2d at 9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332. This generally refers to "for-
tuitous, active, physical forces such as lightning, wind, and explosion." Id. (citations
omitted).
37. Id. at 664, 897 P.2d at 10, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333 (quoting Garvey v. State Farm
Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 407, 770 P.2d 704, 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298
in the liability analysis focuses on the "'broader spectrum of risks"' cov-
ered by the policy.'
Secondly, the expectations of the parties differ greatly depending on
first- or third-party coverage.9 An insured purchases first-party insur-
ance in order to cover the full potential loss, which is generally the value
of the insured property. 4° On the other hand, a third-party policy re-
quires that the insured and the insurer make an "educated guess" as to
the maximum amount of exposure and adjust the premium according-
ly.41
The court drew a third distinction between the two types of policies
by noting that "CGL policies do not impose, as a condition of coverage, a
requirement that the damage or injury be discovered at any particular
point in time."42 Standard third-party policy language provides for cover-
age upon an "occurrence.
"41
Chief Justice Lucas noted as a final distinction the different actions
policies require a party to take.44 In most cases, first-party insurance
policies mandate that the insured bring an "action against the insurer
within twelve months after 'inception of the loss."'45 Conversely, a CGL
policy fails to impose such a duty because the injured third party is gen-
erally the initiator of legal action.46
In addition to the distinction between first- and third-party insurance,
the court focused on whether the policy covered "bodily injury, property
damage, or both."47 Fortunately, Admiral's policies covered both types
of damage so the court failed to draw any distinctions.4
(1989) (citations omitted)). Rather than a "grocery list" of covered or uncovered acts,
the third-party liability policy spans all negligence on the part of the insured. Id.; see
also 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts §§ 237-395 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
rules governing enforcement of insurance contracts).
38. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 664, 897 P.2d at 10, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333 (quoting
Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 407, 770 P.2d at 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 298).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 664, 897 P.2d at tO, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
42. Id.
43. Id. These policies generally define occurrence "as an accident . . . including a
'continuous or repeated exposure to conditionis,' that results in bodily injury or prop-
erty damage during the policy period." Id.; see infra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text.
44. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 664-65, 897 P.2d at 10, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333.
45. Id. (citing Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 682-
87, 798 P.2d 1230, 1234-38, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 391-95 (1990)). This requirement imposes
on the insureds a duty to know when they have suffered a loss. Id. (citing Prudential-
LMI, 51 Cal. 3d 686-87, 798 P.2d 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 395).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 666, 897 P.2d at 11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334.
[Vol. 23: 245, 1996] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Finally, the individual facts of the case come into play when exploring
the last preliminary consideration." The triggering event is significant
because it can be either: (1) "a single event resulting in immediate inju-
ry;" (2) "a single event resulting in delayed or progressively deteriorating
injury;" or (3) "a continuing event... resulting in single or multiple inju-
ries." ° The court noted that the instant case contained both claims of
continuous or progressively deteriorating bodily inury ... and progres-
sively deteriorating property damage... all arising from continuous or
repeated exposure... over time."5 Ultimately, the court placed a great
deal of importance on all three distinctions and stressed the significant
role such differences play in determining a coverage-triggering issue.'
b. Policy language
In this section of its analysis the court explored standard rules of con-
tract interpretation because "[i]nsurance policies are contracts."' Ac-
cordingly, the threshold question becomes whether the policy language is
clear' or ambiguous.55 The supreme court, in contrast to the court of
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. It is unclear what distinction the court would have made if the triggering
event were a single event with immediate injury or a single event with delayed or
progressively deteriorating injury. For a discussion of the application of this decision to
construction defect and asbestos litigation, see supra notes 13442 and accompanying
text.
52. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 665-66, 897 P.2d at 10-11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 333-34.
The court warned that "cases whose analyses fail to take these distinctions into ac-
count . . .may shed more darkness than light on the [issues of allocation and trigger
of coverage]." Id. at 665, 897 P.2d at 11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334.
53. Id. at 666, 897 P.2d at 11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334. The court acknowledged
rather typical rules of contract interpretation: (1) the parties' mutual intention governs
interpretation; and (2) intent is inferred from the contract itself. Id. at 666-67, 897 P.2d
at 11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334; see also CAL CIV. CODE §§ 1636, 1639, 1649, 1654 (West
1995) (defining and explaining interpretation of intent); 39 CAL JUR. 3D Insurance Con-
tracts, §§ 3745 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (discussing contract construction and interpreta-
tion; and 1 B.E. WrrEuN, SUMMARY OF CAWFORNiA LAW, Contracts §§ 699-704 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1995) (reviewing insurance contracts generally).
54. When policy language is "clear and explicit," the ordinary sense controls. CAL.
Civ. CODE §§ 1638, 1644 (West 1995).
55. When ambiguity exists, "it is resolved by interpreting the ambiguous provision in
the sense ...the insurer . . . believed the [insured] understood them at the time of
formation." Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 667, 897 P.2d at 11, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d(at 334 (para-
phrasing California Civil Code § 1649); see also 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts
§§ 39, 42 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (discussing intent of contracting parties); 1 B.E. WITIGN,
appeal, found "that the express language of Admiral's policies of insur-
ance, when read as a whole, unambiguously provides potential coverage
for the continuous and progressively deteriorating bodily injury and prop-
erty damage alleged."' Chief Justice Lucas focused on the triggering
language for coverage 7 and the definition of occurrence' in reaching
this conclusion.'
c. Settled case law and the drafting history of the standard CGL
policy
Admiral argued that to adopt a continuous trigger of coverage "is 'to
ignore[] the policy language'" and unnecessarily impose on subsequent
policies the duty to defend.' The court flatly rejected this argument
based on the policy language,"settled case law," and "the drafting history
SUMMARY OF CALUFORNIA LAw, Contracts § 699 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (explaining
contract ambiguity). For a general background discussion of the drafting process of the
CGL policy in the United States, see American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1500-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). If this rule fails to resolve the
ambiguity, then the vague language is construed against the party who caused the
ambiguity. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 667, 897 P.2d at 11-12, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 334-35.
Finally, if the ambiguity still exists, it is resolved against the insurer. Id. The court
reasoned that because the insurer generally drafts the policy and the insured has little
or no bargaining power as to the policy's modification, these rules of construction
were reasonable. Id. at 667, 897 P.2d at 12, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335; see also 39 CAL
JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 42 (1977. & Supp. 1995) (explaining construction of
contract ambiguity in favor of the insured).
56. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 668, 897 P.2d at 12, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335 (emphasis
added). In contrast, the court of appeal held "[tihe dozens of judicial definitions attrib-
uted to 'occurrence' leaves little room for argument about whether we are dealing with
an ambiguity." Montrose, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 348, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. In fact, the
Second District undertook an entire analysis of the expectations of the parties and the
meaning of "occurrence." Id. at 348-54, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-70. Eventually, the court
of appeal concluded that the insurer reasonably anticipated coverage for progressive
continuing injuries in successive policies. Id. at 353, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369; see also
ROBIE, supra note 9, § 5:9 (examining the interpretation of "occurrence" in California);
Stuart I. Parker, Insurance Coverage Issues Arising Out of Environmental Litigation,
available in WESTLAW, C757 All-ABA 495 (1992) (illustrating the perception that com-
mon occurrence language is generally considered ambiguous).
57. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 668, 897 P.2d at 12-13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 335-36. The
policy specifically obligated Admiral to pay all sums "'the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages because of ... bodily injury, or. . . property dam-
age . . . caused by an occurrence.'" Id. (quoting the policy language). According to the
policy, the bodily injury or property damage must "occur during the policy period" in
order to trigger coverage. Id. at 668, 897 P.2d at 13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336.
58. The policy defined occurrence as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage." Id. at 669,
897 P.2d at 13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336 (emphasis in original).
59. Id.
60. Id. See infra note 72 for a discussion of the injury-in-fact trigger of coverage.
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of the standard CGL policy."" In construing the policy language to sup-
port a continuous trigger of coverage, Chief Justice Lucas placed heavy
emphasis on Remmer v. Glens. Falls Indemnity Co.,62 which stands for
the proposition that coverage begins at the time of actual damage to the
party.' "'The general rule is that the time of the. occurrence of an acci-
dent within the meaning of an indemnity policy is not the time the
wrongful act was committed, but the time when the complaining party
was actually damaged.'"'
The court then shifted its analysis to CGL drafting history and its use-
fulness in determining coverage issues.' Chief Justice Lucas concluded
the specific changes made to the language of the standard CGL policy
and the drafting history clearly indicated that the policy covered "all
property damage or injury occurring during that period."' More impor-
tantly, the policy language failed to exclude continuous or progressive
damage or injury that occurred during the policy period.67 Accordingly,
the court held that all policies during the period of continuous injury
were in effect.8
61. Id. at 669-73, 897 P.2d at 13-16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336-39. See infra note 71 for
discussion of the continuous trigger of coverage.
62. 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956).
63. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 669, 897 P.2d at 13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336.
64. Id. at 670, 897 P.2d at 13, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336 (emphasis added) (quoting
Remmer, 140 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 295 P.2d at 21).
65. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 670-73, 897 P.2d at 14-16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337-39; see
also ROBIE, supra note 9, § 5:9 (tracing changes to the language of the CGL policies).
66. Id. at 672-73, 897 P.2d at 15, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 673, 897 P.2d at 16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
d. Applicable case law and authorities discussing trigger of
coverage for continuous damage or injury over successive
policy periods
Courts have formulated four general "trigger" theories that give rise to
coverage: (1) the exposure or continuous exposure trigger; 9 (2) the
manifestation or manifestation of loss trigger;" (3) the continuous injury
or multiple trigger;7 and (4) the injury in fact trigger.72 The California
69. Id. at 674, 897 P.2d at 16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339. The continuous exposure
trigger "focuses on the date on which the injury-producing agent first contacts the
body." Id. The insurer is liable for all policies in effect from the point of injury on-
ward. Id.; see also Nicholas R. Andrea, Comment, Exposure, Manifestation of Loss,
Injury-In-Fact, Continuous Trigger: The Insurance Coverage Quagmire, 21 PEPP. L.
REv. 813, 831-36 (1994) (explaining the applicability of the exposure trigger in the con-
text of bodily injury and property damage); see, e.g., Continental Ins. Cos. v.
Northeastern Pharms. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying an exposure
trigger of coverage in the context of environmental, contamination), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 821 (1988); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations Inc., 633 F.2d 1212
(6th Cir. 1980) (adopting the exposure theory for asbestos litigation), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981).
70. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 674-75, 897 P.2d at 16-17, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339-40.
Under a manifestation of loss trigger, only the insurer whose policy is in effect at the
time when- appreciable damage occurs is held liable. Id. Manifestation occurs when in-
juries first become reasonably capable of medical diagnosis. Id.; see also Andrea, supra
note 69, at 836-41 (explaining the applicability of the manifestation trigger in the con-
text of first- and third-party coverage); see, e.g., Chemstar, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
797 F. Supp. 1541 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding the insurer at the time of manifestation of
damage liable even if damage progresses after the policy expires); Pines of La Jolia
Homeowners Ass'n v. Industrial Indem., 5 Cal. App. 4th 714, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53; Jack-
son v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 835 P.2d 786 (Nev. 1992) (holding insurer liable
whose policy was effective when progressive damage manifested).
71. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 675, 897 P.2d at 17, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340. "[Blodily
injuries and property damage that are continuous or progressively deteriorating
throughout successive policy periods are covered by all policies in effect during those
periods." Id. The actual time of the event causing the injury is relatively unimportant
"to establishing coverage [because] it can occur before or during the policy period."
Id.; see also Andrea, supra note 69, at 843-49 (discussing the applicability of the con-
tinuous trigger of coverage to both personal injury claims and property injury claims);
see, e.g., J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa 1993)
(holding that insurers who policies are in effect between time of exposure and mami-
festation are liable); Lac D'Amiante Du Que., Ltee. v. American Home Assurance Co.,
613 F. Supp. 1549 (D.N.J. 1985) (noting that continuing injury or damage triggers liabili-
ty as long as any part occurred during policy period).
72. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 675-76, 897 P.2d at 17-18, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340-41.
Coverage begins when the insured first suffers actual injury. Id. This has the effect of
eliminating liability from the point of exposure to the point of injury-in-fact. Id.; see
also Andrea, supra note 69, at 841-43 (presenting a brief history of the evolution and
applicability of the injury-in-fact trigger of coverage and noting it as the least recog-
nized of the four trigger theories); see, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Associated Indem.
Corp., 724 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding coverage triggered when damage
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Supreme Court paid particular attention to the development and appli-
cation of the various trigger theories in California, but conceded that the
language of the policies must dictate which trigger ultimately applies. '3
In California, courts have applied only two of the trigger theories for
third-party continuous or progressive injury: manifestation and continu-
ous injury. 4 California Union Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance
Co. 5 was the first California case to address the issue of successive
third-party liability insurance policies for property damage that was both
continuous and progressive." California Union, a construction defect
case, involved the construction of a swimming pool that caused property
damage over a period of a year and a half.7 The court of appeal held
both successive insurers liable and adopted a continuous trigger on the
grounds that the occurrence language was sufficient to trigger the poli-
cies."
The court then turned to the Fourth District's adoption of a manifesta-
tion trigger.' In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,' another construction defect case, a contractor defectively
restored a hotel facade, which caused it to crack over the period of the
next year.8 The court based its decision on Home Insurance Co. v.
Landmark Insurance Co.,82 which was a first-party insurance case.'
The supreme court's preliminary considerations regarding the differences
between first-party and third-party policies became the grounds for criti-
actually occurred).
73. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 677-85, 897 P.2d at 19-24, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342-47.
74. Id.
75. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
76. Id. at 468-78, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 464-71.
77. Id. at 466, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
78. Id. at 473-76, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467-69. The court specifically relied on Gruol
Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524 P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (adopting
a continuous trigger of coverage in a progressive injury situation), Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (putting forth an exposure
trigger of coverage), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) and Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (adopting a continuous trigger based
primarily on the expectations of the parties and the ambiguous policy language), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982)).
79. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 682-85, 897 P.2d at 22-24, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 345-47.
80. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1990).
81. Id. at 1624, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31.
82. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1988).
83. Id. at 1390, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 278.
cizing Fireman's Fund as unreasoned.' In Pines of La Jolla Homeown-
ers Ass'n v. Industrial Indemnity,' the only case to follow Fireman's
Fund, "the Fourth District... concluded that a manifestation theory
should be applied in determining the trigger of potential coverage... for
continuous property damage resulting from construction defects."'
Recently, however, in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Transamerica Insur-
ance Co.,87 the Fourth District declined to follow its own rationale from
Fireman's Fund.' Zurich involved a construction defect case with suc-
cessive periods of coverage and progressive damage.' Even though the
case was factually similar to Fireman's Fund and Pines, the court
adopted a continuing injury trigger "in this [third party] liability con-
text,... [where] property damage occurred... and continued... [over
the period of several years]."' Fireman's Fund and Pines remain the
only examples of the manifestation trigger in California jurisprudence.
In light of this, Chief Justice Lucas concluded that California jurispru-
dence currently supports a continuous injury trigger in third-party liabil-
ity cases in which a continuous or progressive loss extends over succes-
sive CGL policy periods.9
e. Policy considerations in support of a continuous injury trigger
As final support for a continuous trigger, Chief Justice Lucas examined
a number of policy considerations.' Admiral adopted a policy put forth
by the California Supreme Court in Prudential and argued that the court
should follow the general policy to establish predictable underwriting
practices to allow insurance companies to set aside proper reserves."3
The court rejected this argument by noting that insurers can predictably
rely on the courts to apply equitable considerations and to spread the
cost among the several insurers.' As an additional policy consideration,
because the insurance industry willingly and knowingly changed to an
84. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 682-85, 897 P.2d at 22-24, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 345-47.
85. 5 Cal. App. 4th 714, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (1992).
86. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 684, 897 P.2d at 23-24, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346-47.
87. 34 Cal. App. 4th 933, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 913 (1994), superseded by 889 P.2d 539,
38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345 (1995).
88. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 685, 897 P.2d at 24, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
89. Zurich, 34 Cal. App. 4th 933, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914.
90. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 685, 897 P.2d at 24, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347.
91. Id. The Montrose court specifically disapproved of Pines and Fireman's Fund to
the extent those decisions contradict the court's holding. Id.
92. Id. at 685-89, 897 P.2d at 24-27, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347-50.
93. Id. at 687, 897 P.2d at 25, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348. In applying a manifestation
trigger in Prudential, the court acknowledged this rationale and the certainty it lends
to underwriting practices. Id.
94. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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"occurrence" based policy with full knowledge of the implications, insur-
ers should have been aware and set aside the proper reserves. 5 Ulti-
mately, the court concluded that the adoption of a manifestation trigger
would unduly transform the policy into a "claims made" policy and effec-
tively rewrite the policy in favor of the insurer.'
In light of the policy language, settled California law, CGL drafting
history, and other policy considerations, the court held that a continuous
trigger of coverage applies in third-party liability insurance cases involv-
ing continuous or progressively deteriorating losses and successive CGL
policy periods.
2. Loss-In-Progress Rule
Admiral argued that the loss-in-progress rule precluded coverage be-
cause Montrose had knowledge of the problems at the Stringfellow site
as shown by its receipt of a PRP letter in August 1982.' 7 The court dis-
95. Id. at 687-88, 897 P.2d at 26, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349. In 1966, the insurance
industry specifically rejected the inclusion of a manifestation trigger of coverage based
on the following reasons: (1) the difficulty of applying a manifestation trigger in cases
of continuous damage over successive policies; (2) who was to carry the burden of
discovery; and (3) the problem with placing all the liability on one policy. Id. See su-
pra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for discussion of the drafting history of CGL
policies.
96. Id. at 688-89, 897 P.2d at 26-27, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349-50. Insurers designed
claims-made policies to limit their risk to "the single policy in effect at the time a
claim was asserted." Id. at 688, 897 P.2d at 26, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349.
97. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 689-93, 897 P.2d at 27-29, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350-52.
Montrose received the PRP letter on August 31, 1982, six weeks before Admiral issued
the first policy. Id. at 658, 897 P.2d at 5-6, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328-29. See supra note
17 for a discussion of the implications of a PRP letter.
The loss-in-progress rule is based upon two provisions in the California Insurance
Code. Section 22 provides that insurance covers "a contingent or unknown event" Id.
at 689-90, 897 P.2d at 27, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West
1995)). Section 250 provides in pertinent part: "any contingent or unknown event,
whether past or future, which may damnify a person having an insurable interest, or
create a liability against him, may be insured against." Id. (quoting CAL INS. CODE
§ 250 (West 1995)).
The loss-in-progress rule codifies a fundamental principle of insurance law
that an insurer cannot insure against a loss that is known or apparent to the
insured .... The public policy is premised on the view that- To hold the
insurer liable for a progressive and continuing property loss that was discov-
ered before the carrier insured the risk "would be to impose upon the insur-
er a guaranty of the good quality of the [property] . . . , which liability un-
der the policy the insurer had not assumed."
agreed, however, holding that the receipt of a PRP letter does not make
a risk so certain that it cannot be insured.98 Only risks that are known
to be inevitable are uninsurable under the loss-in-progress rule, and as
long as any contingency remains, the risk is insurable.' Thus, the court
emphasized that a PRP letter implies as much as its name suggests: it
notifies a potentially responsible party.' Ultimately, the court held
that:
the loss-in-progress rule will not defeat coverage for a claimed loss where it had
yet to be established, at the time the insurer entered into the contract of insur-
ance with the policyholder, that the insured had a legal obligation to pay damages
to a third party in connection with a loss.''
3. Conclusion and Reservation of Issues
Rather than use its conclusion to recap the two key holdings, the court
described the issues left unresolved by this opinion."° The following is-
sues are yet to be decided: (1) whether indemnity coverage under
Admiral's policies for the injury and damage alleged in the underlying
lawsuits can be established; (2) whether the damages and injuries were
in fact continuous; (3) what is the possible effect of any policy exclusion
on the ultimate issue of coverage; (4) whether any of the affirmative
defenses (i.e. the pollution exclusion) have merit; and (5) the effect of
Montrose's failure to advise Admiral upon its receipt of the PRP let-
ter."0
B. Justice Baxter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Baxter did not join the majority for two reasons: (1) he did not
believe the policy language was as clear as the majority portrayed it; and
(2) he disagreed with both of the rationales offered by the majority to
support the loss-in-progress holding. °"
Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 695 n.7, 798 P.2d
1230, 1244 n.7, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 401 n.7 (1990) (citations omitted); see also 39 CAL.
JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 1 (1977 & Supp. 1995).
98. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 693, 897 P.2d at 29, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352.
99. Id. at 690, 897 P.2d at 27, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350 (citing Sabella v. Wisler, 59
Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963)).
100. Id. at 690, 897 P.2d at 27, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
101. Id. at 693, 897 P.2d at 29, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352.
102. Id. at 693-94, 897 P.2d at 29-30, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 352-53.
103. Id. See i1fra note 127 and accompanying text for discussion of the resolution of
these issues.
104. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 695-97, 897 P.2d at 30-32, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330-31
(Baxter, J., concurring).
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Justice Baxter began by analyzing the language of the policy and ac-
knowledging Admiral's position that "the coverage language can plausi-
bly be read.., to mean that each increment of harm... which 'occurs'
during a particular policy period is covered by the policy then in ef-
fect."'" Further, in criticizing the majority's interpretation of the draft-
ing history of CGL policies, the justice concluded that two themes may
be gleaned from the drafting history: (1) "the drafters plainly rejected a
'manifestation of injury' trigger," and (2) the drafters created the poten-
tial for liability across successive policy periods.'" In light of these two
themes, however, Justice Baxter finally conceded that the majority's
interpretation of the reasonable expectations of the parties could support
a continuous trigger of coverage. 7
Of the two rationales set forth by the majority to support its conclu-
sion that the loss-in-progress rule did not preclude coverage, Justice
Baxter agreed with only one."° Justice Baxter criticized the majority's
suggestion that a tortfeasor could purchase liability insurance up until
the time of a final damage judgment."° Justice Baxter agreed, however,
with the holding that under the loss-in-progress rule, a past act that cre-
ates a future harm can still be insured against."0
IV. IMPACT
A. Effect on the Insurance Industry and Future Litigation
In adopting a continuous trigger of coverage, Montrose is clearly one
of the most significant insurance and environmental decisions handed
down by the California Supreme Court in recent years."' As noted
105. Id. at 695, 897 P.2d at 30, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353 (Baxter, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 695-96, 897 P.2d at 31, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354 (Baxter, J., concurring).
107. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring). See supra note 55 discussing the applicability of in-
tent to aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous contract term.
108. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring). See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text for a
detailed explanation of the loss-in-progress holding. The majority concluded that the
loss-in-progress rule did not preclude coverage because: (1) the language of California
Insurance Code §§ 22 & 250 allows for the possibility of insuring against some con-
tingent liability; and (2) "the loss-in-progress rule does not preclude liability for future
or unknown harm from a past act or omission, even if the insured does not know that
some harm may already have arisen from his conduct." Id. at 696-97, 897 P.2d at 31-
32, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354-55 (Baxter, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 696, 897 P.2d at 31, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354 (Baxter, J., concurring).
110. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
111. See Phillip Carrizosa, Court Decides Insurers Have Duty to Defend, L.A. DAILY J.,
above, a continuous trigger of coverage effectively allows an" insured to
"line up" every applicable policy and assert. coverage under each one.' 2
Even though other jurisdictions have previously adopted a continuous
trigger," 3 the insurance industry considers California to be a "harbinger
state" and the immediate implication of this decision to the insurance
industry is uncertain."4 The industry claims that Montrose will bank-
rupt it, yet the California Supreme Court and other experts view the
decision as a risk-spreading measure."'5 While the claims of bankruptcy
may be slightly exaggerated, insurance companies are certainly reacting
to Montrose."'
July 5, 1995, at Al (outlining the ruling and its potentially devastating effect on the
insurance industry); Robert I. McMurry, Environmental Contamination, available in
WESTLAW, CA34 ALI-ABA 967 (1995) (presenting tie implications of Montrose to the
insurance industry); and State Court Backs Companies over Pollution-Based Claims,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 5, 1995, at DI (stating that Montrose is the California Supreme
Court's "most important ruling on insurance coverage in 30 years").
112. McMurry, supra note 111, at 969.
113. J. Niles Wright, Construction Insurers Spooked by Court Ruling, Bus. J. SACRA-
MENTO, July 24, 1995, at 3; see also Gruol Constr. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 524
P.2d 427 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (holding all insurers liable in construction defect con-
text); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
a continuous trigger applies for asbestos related bodily injury), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982); Trustees of Tufts Univ. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 68
(Mass. 1993) (holding insurer had duty to defend even though damage discovered after
policy expired); Harford Co. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286 (Md. 1992) (holding
coverage triggered when damage occurred); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650
A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994) (holding a continuous trigger applies to asbestos related injury or
damage); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502 (Pa. 1993)
(holding each stage of asbestosis constituted bodily injury, which triggered insurer's
duty indemnify).
114. Wright, supra note 113, at 3; see also Roberto Ceniceros, California Ruling May
Widen Cover, Bus. INS., July 10, 1995, at 1; Alfred G. Haggerty, Calif. Court Hits In-
surers on Pollution, NAT'L UNDERWRITERS: PROP. & CASuALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MANAGE-
-MENT ED., July 17, 1995, at 3 (stressing the importance of the ruling since there is no
national standard).
115. See supra note 114; see also Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 687, 897 P.2d at 25-26, 42
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348-49 (stating that one of the policy reasons for adopting a continu-
ous trigger is to attempt to spread the costs over several policies and insurers). By
"stacking" as many insurance policies as possible, the prohibitive cost of defense will
be spread among the policies rather than borne by a single entity. Ceniceros, supra
note 114, at 1; Court Rules for Broad Coverage of Pollution, ORANGE COuNTY REG.,
July 4, 1995, at C02. See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text for discussion of
the unresolved issue of allocation of costs.
116. See Janet Aschkenasy, Mainstream Insurers Regain Appetite For High-Risk Mar-
ket, BEST'S REV., Sept. 1, 1995, at 5; Cigna Leads off Hearing on Proposed Restructur-
ing, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP., Dec. 5, 1995; Douglas McLeod Aetna Move Unrelated to
Montrose Decision, Bus. INS., July 24, 1995, at 22 (citing Aetna's decision to bolster its
loss reserves as based not on the Montrose decision, but on the assumption of a con-
tinuous trigger of coverage); Wright, supra note 113, at 1; Policyholders Object to Pro-
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The primary reaction thus far can be characterized as a defensive one.
Insurance companies are bolstering reserves, restructuring and isolating
the environmental portions of their businesses, tightening underwriting
standards, increasing premiums, and canceling policies."' The decision
has also caused insurers to not only raise coverage prices, but also to
limit the amount and quality of coverage available." 8 While the reaction
seems to curtail the availability of insurance, considering the potential
liability risk run by these companies the measures taken appear reason-
able."
9
Of equal concern is the effect that Montrose will have on litigation.
Under the typical CGL language, an insurer has two primary duties: (1)
the duty to defend; and (2) the duty to indemnify. 2 ' Recent California
precedent, coupled with Montrose, give a giant boost to policyholders
and their rights.'2 ' The decision effectively eliminates an insurance
posed Restructuring of Cigna Corporation, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP., Nov. 21, 1995. See
infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text for discussion of duty to defend and the
associated costs.
117. See McCleod, supra note 116, at 22 (noting Aetna's strengthening of its environ-
mental liability reserves by $1.1 billion); Policyholders Object, supra note 116, at 9
(noting that Cigna finally strengthened its reserves by $1.2 billion in addition to form-
ing a new corporate entity solely for asbestos and environmental claims); Wright, supra
note 113, at 3 (explaining that construction companies are noting an increase in the
number of canceled polices in addition to a 10 percent increase in premiums).
118. Aschkenasy, supra note 116, at 5. Several insurance companies have changed
their underwriting standards or completely ended writing new policies for the construc-
tion industry. Wright, supranote 113, at 2. Many in the industry fear that this may
lead to policies that do not have coverage. Id. See generally Inter-Agency Task Force
on Product Liability, U.S. Department of Commerce, Final Report at VI-11 to 24 (1978)
(explaining how insurance companies reacted to a continuous trigger of coverage).
119. Many insurance companies are experiencing problems with the liability imposed
on CGL policies. Joanne Wojcik, Construction Defect Claim Threat Lurks Ahead: In-
surer, Bus. INs., Apr. 3, 1995, at 38. "[One] insurer, which wrote about $20 million in
premiums in liability coverage in the late 1980s and early 1990s . . . paid out more
than $35 million in claims . . . ." Id. In light of the fact that the costs of environmen-
tal defense can often exceed the actual cost of remediation, insurers stand potentially
liable for unanticipated billions. Jeffrey L. Fillerup & Dominic S. Nesbitt, The Duty to
Defend: Post-Montrose Issues, 718 PRACTICING L. INST. 49 (1995).
120. 6 B.E. WTIAN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1135-1136 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. June 1995); see also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966) (stating that facts extrinsic to the third-party complaint can gener-
ate a duty to defend); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287, 861
P.2d 1153, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (1993) (holding policyholders need only show a possi-
bility of coverage to invoke the duty to defend).
121. Mark D. Harrison, Policy Holders Have Rights in Environmental Lawsuits, SAC-
carrier's first line of defense for coverage by imposing the costly duty to
defend in all but a few situations.'22 In light of the prohibitive legal fees
associated with the duty to defend,"2 insurers will clearly have more in-
centive to settle.' Insurers, however, may take the fight to a more fa-
vorable jurisdiction in light of Montrose.'25 Overall, Montrose illustrates
how broadly California is willing to extend the duty to defend to ensure
that policyholders have a legal defense paid for by their insurers.'26
B. Unanswered Questions
Almost as important as the issues that Montrose resolved were the
issues that the court's decision failed to resolve. As noted above, the
court specifically enumerated several key issues left unresolved by its
decision.'27 As of the time of publication, the trial court has yet to de-
cide on any of these issues.
RAMENTO BEE, Nov. 26, 1995, at E2.
122. Initially, when questioning whether the duty to defend exists, the first fight gen-
erally is over. (1) "[w]hat must policyholders establish in order to trigger the duty to
defend;" and (2) which insurance company owes that duty (i.e. which trigger of cov-
erage applies). Id.; see also Fillerup, supra note 119, (explaining how the question of
the duty to defend and the payment of the costs amounts to a "significant problem
[between] the insurer and insured"). As much a, Montrose has been characterized as
the bane of the insurance industry, the decision has not eliminated the possibility of a
specific policy exclusion or the lack of a potential for liability to preclude coverage. 6
B.E. Wrrs]N, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAw, Torts § 1136 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. June
1995). See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text for discussion of the allocation of
these costs.
This decision, however, also deals another blow to the insurance industry.
Ceniceros, supra note 114, at 1. Up to this point, insurance companies have fought
vigorously to keep drafting history outside a court's consideration. Id. The California
Supreme Court, by basing its decision partially on the drafting history, has placed its
imprimatur on the admissibility and relevance of drafting history. See Montrose, 10 Cal.
4th at 669-73, 897 P.2d at 13-16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336-39. See supra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the applicability of drafting history to the court's
decision.
123. McMurry, supra note 111, at 978-79 n.5. Not only do defense costs usually ex-
ceed the cost of indemnification, but a recent survey shows that legal fees account for
nearly 90 percent of all expenditures. Id.
124. McMurry, supra note 111, at 980-81.
125. Russ Britt, Insurers Sued over Toxic Sites' Cleanup Costs: Rockwell Tries to
Pass on Burden, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 1995, at NI; see also Barry R. Ostrager,
Insurance Coverage for Tort Claims Under Comprehensive General Liability Policies,
available in WESTLAW, C534 ALI-ABA 833, 869-71 (1990) (noting that the plaintiffs
forum-shopped in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 746 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1985), sole-
ly to take advantage of a continuous trigger of coverage); Parker, supra note 56, at.
498-501 (discussing choice of law issues).
126. Harrison, supra note 121, at E2.
127. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Of paramount importance, the court specifically failed to discuss how
to allocate these new defense costs among insurers." The court pro-
vided some guidance in its discussion of California Union, however,
where the Chief Justice specifically noted that the court was not endors-
ing California Union's holding of joint and several liability.'29 The ma-
jority further stated that "[a]llocation of the cost of indemnification re-
quires application of principles of contract law to the express terms and
limitations of the various policies of insurance on the risk.""n This
leaves open the question of which allocation formula California will fol-
low. 1' California precedent seems divided between a pro rata alloca-
tion of defense costs and joint and several liability.'32 In light of
Montrose's potential to increase settlements, the question of allocation
128. Haggerty, supra note 114, at 3.
129. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 681 n.19, 897 P.2d at 21 n.19, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344
n.19. But see John H. Mathias Jr. et al., Allocation: J.H. France and the Insureds'
Right to Select from Multiple-Triggered Policies, 4 N.2 Coverage 19, 21 available in
WESTLAW, 4 No. 2 CVRG 19 (Mar./Apr. 1994) (arguing that allocation on a theory of
joint and several liability "is most consistent with the [continuous trigger] of cover-
age").
130. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 681 n.19, 897 P.2d at 21 n.19, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344
n.19. See generally 1 B.E. WrruN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 674-676
(9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (outlining the general principles of joint and several liabil-
ity); 39 CAL JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts §§ 500, 509 (1977 & Supp. 1995) (discussing
apportionment of loss between insurers and contribution of defense expenses).
131. Courts generally adopt one of four formulas for allocating costs in the insurance
context: (1) joint and several; (2) pro rata; (3) sequential exhaustion; or (4) proportion
of loss. Michael J. Brady & Lawrence 0. Monin, Reinsurance Disputes: Death of the
Handshake, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 529, 540-41 (1994).
Naturally, joint and several liability assigns the entire loss to each insurer. Id. A
pro rata formula can be applied either by taking the total loss and assigning an equal
share to each year or by assigning on the basis of policy limits. Michael Dore, Insur-
ance Coverage for Toxic Tort Claims: Solving the Self-Insurance Allocation Dilemma,
28 TORT & INS. L.J. 823, 829 (1993). Under a sequential exhaustion technique, the limits
of the earliest policy are exhausted, then followed sequentially by all other triggered
policies. Brady, supra, at 540. Finally, proportion of loss "quantifies the total amount
of the injury that took place in each policy year." Id.
132. "Where two insurers cover the same risk, defense costs must also be shared be-
tween them pro rata in proportion to the respective coverage afforded by them to the
insured." Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner, Inc., 83 Cal.
App. 3d 593, 608, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57, 66 (1978). But see Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 35 Cal. App. 4th 192, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 (1993) (adopting a
continuous trigger and construing the plain language of the policy to require "the insur-
er to pay 'all sums' which the insured shall become liable to pay."); see supra note 9
(reflecting exact same language in Admiral's policy as was construed in the Armstrong
case).
will become even more complicated and will certainly occupy the court's
attention for sometime. 3
While Montrose definitively answered the question of trigger of cover-
age in the environmental context, it raised the question of applicability to
other areas where continuous and progressive damage occurs. Of main
concern are the areas of asbestos and construction defect." In the
construction arena, the courts generally have "held that when contractors
are sued on allegations of faulty construction, only those insurers that
held policies with the contractor at the time of construction were lia-
ble." " In Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Co.," a construction defect case, he court granted review pend-
ing a decision in Montrose. After the petition for rehearing on Montrose,
the court vacated Ohio Casualty and instructed the Fourth District to
"reconsider the cause in light of Montrose."37
Crossover applicability to asbestos litigation seems a little more in
doubt." In discussing Armstrong World Industries, Inc. v. Aetna Ca-
sualty & Surety Co.,"3 the court acknowledged the adoption of a con-
tinuous trigger for asbestos claims but failed to extend Montrose's hold-
ing to that area of litigation. 40 The court noted that the discussion of
the trigger of coverage issue in Armstrong appears largely consistent
with Montrose, but insisted that the "unique facts of asbestos-related
bodily injury claims" warrant waiting for an appropriate case. 4' At least
133. Brady, supra note 131, at 538-41.
134. McMurry, supra note 111, at 981.
135. Wright, supra note 113, at 3. See also suprra notes 30-52 and accompanying text
for the preliminary considerations in deciding a rigger of coverage issue.
136. 38 Cal. App. 4th 1142, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 27 (Cal. Ct. App.), vacated, 900 P.2d 600,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (1995). The lower court adopted a manifestation trigger for pro-
gressive property damage. Ohio Casualty, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 1142, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
27.
137. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 902 P.2d 1298, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 645 (1995).
138. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 676-77 n.16, 897 P.2d at 18-19 n.16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
341-42 n.16. See generally Insurance Industry Si~ffers Big Loss in California Supreme
Court, ASBESTOS & LEAD ABATEMENT REP., July 17, 1995, at *1. See also supra notes
30-52 and accompanying text discussing the preliminary considerations for a trigger of
coverage issue.
139. 35 Cal. App. 4th 192, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 (1993), superseded by 866 P.2d 1311,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488 (1994). In Armstrong, the court of appeal based its decision on
"factual findings that ... an injury-in-fact took place during each triggered policy pe-
riod." Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 676-77 n.16, 897 P.2d at 18-19 n.16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d at,
341-42 n.16 (italics omitted) (quoting Armstrong, 35 Cal. App. 4th at 250, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 54).
140. Montrose, 10 Cal. 4th at 676-77 n.16, 897 P.2d at 18-19 n.16, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d al.
34142 n.16.
141. Id.
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one commentator asserted that the same rationale as espoused in
Montrose would apply to asbestos litigation and require a continuous
trigger of coverage. 14 2 As with construction defect, however, the prelim-
inary considerations voiced by, the court may make all the difference.
V. CONCLUSION
In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co., the California
Supreme Court dealt the insurance industry a serious blow. By adopting
a continuous trigger of coverage for continuous or progressively deterio-
rating losses, the insurance industry lost a key defense to the duty to
defend. Insurance companies will no longer be able to avoid defense
costs based on the policy period and the timing of the harm. This deci-
sion will effectively force all insurers, regardless of whether the damage
occurred before, after, or during the policy period, to bear the burden of
defense costs. Ironically, Admiral may yet escape liability under the duty
to indemnify, but not before expending an enormous sum as a result of
the duty to defend.
TMOTHY Hix
142. Insurance Industry, supra note 138, at 1.
VIII. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
The statutory five-year period .for bringing an action to
trial will be tolled within the last six months of that
period following arbitration if the plaintiff timely noti-
fies the trial court of the impending five-year deadline
date and requests that the trial be set prior to that date:
Howard v. Thrifty Drug and Discount Stores.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Howard v. Thrifty Drug and Discount Stores,' the California Su-
preme Court explained what a plaintiff must do in order to toll the statu-
tory five-year period when requesting a trial de novo following an arbitra-
tion. In arriving at its decision, the court evaluated the relationship be-
tween Civil Code section 583.310,2 which specifies the timeliness of set-
ting a date for trial, and the Judicial Arbitration Act.3 The supreme court
also considered whether section 583.310 mandated dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim. Lastly, the court determined whether the trial court
abused its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs action subsequent to
arbitration.5 Upholding the decisions of both the trial court and court of
1. 10 Cal. 4th 424, 895 P.2d 469, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362 (1995). Justice Mosk
authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, George, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 444, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 374. Justice Baxter filed a concurring opinion. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
2. California Code of Civil Procedure § 583.310 provides: "An action shall be
brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant."
CAL. CW. PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
3. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 429, 895 P.2d at 471, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
4. Id. at 437, 895 P.2d at 477, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370. California Code of Civil
Procedure § 583.340 provides in relevant part- "In computing the time within which an
action must be brought to trial ... there shall be excluded the time during
which ... [b]ringing the action to trial . . . was impossible, impracticable, or futile."
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.340 (West 1976 & Supp. 1996).
5. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 439, 895 P.2d at 478, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371. On May
12, 1987, Arkita Howard filed a negligence action against Thrifty Drug and Discount
Stores after she was assaulted on their property. Id. at 429-30, 895 P.2d at 472, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 365. Although there was some discovery produced by both parties in 1988,
there was relatively no other action until January of 1991 when Ms. Howard filed an.
at-issue memorandum. Id. at 430, 895 P.2d at 472, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365.
The case was placed on the court's civil active list, then assigned to judicial arbi-
tration in April of 1991 in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1141.10. Id. After two arbitration hearings in August of 1991, Ms. Howard was
awarded $30,000. Id. The trial court entered the arbitrator's judgment for Ms. Howard
on October 1, 1991. Id.
On October 11, 1991, Thrifty Drug and Discount Stores filed a motion to vacate
the judgment and requested a trial de novo, which was denied because of technical de-
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appeal, the California Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs action
based on past precedent and public policy considerations.6
I. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Application of Moran
The supreme court first analyzed Moran v. Superior Court7 to deter-
mine whether dismissal of the plaintiffs case was appropriate.8 The
court affirmed several court of appeal decisions that required the plain-
tiff to have acted reasonably "diligent" in order to toll the five-year
timeline once a motion for a trial de novo had been made.' The majority
fects. Id. On November 27, 1991, the court granted Thrifty's renewed motion to vacate
the judgment, conditioned upon the defense paying for plaintiffs attorney's fees in
opposing the motions. Id. On December 4, 1991, Thrifty requested a trial de novo. Id.
at 439, 895 P.2d at 478, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371. On January 8, 1992, the court ordered
Thrifty to pay an additional $500 to plaintiff for attorneys fees. Id. at 430, 895 P.2d at
472-73, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-66.
Neither party acted on the case until July 7, 1992, when the court granted Ms.
Howard "an order shortening time which allowed her to schedule a July 10, 1992 mo-
tion to specially set the case for trial." Id. at 430, 895 P.2d at 433, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
366. The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion to specially set the case for trial for
two main reasons. First, the court found that § 583.310 required dismissal because the
five-year time period had lapsed. Id. at 431, 895 P.2d at 473, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366.
Second, "the plaintiffs lack of activity since defendant's request for a trial de novo
made a denial of the motion to specifically set appropriate on discretionary grounds."
Id. The court of appeal affirmed the lower court's holding on discretionary grounds.
Id.
6. Id. at 444, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374.
7. 35 Cal. 3d 229, 673 P.2d 216, 197 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1983).
8. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 431, 895 P.2d at 473, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. In Moran,
the court "recognized an implied exception to the five-year statute when, despite a
plaintiffs reasonable diligence, prosecution of the action within five years proves to be
'impossible, impracticable, or futile.'" Id. at 432, 895 P.2d at 473-74, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
366-67. The court also asserted in Moran that the time between the date of the request
for a trial de novo and the date of trial should be excluded from the five year
timeline. Id. at 432, 895 P.2d at 474, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367.
9. Id. at 433, 895 P.2d at 474, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367; see Matthew D. Disco, The
Impression of Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator Must Disclose in California,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 113 n.1 (1993) ("Judicial arbitration is a term for certain actions
that are statutorily diverted to arbitration before trial .... judicial arbitration awards
are nonbinding on the parties and either party may demand a trial de novo by judge
or jury."); 6 CAL JuR. 3D Arbitration and Award § 121 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (ex-
stressed the importance of requiring the plaintiffs to bear the burden of
monitoring their case and complying with all of the statutory timelines."'
Subsequent to the Moran decision, the legislature enacted Code of
Civil Procedure section 1141.17," which the court held was contrary to
the Moran tolling method.'2 The court found that under section 1141.17,
"the five-year statute will only stop running for arbitrations beginning or
continuing into the last six months of the ive-year period, and then only
from the four-year six-month date after filing the action until the date a
trial de novo is requested."'3 The majority acknowledged that California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.20 provides that the plaintiffs trial
"shall be given the same place on the active list as it had prior to arbitra-
tion."4
The court reconciled sections 1141.17 and 1141.20 by agreeing with
Moran that "if prior to arbitration a plaintiff is eligible to receive a trial
date within the five-year statute,.., then the plaintiff is entitled to re-
ceive such a trial date upon a timely post arbitration request." 5 Further-
more, the court determined that an action will only be tolled from the
date of the request for trial de novo until the date of the new trial, in
accordance with section 1141.20, when the trial court fails to place the
case on the calendar after being fully informed."' The plaintiffs respon-
plaining the rules and procedures regarding a request for a trial de novo after an arbi-
tration award has been rendered); Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts:
Findings & Proposals, 26 U.S.F. L REv. 343, 361 (1992) (stating that the party who
requests the trial de novo must fare better at trial than at arbitration, or suffer the
penalty of paying their opponent's arbitration and litigation expenses).
10. Howard, I0 Cal. 4th at 434, 895 P.2d at 475, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368.
11. California Code of Civil Procedure section 1141.17 provides in pertinent part:
If an action is or remains submitted to arbitration . . . more than four years
and six months after the plaintiff has filed the action, then the time begin-
ning on the date four years and six months after the plaintiff has filed the
action and ending on the date on which a request for a de novo trial is filed
under Section 1141.20 shall not be included in computing the five-year period
specified in Section 583.310.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.17 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). See generally Katherine J.
Hamilton, Litigation Timeline--Calculating the Five-Year Date After Arbitration, 12
LA. LAw. 8 (1989) (evaluating the five-year timeline according to § 1141.17 and the lat-
est court decisions).
12. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 434, 895 P.2d at 475, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368.
13. Id. at 434, 895 P.2d at 475, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368. See generally 6 CAL. JUR. 3D
Arbitration and Award § 101 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (explaining tolling and California
Civil Procedure Code § 1141.17); 11 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CAFORNIA LAw, Equity
§ 37 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (providing an overview of California arbitration stat-
utes).
14. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 435, 895 P.2d at 475, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368.
15. Id.
16. Id. However, Justice Mosk pointed out that § 1140.20 "does not guarantee a trial
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sibility to keep track of important dates, and to advise the court of these
dates, 7 continues even if the court does not fulfill its duty to recalendar
the case. 8 The court warned that the "[p]laintiffs failure to perform
that duty leaves the five-year statute running. ""
2. Appropriateness of the Court's Mandatory Dismissal
The court next considered whether the tolling of the plaintiffs case
was calculated correctly.20 After determining that section 583.340, rather
than section 1141.17, controlled the determination of the statutory peri-
od, the court held that the five-year time period had been miscalculat-
ed.2' The majority agreed with the plaintiff that section 583.340 gov-
erned because the tolling was "due to a post-arbitration condition of
impossibility, impracticability, or futility." ' The court explained that be-
cause there were periods of time when the case was at a "standstill," the
five-year period should have been tolled.' Thus, the five-year statute
date within the five-year period if a dilatory plaintiff would not have been eligible for
a timely trial date prior to entering arbitration." Id. at 435, 895 P.2d at 476, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 369.
17. Id. at 435, 895 P.2d at 475, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368; see Cannon v. Novato, 167
Cal. App. 3d 216, 222, 213 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136 (1985) (allowing dismissal of the
plaintiffs case because the plaintiff should have properly kept track of the five-year
limitation date).
18. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 436, 895 P.2d at 476, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369.
19. Id. The majority concluded that the five-year statute remained in force during
the time between the request for trial and Ms. Howard's motion to specially set the
case for trial, since Ms. Howard "did not inform the trial court of the impending five-
year deadline, or make any effort to have a trial date set immediately following
defendant's request for a trial de novo." Id. at 435, 895 P.2d at 476, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
369; see Messih v. Levine, 228 Cal. App. 3d 454, 458, 278 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (1991)
(refusing to toll the running of the five-year limitation period between the plaintiffs
request for trial de novo and the trial date set by the court when the plaintiff did not
engage in reasonable diligence), cc"t. denied, 502 U.S. 945 (1991); Marchuk v. Ralphs
Grocery Co., 226 Cal. App. 3d 1273, 1280, 276 Cal. Rptr. 627, 631 (1990) (upholding
dismissal of the plaintiffs claim even though the plaintiff filed a timely request for trial
de novo when the plaintiff failed to keep the court informed of the impending five-year
deadline).
20. Howard, 10 Cal 4th at 437, 895 P.2d at 477, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370.
21. Id. at 437-39, 895 P.2d at 477-78, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370-71.
22. Id. at 438, 895 P.2d at 477, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370.
23. Id. at 438-39, 895 P.2d at 478, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371 (citing Hughes v. Kimble,
5 Cal. App. 4th 59, 71, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616, 624 (1992) (stating that the five-year period
should toll between the time of default and the default judgment). Justice Mosk tolled
the five-year period during the week prior to the entry of judgment and during the
had not expired, and the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs action
was therefore not mandatory under section 583.310."
3. Abuse of Discretion
Next, the majority contemplated whether the trial court abused its
discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs case when the trial court denied
the plaintiffs motion to specially set the case for trial.25 The court noted
that although public policy favors disposition of a case on the merits, the
court must consider the totality of the circumstances.26 The majority
emphasized both the duty of the court to recalendar cases and the direc-
tive set forth in section 1141.20 which states that plaintiffs should not be
penalized for going through the arbitration process.27 However, the
court noted that the trial court still has discretion to deny a motion to
specifically set a date for trial if the plaintiff waits an "unreasonably long
time in acting to correct the court's failure to recalendar the case."
28
Finally, the supreme court pointed out that a court may dismiss a motion
to specially set a trial date if an accelerated trial date would prejudice
the defendantY.2  Based on such rationale, the court concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed the plaintiffs
case "in light of plaintiffs delay both before and after arbitration. " '°
period between the date of defendant's default and the date that the court entered de-
fault judgment in the plaintiffs favor. Id.; see 1 CAL. JUR. 3D Actions § 253 (1988)
("The time during which the defendant was not amenable to the process of the
court . . . is not included in computing the 5-year period.").
24. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 439, 895 P.2d at 469, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371.
25. Id. at 439, 895 P.2d at 478, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 371.
26. Id. at 440-41, 895 P.2d at 479, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
27. Id. at 441-42, 895 P.2d at 480, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373. See generally 11 B.E.
WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAw, Equity §§ 36-39 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995)
(providing a general overview of arbitration); 6 CAL JUR. 3D Arbitration and Award
§§ 1-5 (1988 & Supp. 1995) (same).
28. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 442, 895 P.2d at 480, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373 (citing
Karubian v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 152 Cal. App. 3d 134, 139, 199 Cal. Rptr. 295, 299
(1984) (finding no abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to specially set the
matter for trial, since the plaintiff waited 40 days before the deadline to take any ac-
tion)). Justice Mosk noted the plaintiffs delay both before and after the arbitration
process. Id. at 443, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 373.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 444, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374; see Salas v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 42 Cal. 3d 342, 349-50, 721 P.2d 590, 594-95, 228 Cal. Rptr. 504, 508-09 (1986)
(considering the totality of the circumstances in determining that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in subjecting the plaintiffs claim to dismissal).
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B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Baxter wrote a separate opinion, concurring with the majority's
conclusion that dismissal of the plaintiffs action was appropriate.3
However, Justice Baxter disagreed with the majority's determination that
the five-year period had not expired.' Justice Baxter espoused that sec-
tion 1141.17 should have applied instead of the more general section
583.340, because section 1141.17 "governs tolling of actions submitted to
arbitration."' Justice Baxter asserted that section 1141.17 mandated dis-
missal because it permits tolling of arbitration-related time only within
the last six months of the five-year period.' Justice Baxter concluded
by criticizing the majority for giving plaintiffs more time to bring an ac-
tion to trial.
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
One of the leading California Supreme Court cases regarding a post-
arbitration request for a trial de novo is Moran v. Superior Court.' In
Moran, the court held that the five-year time limit set forth in section
583.310 should have been tolled when the plaintiff waited for the court to
recalendar the case after the defendant requested a trial de novo.3" The
court further held that the plaintiff has a duty of reasonable diligence in
prosecuting the case.' In Messih v. Levine, the appellate court added a
new dimension to Moran when the court held that the "plaintiff has an
ongoing duty of reasonable diligence."'
In Howard, the California Supreme Court defined exactly what the
plaintiff must do in order to toll the statutory five-year period within the
last six months following arbitration; the plaintiff must timely notify the
trial court of the impending five-year deadline and request that the court
set the trial prior to that date.4" The court clarified the relationship be-
31. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 444, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374 (Baxter, J.,
concurring).
32. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 444-45, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 375 (Baxter, J., concurring).
34. Id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 446, 895 P.2d at 481, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 376 (Baxter, J., concurring).
36. 35 Cal. 3d 229, 673 P.2d 216, 197 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1983).
37. Id. at 239, 673 P.2d at 223, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
38. Id. at 238, 673 P.2d at 222, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
39. 228 Cal. App. 3d 454, 458, 278 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (1991) (emphasis added).
40. Howard, 10 Cal. 4th at 435, 895 P.2d at 475, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368.
tween the Judicial Arbitration Act and Civil Code section 583.310, there-
by giving attorneys a timeline to calculate the five-year period." The
court set forth an appropriate timeline that will not harm plaintiffs who
agree to arbitrate their case. This is an essential ruling since arbitration
is a viable alternative to litigation in today's legal environment.42
LORI L. PROUDFIT
41. Id.
42. Id.; see Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudi-
cative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier 7Tial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1808, 1840 n.133 (1986) ("[California's] trial de novo rate for cases placed on an
arbitration hearing list was 1.4%"). See generally Kim Karelis, Comment, Private Jus-
tice: How Civil Litigation is Becoming a Private Institution-The Rise of Private
Dispute Centers, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 62 (1994) (addressing the future of the civil justice
system and the integration of private dispute resolution centers with the public court
system).
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IX. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The court should only instruct jurors to consider ordi-
nary consumer expectations in products liability cases
where the question of whether the product defectively
designed is within the common experience of the con-
sumer. Additionally, errors in instructing a civil jury
do not lead to automatic reversal; rather, the court
must examine the evidence and the entire cause to
determine whether the error constituted a miscarriage
of justice: Soule v. General Motors Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Soule v. General Motors Corp.,' the California Supreme Court first
considered whether the ordinary consumer expectation test was properly
put before the jury in a complex design defect case.' Next, the court
determined whether the trial court erred in refusing to give jurors the
specific legal cause instruction proposed by General Motors Corp.
(GM).' Finally, the court decided whether the refusal, if erroneous, con-
stituted per se reversible error.4
The supreme court held in the first instance that the consumer expec-
tation test was not an appropriate jury instruction in a complex case.'
Second, the court found that the trial court erred in not admitting GM's
proposed jury instruction on legal causation, following the general rule
that a party is entitled to have the jury instructed on every specific theo-
ry of defendant's case.' Third, the court concluded that, although the
1. 8 Cal. 4th 548, 882 P.2d 298, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (1994). Justice Baxter
authored the majority opinion in which Justices Kennard, George, Werdegar, and Boren
concurred. Id. at 556-83, 882 P.2d at 301-19, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610-28. Justice Mosk,
Acting Chief Justice, filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 583, 882 P.2d at 319, 34
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628. Justice Arabian wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at
583-86, 882 P.2d at 319-21, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628-30.
2. Id. at 556, 882 P.2d at 301, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610. See generally 6 B.E. WrriuN,
SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1259-1261 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (delineat-
ing the criteria and proof needed to sustain a design defect case); 50 CAL. JUR. 3D
Products Liability § 12 (1993) (discussing the effect of a manufacturers failure to
design a reasonably safe product).
3. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 556, 882 P.2d at 301, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 556, 571, 882 P.2d at 301, 311-12, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610, 620-21.
trial court erred in both the first and second instances, the errors were
harmless and did not require reversal.7 Finally, the court made it clear
that errors in issuing civil jury instructions will never necessitate per se
reversal, but rather the court must examine the evidence and the entire
cause to determine whether the error constituted a miscarriage of jus-
tice.' For these reasons, the supreme court affirmed.9
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, Terri Soule, was driving her Camaro, which was manufac-
tured by GM, when a Datsun skidded out of control and struck her
Camaro close to the left front wheel.'" The Camaro's wheel assembly
was separated from its frame when the bracket tore loose." "[T]he
wheel collapsed rearward and inward. The wheel hit the underside of the
'toe pan'-the slanted floorboard area beneath the pedals-causing the
toe pan to crumple, or 'deform,' upward into the passenger compart-
ment."'2 Plaintiff suffered several injuries, including minor knee and
scalp injuries, a fractured rib, and fractures of both her ankles, particu-
larly her left ankle which was the most severely damaged.'
Plaintiff filed suit against GM, claiming strict liability for a tortiously
defective product that caused the "enhanced" injury to her ankles.'4
Plaintiff alleged that her ankle injuries were caused by a design defect, in
that the bracket was improperly welded to the wheel assembly, allowing
the wheel to collapse rearward and force the toe pan into the passenger
compartment.'5 At trial, plaintiff presented expert testimony and the re-
sults of crash tests tending to show that the force of the Datsun hitting
her car was not enough to cause the injury to her ankles.'6 This evi-
dence, plaintiff asserted, proved that her injury would not have occurred
but for the faulty weld that started the chain reaction ending in a de-
formed toe pan pushing through the driver's side floor.'7 Specifically,
plaintiffs metallurgist testified that the failed bracket's "weld was partic-
ularly weak because of excess 'porosity' caused by improper welding
7. Id.
8. Id. at 580-81, 882 P.2d at 317, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626.
9. Id. at 583, 882 P.2d at 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628.
10. Id. at 556-57, 882 P.2d at 301, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610.
11. Id. at 557, 882 P.2d at 301, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 557-59, .882 P.2d at 302-03, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611-12. See generally 50
CAL. JUR. 3D Products Liability § 45 (1993) (explaining who can recover in a strict lia-
bility action).
15. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 557, 882 P.2d at 302, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611.
16. Id. at 558, 882 P.2d at 302, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611.
17. Id.
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techniques." 8 GM's metallurgist testified against plaintiffs expert's find-
ings. 9 GM also put forth the defense that "the force of the collision,
rather than any product defect, was the sole cause of plaintiffs ankle
injuries."2 °
The trial judge instructed the jury on the ordinary consumer expecta-
tion standard for deciding whether there was a design defect, overruling
GM's objection to the use of that standard instead of the risk-benefit
test.2' The judge also rejected GM's request for a specific causation in-
struction and instead gave the jury a standard instruction on legal causa-
tion.22
The jury returned a special verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the
amount of $1.65 million.' GM appealed, complaining that the court
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. See generally 6 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CAMFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1304 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the defense that no causal connection exists be-
tween a plaintiffs injuries and the alleged defect). Specifically, the defense alleged that
plaintiffs ankle injuries resulted when she braced her feet against the floor board on
realization that an impact was imminent. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 558-59, 882 P.2d at 302,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
21. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 559, 569, 882 P.2d at 303, 309-10, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612,
618-19. See generally BAJI No. 9.00.5 (7th ed. 1986 & 1992 Revision) (setting forth the
instruction for finding a design defect). Furthermore, the court instructed the jury that:
[In order to establish liability for a design defect under the "ordinary con-
sumer expectations" standard, plaintiff must show (1) the manufacturer's
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect,
(2) the defect existed when the product left the manufacturer's possession,
(3) the defect was a "legal cause" of plaintiffs "enhanced injury," and (4) the
product was used in a reasonably foreseeable manner.
Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 559, 882 P.2d at 303, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
22. Id. at 559, 882 P.2d at 303, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612. See generally BAJI No. 3.76
(7th ed. 1986) (defining legal cause). GM proposed the following instruction:
If you find that the subject Camaro . . . was improperly designed, but you
also find that [plaintiff] would have received enhanced injuries even if the
design had been proper, then you must find that the design was not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about her injuries and therefore was not a con-'
tributing cause thereto.
Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 559, 882 P.2d at 303, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
23. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 559, 882 P.2d at 303, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612. See generally
Jury Finds Manufacturing Defect in Automobile, 11 No. 9 VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS &
TACTICS 310 (1991) (summarizing the case, the parties involved, and the jury's verdict);
6 B.E. WIT N, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW, Torts § 1360 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing
products liability and punitive and compensatory damage awards).
erred by instructing the jury on the ordinary consumer expectations
standard in a complex case, refusing to give the jury GM's specific cau-
sation instruction.24 The California Court of Appeal held that the trial
court should have given the jury GM's specific causation instruction, but
its failure to do so was harmless error.2" The court of appeal further
held that the trial court did not err by using the ordinary consumer ex-
pectation standard, and "that a jury may rely on expert assistance to
determine what level of safe performance an ordinary consumer would
expect under particular circumstances."" GM subsequently appealed to
the Supreme Court of California.27
III. TREATME
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Baxter, writing for the majority, considered GM's appeal in
three distinct parts. First, the majority set forth the proper instruction for
jurors deliberating the issue of design defect in a complex case.' Next,
the majority considered whether the trial court's causation instruction
was adequate, thereby making the court's refusal of GM's proposed spe-
cific causation instruction proper.29 Finally, the majority announced the
standard for determining whether an incorrect instruction to the jury in a
civil case constitutes reversible error.'
1. The court should only instruct jurors to consider ordinary
consumer expectations in products liability cases where the
question of whether the product is defectly designed is within the
common experience of the consumer."
The majority opinion began with a review of the leading cases that
established and clarified the design defect test.' The design defect test
24. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 559, 882 P.2d at 303, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
25. Id. at 560, 882 P.2d at 303, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 560-71, 882 P.2d at 303-11, 34 Cl Rptr. 2d at 612-20.
29. See id. at 572-73, 882 P.2d at 311-12, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620-21.
30. See id. at 573-83, 882 P.2d at 312-19, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621-28.
31. See id. at 567, 882 P.2d at 308, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
32. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 560-64, 882 P.2d at 303-06, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612-15. See
generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).(establishing the proposition that manufacturers, retailers and distribu-
tors are liable for harm caused by their defective products if the product was "used in
a reasonably foreseeable" manner); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (holding that, the "unreasonably dangerous test"
taken from the Second Restatement of Torts shall not be applied in California); Barker
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is a two-prong test consisting of first, discerning whether the product
performed within the ordinary consumer's expectations, and second, if
the consumer expectation test is satisfied, performing risk-benefit analy-
sis, weighing specified factors.' The majority next considered several
ensuing court of appeal decisions, which appear to have increased the
scope of the ordinary consumer expectations prong of the design defect
test.' Finally, the majority laid the framework for the proper use of the
ordinary consumer expectation test.""
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (setting forth
a two-prong test for design defects-ordinary consumer expectations or risk-benefit
analysis); Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (1982) (offering framework for properly applying the ordinary consumer ex-
pectations test); 6 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALiFORNL LAW, Torts §§ 1259, 1260 (9th
ed. 1988) (discussing the importance of Barker and Campbell, respectively).
33. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 562, 882 P.2d at 304-05, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 613-14. Risk-
benefit factors a jury may consider include:
'the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that
such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative de-
sign, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences
to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative de-
sign.'
Id. (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978)).
34. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 564-66, 882 P.2d at 306-07, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614-16; see
Bates v. John Deere Co., 148 Cal. App. 3d 40, 195 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1983) (holding that
the ordinary consumer expectations test should not be applied where it is unlikely that
the ordinary consumer would have any reasonable expectations as to the product);
Lunghi v. Clark Equip. Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 485, 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1984) (allowing
the plaintiff to offer an expert's opinion regarding ordinary consumer expectations to-
wards particular products); Akers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 219 Cal. Rptr.
513 (1985) (asserting that the ordinary consumer expectations test is not limited to
accidents or products within the jury's common experience); West v. Johnson & John-
son Prods., Inc., 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1985) (holding that the
proper use of the ordinary consumer expectations test may include expert opinion in
complex cases); Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d 726, 226
Cal. Rptr. 299 (1986) (finding that the plaintiffs expectations regarding the effects of a
procedure not within her expertise did not prove defect when expert opinion stated
that plaintiffs expectations were incorrect or unreasonable). For an analysis of these
cases, see also supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text and 6 B.E. WrrK3N, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1261 (9th ed. 1988) (reviewing the above decisions).
35. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 566-71, 882 P.2d at 307-11, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-20. See
generally Howard Klenme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Members of the
Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1173 (1994) (discussing Restatement (Third) proposals regarding the ordinary consumers
expectations test); Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectation:
In applying the ordinary consumer expectation test, the appropriate
question is "whether the circumstances of the product's failure permit an
inference that the product's design performed below the legitimate, com-
monly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary consum-
ers. " 6 If the facts support such an inference, the defendant will be fore-
closed from presenting evidence by experts that the alleged design defect
has more benefits to the public than risks."
Next, the majority limited the use of the consumer expectations test to
cases where the consumers' familiarity with a product enables them to
conclude that its design "violated minimum safety assumptions."' The
court further prohibited the use of experts to illustrate what jurors
"would or should expect."' Moreover, the court cautioned, a jury must
not be allowed to consider whether a product performed within their
expectations of the minimum level of safety unless the facts would per-
mit such an inference.40 If the facts do not permit this inference, the
jury must be instructed to balance the relative benefits and risks of a
product's design as Barker necessitates.4 The majority also emphasized
that complex products, even when used properly, may cause injury in a
manner that does not fall within a consumer's ordinary expectation of
safe performance; thus, the risk-benefit analysis would be the correct
test to determine design defect in such a case." Therefore, if jury in-
structions do not direct jurors to engage in the risk-benefit analysis
where the ordinary consumer expectation test is not implicated, the in-
structions are "misleading and incorrect."43
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 861 (1983) (advocating a strong role for the judge in the consumer expectation
test); William R. Pilat, Comment, Strict Liability and Design Defects: Do Texas Courts
Provide Jury Instructions that Instruct?, 29 HoUs. L. REv. 633 (1992) (analyzing the
effectiveness of the ordinary consumer expectation instruction in instructing the jury in
their deliberations in Texas); David A. Urban, Comment, Custom's Proper Role in
Strict Product Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 UCLA I REv. 439 (1990)
(arguing that evidence on industry custom should be admitted and jury should be al-
lowed to consider it when determining ordinary consumer expectations).
36. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 568-69, 882 P.2d at 309, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
37. Id. at 566, 882 P.2d at 308, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2(1 at 617.
38. Id. at 567, 882 P.2d at 308, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 568, 882 P.2d at 309, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
41. Id.; see supra note 33 (listing factors to be weighed in the risk-benefit analysis).
42. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 566-67, 882 P.2d at 308, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617. Justice
Baxter reasoned that automobiles were exactly such a product because consumers
could not predict how the vehicle would perform in all driving scenarios or how safely
the product should be designed to avoid those dangers. Id. at 567, 882 P.2d at 308, 34
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617 (citing Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443,
454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978)).
43. Id. at 568, 882 P.2d at 309, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
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GM argued that the ordinary consumer expectation test should be
abolished in design defect cases because it "is an 'unworkable, amorphic,
fleeting standard'" that is unfair and deficient." The majority rejected
GM's request to abolish the test, stating that its opinion limited the scope
of the consumer expectation test sufficiently to protect GM's interests.45
In addition, the niajority explained, situations will arise where a product
may perform so unsafely that the design defect is clear to the "common
understanding, experience, and reason" of the ordinary consumer and a
lay jury will be capable of making that judgment.46
Finally, the majority determined that the trial court should not have
instructed the jury to apply the ordinary consumer expectation test be-
cause the plaintiff's design defect theory encompassed mechanical and
technical detail that an ordinary consumer could not reasonably be ex-
pected to understand without expert testimony.47 The majority held that
the instructional error was harmless because the consumer expectation
theory was not emphasized at trial and it was unreasonable to assume
that the jury "disregarded the voluminous evidence on the risks and ben-
efits" of the car's design when it reached its verdict.'
2. A party is entitled to have the jury instructed on every specific
legal theory of their case; therefore, a general causation
instruction is not sufficient where the defense's theory centers
on causation.
Next, the majority considered whether the trial court's causation in-
struction was adequate and whether the court erred when it refused to
44. Id. at 569, 882 P.2d at 309, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618. Specifically, GM stated five
ways they felt the ordinary consumer expectation test was unfair and deficient:
First, it defies definition. Second, it focuses not on the objective condition of
products, but on the subjective, unstable, and often unreasonable opinions of
consumers. Third, it ignores the reality that ordinary consumers know little
about how safe the complex products they use can or should be made.
Fourth, it invites the jury to isolate the particular consumer, component, acci-
dent, and injury before it instead of considering whether the whole product
fairly accommodates the competing expectations of all consumers in all situa-
tions (citations omitted). Fifth, it eliminates the careful balancing of risks and
benefits which is essential to any design issue.
Id. at 569, 882 P.2d at 309-10, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618-19 (internal citation omitted).
45. Id. at 569-70, 882 P.2d at 310, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
46. Id. at 569, 882 P.2d at 310, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
47. Id. at 570, 882 P.2d at 310, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
48. Id.
give GM's proposed specific causation instruction.4" GM argued at trial
that the force and angle of the collision would have caused the wheel to
collapse despite any design defect and that the collapsing wheel did not
cause plaintiffs ankle injuries. 0 GM requested the judge to instruct the
jury that, if plaintiffs ankle injuries would have happened notwithstand-
ing any design defect, then GM's design "was not a 'substantial' or
'contributing' cause of plaintiffs 'enhanced' injuries."' Moreover, GM
argued that the trial court's refusal to issue this instruction was per se
reversible error.52
The majority stated the general rule that "a party is entitled upon re-
quest to correct, nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the
case advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence."'
The majority found that GM's requested instruction was proper and
should have been read to the jury.' The majority analyzed what preju-
dice, if any, GM suffered under the California Constitution5 and prece-
dent, due to the trial court's failure to issue the proposed instruction.'
The court weighed several factors, set forth below, and determined that
the trial court's erroneous denial of GM's proposed instruction did not
prejudice their case and, therefore, constituted harmless error.57
49. Id. at 572, 882 P.2d at 311-12, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2ul at 620-21.
50. Id. at 572, 882 P.2d at 311, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620; see 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY
OF CAMFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1304 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the affirma-
tive defense that a design defect is not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries).
51. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 572, 882 P.2d at 311, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620. The following
is the actual proposed instruction:
If you find that the subject Camaro vehicle was improperly designed, but you
also find that Terri Soule would have received enhanced injuries even if the
design had been proper, then you must find that the design was not a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about her injuries and therefore was not a contrib-
uting cause thereto.
Id. at 584 n.1, 882 P.2d at 319 n.1, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628 n.1 (Arabian, J., concurring
and dissenting).
52. Id. at 573, 882 P.2d at 312, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621. GM argued "that the errone-
ous denial of instructions explaining a 'central theory' of a party's case is prejudicial
as a matter of law." Id.
53. Id. at 572, 882 P.2d at 311, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 620.
54. Id. at 572-73, 882 P.2d at 312, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 621.
55. Id. at 580, 882 P.2d at 317, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626. "A judgment may not be re-
versed for instructional error in a civil case 'unless, after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error com-
plained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'" Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 13 (West Supp. 1996)).
56. Id. at 580, 882 P.2d at 317, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626. The majority was guided by
People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478, 503, 853 P.2d 1037, 1054, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582, 599
(1993), in determining the standard of reversibility for erroneous omission of jury in-
structions. Id. at 576, 882 P.2d at 314, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 623.
57. Id. at 580-81, 882 P.2d at 317-18, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626-27.
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3. Errors in instructing a civil jury do not lead to automatic
reversal; rather, the court must examine the evidence and the
entire cause to determine whether the error constituted a
miscarriage of justice.
Finally, the majority announced the standard for determining whether
it is reversible error when a trial judge gives incorrect jury instructions in
a civil case:
[Tihere is no rule of automatic reversal or "inherent" prejudice applicable to any
category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission. A judg-
ment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case "unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the
opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.""'
Moreover, the test for prejudice when there has been an erroneous
omission, or an erroneous inclusion, of a jury instruction in a civil case
is whether "'it seems probable' that the error 'prejudicially affected the
verdict.'"' In making this determination, the court should take into con-
sideration several factors.' First, the court should consider the nature
of the error, which incorporates the likely and natural effect of the error
on the party's ability to present his case to the jury." Second, the court
should examine whether there has been any actual prejudice to the par-
ty, evaluated in the context of the trial record.62 The majority set forth a
multifactor approach for making this determination, stating that "the
court must also evaluate: (1) the state of the evidence; (2) the effect of
other instructions; (3) the effect of counsel's arguments; and (4) any
indications by the jury itself that it was misled."3
In sum, although the court found that the trial court erred as to both
the design defect instruction and the refusal to issue the specific causa-
tion instruction, it held that both errors were harmless, and they affirmed
the court of appeal's judgment in favor of the plaintiff.'
58. Id. at 580, 882 P.2d at 317, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (quoting CAL CONsT. art VI,
§ 13). Furthermore, the court overruled and disapproved of any prior decisions that im-
plicated a rule to the contrary. Id.
59. Id.
60. id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 580-81, 882 P.2d at 317, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 626 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 581-83, 882 P.2d at 317-19, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627-28.
B. Acting Chief Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk, Acting Chief Justice, concurred with the majority's con-
clusion.' He wrote separately to protest the majority's reference to Peo-
ple v. Cahill,' which the majority used as "guidance" in its discussion
of the proper standard for determining prejudice resulting from errone-
ous jury instructions.67 Justice Mosk found CahiU to be a "cruel aberra-
tion in the law" and asserted that the majority's use of this case weak-
ened their analysis.'
C. Justice Arabian's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Arabian concurred with the majority holding that the issuance
of the ordinary consumer expectation test for design defect was errone-
ous and that the trial court's refusal to issue GM's specific causation in-
struction was erroneous. 9 Justice Arabian dissented against the
majority's finding that refusal to issue GM's causation instruction was
harnless error."0 He found it reasonably likely that the jury based its
decision on the general causation instruction and that the erroneous
exclusion of GM's specific causation instruction prejudiced the
defendant's case.7
IV. IMPACT
Strict products liability is a relatively recent phenomenon, appearing
only slightly more than thirty years ago in the now landmark case
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.72 Prior to Greenman, liability
was established solely on a showing of negligence or warranty.73 In re-
65. Id. at 583, 882 P.2d at 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628 (Mosk, J., concurring).
66. 5 Cal. 4th 478, 853 P.2d 1037, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 582 (1993).
67. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 583, 882 P.2d at 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
68. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). Acting Chief Justice Mosk protested the use of Cahill
because that decision held that a coerced confession was harmless. Id. (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
69. Id. at 583, 882 P.2d at 319, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 628 (Arabian, J., concurring and
dissenting).
70. Id. (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id. at 586, 882 P.2d at 321, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630 (Arabian, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Arabian refuted every part of the majority's analysis regarding preju-
dice resulting from this instruction. Id. at 585-86, 182 P.2d at 320-21, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 629-30 (Arabian, J., concurring and dissenting).
72. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See generally 6 B.E.
WrrIhN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAw, Torts § 1242 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (de-
scribing the Greenman case).
73. 6 B.E. WITuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1241 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
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sponse to the numerous cases where plaintiffs harmed by products were
precluded from recovering for their injuries under warranty and negli-
gence standards, the California Supreme Court created the doctrine of
strict liability.7 4 Additionally, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section
402A, accepted and incorporated the doctrine of strict products liability
for design defects two years after the Greenman decision.7"
There are three main reasons for the courts imposing strict liability on
manufacturers.' First, "manufacturers are in the best position to avoid
the risks of defective products through control of the production pro-
1996) (delineating the period before Greenman).
74. Judge Todd M. Thornhill, Products Liability: The Open and Obvious Danger
Rule, 51 J. Mo. B. 203, 203 (1995). "Negligence was, and often still is, perceived as
inadequate for consumers because of the inherent difficulty of proving what a manu-
facturer did or failed to do in the design process." Id. (citations omitted). "The breach
of warranty action had been increasingly seen as futile for many injured consumers be-
cause of the requirement of privity of contract between the injured party and manufac-
turer or seller." Id. Additionally, "manufacturers disclaimed liability and damages
through contractual disclaimers, and argued that they were not liable if there was no
express guarantee of the product." Id. (citations omitted).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. "Defective condition" is defined in Comment g as "a condition not contemplated by
the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." Pilat, supra
note 35, at 637 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965)). Fur-
thermore, Comment i defines "unreasonably dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id.
Pilat, supra note 35, at 637 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TomS § 402A cmt. i
(1965)).
76. Pilat, supra note 35, at 634; see also James A. Henderson Jr. et al., Optimal
Issue Separation in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1653, 1659-
60 (1995) (discussing a different perspective on the social policy objectives of strict
products liability).
cess."77 Second, "the potential of strict liability hypothetically stimulates
manufacturers to make their products safer.""8 Third, "manufacturers
stand in the best position to assume the costs for any injuries that their
products cause."'9
The California Supreme Court established in Greenman that "[a] manu-
facturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being."' This rule simply
requires the California plaintiff to show that the product was "defective,"
unlike the Restatement (Second) of Torts which subsequently required
the plaintiff to show that it was "unreasonably defective.""'
The California Supreme Court next considered the issue of strict liabil-
ity in a design defect case. In Barker v. LuU Engineering Co.,' the su-
preme court set forth the criteria and requirements of proof for design
defect.' Specifically, the court delineated two alternative tests to in-
struct the jury on design defect: the ordinary consumer expectation test
and the risk-benefit test.' A product design is defective under the ordi-
nary consumer expectation test if "the plaintiff proves that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."' On the other
hand, a product design is defective under the risk-benefit test if "the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and
the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on bal-
ance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in such design."'
77. Pilat, supra note 35, at 634 (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 700 (1963); see also 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1242
(9th ed. 1988) (discussing strict liability after G'reemman); Pilat, supra note 35, at 635
(same).
81. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972) (holding that plaintiff need not prove that product was unreasonably danger-
ous, only that it was defective); 6 B.E. WITK1N, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§ 1248 (9th ed. 1988) (delineating the California approach); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
82. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
83. Id. at 426-35, 573 P.2d at 452-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234-40. See generally 6 B.E.
WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Torts § 1259 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the crite-
ria and proof delineated in Barker).
84. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 152, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
85. Id.
86. Id.; see supra note 32 (factors to be considered in risk-benefit analysis).
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The California Supreme Court revisited design defect again in Camp-
bell v. General Motors Corp.87 Campbell established the "quantum of
proof" required to demonstrate a prima facie case of design defect.'
Under the ordinary consumer expectation test, the court stated that
proof will generally be adequate to create an inference of liability "if the
plaintiff provides evidence concerning (1) his or her use of the product;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the injury; and (3) the objective fea-
tures of the product which are relevant to an evaluation of its safety."'
The plaintiffs burden of proof under the risk-benefit test is simply to of-
fer evidence that would permit the jury to determine that a defect in the
product's design was the proximate cause of his or her injuries.' When
this is accomplished the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove
that the benefits of the product's design outweigh the risks.9'
Finally, in Soule v. General Motors Corp.,' the California Supreme
Court determined when to properly use the ordinary consumer expecta-
tion test instead of, or in addition to the risk-benefit test. 3 The court
granted certiorari in Soule, in part, to settle a disagreement among sever-
al courts of appeal on their interpretation of Campbell.' In Bates v.
John Deere, Co.,9" the court of appeal stated in dicta that the ordinary
consumer expectation jury instruction was not appropriate in a case
when the court believed that the ordinary consumer would not "know
what to expect concerning the safety design of a commercial cotton
picker."'
In Lunghi v. Clark Equipment Co.,97 the California Court of Appeal
stated that although the ordinary consumer expectation test was not
proper under the facts presented for appeal, if the plaintiff could prop-
87. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982). See generally 6 B.E.
WITEIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1260 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the im-
portance of Campbell).
88. Campbell, 32 Cal. 3d at 127, 649 P.2d at 233, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 119, 649 P.2d at 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
91. Id.
92. 8 Cal. 4th 548, 882 P.2d 298, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (1994).
93. Id. at 556, 882 P.2d at 301, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610; see supra notes 35-43 and
accompanying text.
94. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 563-66, 882 P.2d at 305-08, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 614-16.
95. 148 Cal. App. 3d 40, 195 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1983).
96. Id. at 52, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 645; see also Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 564, 882 P.2d at
306, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
97. 153 Cal. App. 3d 485, 200 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1984).
erly offer expert opinion during retrial to allow a jury to determine what
a consumer should reasonably expect from the product, the ordinary
consumer expectation instruction could be properly placed before the
jury.,
Another court of appeal held in Akers v. Kelley Co.9' that the trial
court properly instructed the jury on the ordinary consumer expectation
test in a case concerning a bizarre accident."9 8 The court of appeal stat-
ed that the ordinary consumer expectation test is appropriate in situa-
tions where the accident is "so bizarre that the average juror, upon hear-
ing the particulars, might reasonably think: 'Whatever the user may have
expected from that contraption, it certainly wasn't that.'"'0 '
Finally, in both West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc.' 2 and
Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining Manufacturing Co., ° two different
courts of appeal held that Campbell did not prohibit the use of expert
testimony to aid jurors in determining ordinary consumer expectations in
complex cases. °
The California Supreme Court settled the issue by limiting the ordinary
consumer expectation instruction to cases where the consumers' famil-
iarity with the product enables them to conclude that its design "violated
minimum safety assumptions."' °5 The supreme court further prohibited
the use of experts to illustrate what the jurors should or would ex-
pect."'° Additionally, the court emphasized that complex products may
cause injury even when used properly in a manner that does not fall
within a consumer's ordinary expectation of safe performance.' 7 In
such a case, the court should offer the alternative risk-benefit instruction
to determine whether there is a design defect."' The court's decision
clarified yet another ambiguity regarding products liability and in the pro-
98. Id. at 496, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 393; see also Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 564, 882 P.2d at
306, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615.
99. 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1985).
100. Id. at 651, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 524; see also Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 565, 882 P.2d at
306-07, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615-16.
101. Akers, 173 Cal. App. at 651, 219 Cal. Rptx. at 524; see also Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at
565, 882 P.2d at 307, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
102. 174 Cal. App. 3d 831, 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1985).
103. 181 Cal. App. 3d 726, 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1.986).
104. West, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 866-67, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 458; Rosburg, 181 Cal. App.
3d at 732-33, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 303-04; see also Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 565-66, 882 P.2d at
307, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
105. Soule, 8 Cal. 4th at 567, 882 P.2d at 308, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 566-67, 882 P.2d at 308, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
108. Id.
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cess, severely limited the application of the
tation test.19
ordinary consumer expec-
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109. See id. One court of appeal subsequently held that the operation' of an automo-
bile air bag was within the ordinary experience of the consumer, and affirmed the trial
court's use of the ordinary consumer expectation test, reasoning that a product could
fail to meet an ordinary consumer's expectations even though expert testimony would
be required to explain the operation of the air bag since expectations were distinct
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See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect
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X. TORTS
In an action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations, the plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant engaged in conduct that was
wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of the
interference itself. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,' the California Su-
preme Court considered whether a plaintiff seeking to recover for the
tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations has-
the burden of proving that the defendant "wrongfully" interfered with the
plaintiffs prospective economic relations.:: In addressing this issue, the
court looked to legal history, policies established in other courts, and
leading academic authorities for guidance? Overruling the decision of
the court of appeal, the California Supreme Court held that in intentional
interference with prospective economic relations tort cases, the plaintiff
has "the burden of pleading and proving that, the defendant's interference
was wrongful 'by some measure beyond the fact of the interference it-
self.'"4
1. 11 Cal. 4th 376, 902 P.2d 740, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436 (1995). Justice Arabian deliv-
ered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard, Baxter,
George and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 378-93, 902 P.2d at 741-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
437-47. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 393-415, 902 P.2d at 751-65, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447-61 (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 378-93, 902 P.2d at 741-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437-47. In Della Penna, the
plaintiff, John Della Penna was a dealer of Toyota cars. Id. at 379, 902 P.2d at 742, 45
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438. He became upset when the defendant, Toyota Motor Sales and its
Lexus division, inserted into its dealership agreements a "no export" clause, which pro-
vided that dealers were only authorized to sell Lexus automobiles to customers located
in the United States. Id. Della Penna nonetheless purchased Lexus automobiles and ex-
ported them to Japan for resale until Toyota ceased selling models to Della Penna. Id.
at 380, 902 P.2d at 742, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438. Dela Penna brought a suit for inten-
tional interference with prospective economic relations against Toyota Id. at 380, 902
P.2d at 742, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438. At trial, the trial judge modified the standard jury
instruction for intentional interference with prospective economic relations by requiring
that the plaintiff prove in his prima facie case that the defendant's interfering conduct
was "wrongful." Id. at 380, 902 P.2d at 742-43, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 438-39. The jury
rendered a verdict in favor of Toyota. Id. at 380, 902 P.2d at 743, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
439. The court of appeal unanimously reversed the trial court's decision and remanded
the case for a new trial. Id.
3. Id. at 381-91, 902 P.2d at 743-50, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439-46.
4. Id. at 392-93, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447 (quoting Top Serv. Body
Shop v. Allstate Ins., Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978)).
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Intentional interference with prospective economic relations
requires that the defendant intentionally engaged in "wrongful"
acts or conduct designed to interfere with the plaintiffs
economic relationship.
Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, began the opinion by exam-
ining the history of "interference" torts.' In particular, his discussion
focused upon distinguishing between claims for intentional interference
with an existing contract6 and claims for intentional interference with a
prospective economic relationship.7 Justice Arabian stated that while
existing contracts are clearly entitled to protection from the interference
of a stranger to the transaction, prospective economic relationships that
are not contractual8 are not entitled to the same protection as existing
5. Id. at 381-91, 902 P.2d at 743-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439-47. See generally Dan
B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335
(1980) (describing the history and future of the tort of interference with contractual
relationships); Francis B. Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663
(1923) (discussing the historical origins of the breach of contract cause of action);
Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The
Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1980) (explain-
ing the history of the tort of interference with contractual relations).
6. See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 1 (1969 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth
the basic principles of tort liability for interference); 40 CAL. JUR. 3D Interference with
Contract § 1 (1978 & Supp. 1995) (discussing available causes of action when there
has been contractual interference); 5 B.E. Wrr iN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§ 642 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (explaining the rule against inducing a breach of
contract); Jeffery F. Ghent, Annotation, Liability of a Real Estate Broker for Interfer-
ence with a Contract Between a Vendor and Another Real Estate Broker, 34 A.L.R. 3D
720 (1970) (discussing the liability of a real estate broker for contractual interference).
7. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 392, 902 P.2d at 750-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47.
See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 49 (1969 & Supp. 1993) (explaining the
basic principles of interference with prospective economic advantage); 5 B.E. WrTKiN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 655-658 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (giving
illustrations of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations).
8. The tort of interfering with economic relationships that are short of contractual
is variously known as intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,
intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, and intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic relations. See Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 378, 902
P.2d at 741, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437. The court in Della Penna used the phrase "inten-
tional interference with economic relations" in order to avoid confusion and to distin-
guish this tort from "the cognate form, 'intentional interference with contract.'" Id. at
contracts, because prospective economic relationships are not yet final-
ized.' Looking to economic policy concerns regarding competition in the
market place,"° the views of the American Law Institute," and the pre-
cedent established by other courts, 2 the court stated that it was neces-
sary to further obviate the differences between the existing and the pro-
spective interference torts in order to avoid future confusion.'
Addressing these concerns, the court held that in order for a plaintiff
to prevail in a cause of action based on intentional interference with
prospective economic relations, the defendant's interference must have
been "wrongful 'by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
itself.'"'4 Hence, by requiring that Toyota wrongfully interfered with
381 n.2, 902 P.2d at 743 n.2, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 n.2.
9. Id. at 392-93, 902 P.2d at 750-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47. See generally 5 B.E.
WITUIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts § 652 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1995) (explain-
ing that the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage involves con-
tracts still in the negotiation stage).
10. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 392, 902 P.2d at 750-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447. See
generally 40 CAL. JUR. 3D Interference with Contract § 14 (1978 & Supp. 1995) (stating
that competition can be a defense to intentional interference with prospective economic
relations); 5 B.E. WrrEuN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA lAW, Torts §§ 666-669 (9th ed. 1988
& Supp. 1995) (describing the use of competition as a defense in interference cases);
Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiencj and Competition in Antitrust and
Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1097 (1993) (discussing efficiency and
competition in the context of tortious interference cases); Gary D. Wexler, Intentional
Interference with Contract: Market Efficiency and Individual Liberty Considerations,
27 CONN. L. REv. 279 (1994) (explaining the confict between interference torts and
market efficiency).
11. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 383-86, 902 P.2d at 745-46, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441-
42. The American Law Institute publishes the restatements of the law. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 766B (1979) (explaining that a defendant who inten-
tionally interferes with prospective contractual relations is liable if the defendant "im-
properly" interfered).
12. See Top Serv. Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978)
(holding that a claim of interference with economic relations "is made out when inter-
ference resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of
the interference itself").
13. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 392, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447. "Our
courts should, in short, firmly distinguish the two kinds of business contexts, bringing
a greater solicitude to those relationships that have ripened into agreements, while
recognizing that relationships short of that subsist. in a zone where the rewards and
risks of competition are dominant." Id.
14. Id. at 392-93, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447 (quoting Top Service, 582
P.2d at 1371). "The standard jury instruction governing 'intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage'" is found in BARl (the Book of Approved Jury Instruc-
tions) No. 7.82. Id. at 380 n.1, 902 P.2d at 743 n.1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 n.1.
[Tihe essential elements of the claim [are] (1) an economic relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and another, "containing a probable future economic bene-
fit or advantage to plaintiff," (2) defendant's knowledge of the existence of
the relationship, (3) that defendant "intentionally engaged in acts or conduct
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Della Penna's prospective economic relations, the court successfully
achieved both of its intended policy goals: not only does the element of
wrongfulness further differentiate the tort of interference with prospec-
tive economic relations from the tort of interference with an existing
contract,'5 but it also promotes economic efficiency by avoiding "the
dangers inherent in imposing tort liability for competitive business prac-
tices."'6
2. Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant's
interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of
the interference itself.
The court further held that in an action for intentional interference
with prospective economic relations, it is the plaintiff who has the bur-
den of proving 7 that the defendant wrongfully interfered with the
plaintiffs prospective economic relation.'8 Hence, in the instant case,
Della Penna had the burden of proving that Toyota's decision to cease
selling automobiles to Della Penna was wrongful.'9
The court's decision in Della Penna therefore rejects the traditional
"prima facie tort"2" of intentional interference with prospective econom-
designed to interfere with or disrupt" the relationship, (4) actual disruption,
and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of defendant's acts.
Id. (quoting California Jury Instructions: Civil (BAJI) No. 7.34 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp.
1996)). "The modification sought by defendant and adopted by the trial court consisted
in adding the word 'wrongful' in element (3) between the words 'in' and 'acts.'" Della
Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 380 n.1, 902 P.2d at 743 n.1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 439 n.1.
15. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 392, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
16. Id. at 390, 902 P.2d at 749, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445.
17. See generally 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence §§ 155-156 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (ex-
plaining the burden of proof); 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 84-95 (1976 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing the burden of proof and production of evidence); 86 C.J.S. Torts § 57 (1954
& Supp. 1995) (describing the burden of proof as it pertains to interference torts).
18. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 392, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
19. Id. Since Della Penna was unable to meet this burden of proof, the supreme
court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal and remanded the case to the trial
court with directions to affirm the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 393, 902 P.2d at
751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
20. To pursue an action under the traditional prima facie tort of intentional inter-
ference with prospective economic relations, the plaintiff need only show that the de-
fendant was aware of the plaintiffs economic relation, that there was a deliberate
interference with plaintiffs economic relation, and that the plaintiff suffered injury. Id.
at 383, 902 P.2d at 744, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440. Hence, for a prima facie tort there is
no requirement that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's interference was
ic relations.2 Instead, the court adopts a "middle ground" approach,'
which requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's interference
was "wrongful 'by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
itself.'"' This additional burden of proof is significant because it pro-
motes economic efficiency through free competition24 and promotes ju-
dicial economy 5 by avoiding unwarranted litigation.26
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Mosk further analyzed the history
and policy behind the tort of intentional interference with prospective
economic relations.27 Agreeing with the bulk of the majority's opinion,
"wrongful." See id. See generally 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§ 17 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1992) (detailing the prima facie tort doctrine); Jack E.
Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle, 54 Nw. U.
L. REv. 563 (1959) (discussing the history and future of the prima facie tort); Kenneth
J. 'Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 79 Ky. L.J. 519 (1991) (analyz-
ing the prima facie tort doctrine in its contemporary form).
21. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 391, 902 P.2d at 750, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446. The
court disfavored the traditional prima facie tort of intentional interference with pro-
spective economic relations, relying in part on the reasoning adopted by Utah and Ore-
gon:
The problem with the prima facie tort approach is that basing liability on a
mere showing that defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiffs prospec-
tive economic relations makes actionable all sorts of contemporary examples
of otherwise legitimate persuasion, such as efforts to persuade others not
to .. . engage in certain activities .... In short, the prima facie approach to
the tort of interference with prospective economic relations requires too little
of the plaintiff.
Id. at 385-86, 902 P.2d at 746, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1982)).
22. The Utah Supreme Court's "middle ground" approach requires "the plaintiff to al-
lege and prove more than the prima facie tort." Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 304.
23. Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th at 392-93, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447
(quoting Top Serv. Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Or. 1978)).
24. Though the "wrongful" interference requirement makes the plaintiffs burden of
proof more difficult, it does advance economic policy: "Perhaps the most significant
privilege or justification for interference with a prospective business advantage is free
competition." Id. at 389, 902 P.2d at 748, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444 (quoting Buckaloo v.
Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 828, 537 P.2d 865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 (1975), disap-
proved in part by Della Penna, 11 Cal. 4th 376, 902 P.2d 740, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 436).
25. "Without this requirement of wrongfulness, we fear that actors in perfectly legiti-
mate economic transactions would be 'put to justifying the conduct of [their] business
at the whim of a rival.'" Id. at 390, 902 P.2d at 749, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 (quoting
Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 648, 660, 192 Cal. Rptr. 732, 740
(1983)).
26. Id. at 390-91, 902 P.2d at 750, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44546.
27. Id. at 393-412, 902 P.2d at 751-64, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447-60 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
[Vol. 23: 245, 1996] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Justice Mosk disagreed on two key points. First, he stated that the ma-
jority should not have adopted the term "wrongfulness" because it is
inherently ambiguous.' Second, he argued in the alternative that if he
did adopt the wrongfulness standard, he would not have allowed the
term to remain undefined, as did the majority.' Justice Mosk concluded
that this new change in law is "hardly an improvement," because it does
a plaintiff little good to have a legitimate claim for intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic relations without knowing the substance
of the wrongfulness element."'
III. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
Prior to Della Penna, a plaintiff bringing an intentional interference
with prospective economic relations cause of action had never been
required to prove that the defendant's interference was wrongful by
some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself.' Based upon
economic policy concerns and the desire to avoid unneeded litigation,
however, the California Supreme Court chose to follow the precedent
established by other courts and to adopt this new standard.'
Della Penna is, therefore, an important tort case because it clarifies
several aspects of existing law and offers guidance into how California
courts will treat future interference tort causes of action. Yet, the court's
decision to wait until another day to define "wrongful" may ironically
thwart the court's goals of judicial economy and free competition, based
upon the inevitable litigation caused by ambiguity and indefiniteness.
Hence, until an express determination is made by the supreme court, it
remains to be seen what criteria will be used by the lower courts to
define the "wrongful" standard in causes of action based on intentional
interference with prospective economic relations.
ROGER H. SHAAR, JR.
28. Id. at 413, 902 P.2d at 764, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460 (Mosk, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 414, 902 P.2d at 764, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460 (Mosk, J., concurring).
30. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). The court decided to wait and define "wrongfulness"
in another case. Id. at 393, 902 P.2d at 751, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
31. Id. at 414, 902 P.2d at 765, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461 (Mosk, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 378, 902 P.2d at 740, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
33. Id. at 391, 902 P.2d at 750, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
XI. WATERS
Accretion of deposits along shorelines is characterized as
artificial and thus belongs to the state only when it is
directly caused by human activities occurring in the
immediate vicinity of the accreted land: State ex rel.
State Lands Commission v. Superior Court
(Lovelace).
I. INTRODUCTION
in State ex rel. State Lands Commission v. Superior Court
(Lovelace)', the California Supreme Court settled the long-disputed defi-
nition of artificially accreted lands.2 Relying heavily on precedent, the
1. 11 Cal. 4th 50, 900 P.2d 648, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (1995) [hereinafter Lovelace].
Justice Arabian drafted the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Baxter, George, and Werdegar joined. Id. at 55-81, 900 P.2d at 650-67, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 401-18. Justice Mosk wrote a brief concurring opinion. Id. at 81, 900 P.2d at 667, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Kennard also wrote a separate con-
curring opinion. Id. at 81-84, 900 P.2d at 667-69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418-20 (Kennard,
J., concurring).
2. The court quoted from the court of appeal', 2-1 decision which determined that,
where tidelands are "covered by a gradual and imperceptible accumulation of material
that has resulted from the action of the waters, even if artificially influenced, that land
remains in private ownership." Id. at 59, 900 P.2d at 652-53, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403-04
(quoting State ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. Superior Court (Lovelace), 36 Cal. App.
4th 114, 150, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 785 (1993), superseded by 870 P.2d 385, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 794 (1994), affd, 11 Cal. 4th 50, 900 P.2d 648, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399)). The
facts giving rise to this appeal are over a century old, beginning with hydraulic blast-
ing by miners during the California Gold Rush in the late 1840s. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th
at 55, 900 P.2d at 650, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401. See Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights
and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72 CAL L. REV. 217, 233-34 (1984)
(discussing the Gold Rush origins of California's law). The blasting forced monumental
amounts of sedimentary material down the Amelcan, Feather, and Sacramento Rivers
and eventually formed sandbars or adhered to the riverbanks (termed "accretion" or
"accreted land"), extending the original shorelines of property situated along the rivers,
the owners of which are generally termed "upland owners." Id.; see 63 CAL. JUR. 3D
Water §§ 778-779 (1981) (reviewing the landowner's right to accreted lands); 4 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Prp(-rty § 117 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing
landowners' rights in accretion cases). One such parcel along the Sacramento River at
Chicory Bend was expanded by twelve acres of accretion. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 56-
57, 900 P.2d at 650-51, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401.02. When the private owners, Richard
and Starla Lovelace, sued to quiet title to the accreted land, the State Lands Commis-
sion claimed ownership under the theory that the land consisted of artificial accretion
from human activities such as the hydraulic mining, dredging, and the erection of lev-
ees and dams near the property, and thus belonged to the State under the California
artificial accretion rule. Id. Both the trial and appellate courts ruled on behalf of the
private landowner, and the State appealed to the California Supreme Court. Id. at 57-
60, 900 P.2d at 651-53, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402-04. After review was granted, the parties
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court reaffirmed California's rule of artificial accretion. 3 The rule pro-
vides that land along the shoreline of navigable waters within the state,
extended by the gradual accumulation of deposits as a result of artificial
activities, becomes the property of the state under the Public Trust Doc-
trine.' The court established a clear definition of artificial accretion.'
Accretion is artificial only if it is "directly caused by human activities,
such as the dredging, wing dams or levees.., that occurred in the im-
mediate vicinity of the accreted land."6
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. The Public Interest Exception to the Mootness Doctrine
The court first addressed the parties' joint motion to dismiss based on
the settlement of the case,7 as the settlement rendered the controversy
moot. The parties urged the court to order that the appellate court opin-
ion remain unpublished, citing Neary v. The Regents of the University of
California,' which approved the discretionary reversal of a trial court
decision by the court of appeal upon a subsequent settlement by the
parties.9 Finding critical differences between the reversal of a trial court
decision and the nonpublication of a precedential appellate court opin-
settled and jointly moved for a dismissal conditioned upon the receipt of the supreme
court's order that the court of appeal's decision remain unpublished to avoid creating
precedent. Id. at 60, 900 P.2d at 653, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404.
3. Id. at 73, 900 P.2d at 661, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412.
4. Id. The Public Trust Doctrine stands for the proposition that the State holds all
tidelands in trust for the public. See id. at 73, 900 P.2d at 661-62, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
412-13. With the government as trustee, that property is subject to special burdens. See
Joseph L Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L 473, 478-82
(1989) (evaluating the relationship between water rights and the public trust); Scheiber,
supra note 2, at 240 (discussing applications of the California Public Trust Doctrine).
5. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 61, 900 P.2d at 653, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
6. Id. at 79-80, 900 P.2d at 666, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (emphasis added); see also
Phillip W. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of Riparian
and Littoral Title Problems, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L 265, 275-76
(1991) (defining and discussing the accretion process).
7. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 61-62, 900 P.2d at 653-54, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05.
8. 3 Cal. 4th 273, 834 P.2d 119, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (1992).
9. Id. at 284, 834 P.2d at 125-26, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865. The decision in Neary
was based on the desire to avoid further litigation, considering that trial decisions do
not create binding precedent. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 62, 900 P.2d at 654, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 405.
ion, the court denied the motion to dismiss and reiterated the well-estab-
fished principle that an appellate court may choose to hear a case ren-
dered moot by the parties' settlement if "the appeal raises issues of con-
tinuing public importance."'" Because dismissal of this case would result
in continued litigation by future parties over the unsettled definition of
artificial and natural accretions, the court exercised its discretion to
resolve the dispute."
2. A History of Accretion Law
Justice Arabian undertook an extensive examination of accretion law
beginning with Emperor Justinian who first espoused that naturally
accreted lands become the property of the landowner.'" At common
law, the source of the deposits, whether natural or artificial, was irrele-
vant to a determination of ownership.'3 California law, however, turns
on the source of the accretion.
The cornerstone of California accretion law is the Equal Footing Doc-
trine which vested title to all navigable waters to their high tide lines in
the State of California upon its admission into the Union.'4 In the land-
mark accretion case Dana v. Jackson Street Wharf Co., 5 California first
held that the property extended by accretion caused by human activity
along the shoreline does not belong to the landowner.'6 The legislature
codified accretion law in 1872 by the adoption of section 1014 of the
California Civil Code, which vested title to accreted property along rivers
and streams in the upland property owner.'7 A lone 1914 case strayed
from the California approach and applied a common law analysis to
conclude that accretions caused by the county while raising a roadbed
belonged to the landowner.'8 The following year, however, the court
10. Id. at 61-62, 900 P.2d at 654, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405; see William A. Fletcher,
The 'Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Ques-
tions, 78 CAL. L REv. 263, 298-303 (1990) (discussing the Mootness Doctrine in state
court justiciability).
11. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 61-62, 900 P.2d at 654, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405.
12. Id. at 65, 900 P.2d at 656, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 66, 900 P.2d at 657, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408. For an explanation of the
Equal Footing Doctrine, see Lear, supra note 6, at 271.
15. 31 Cal. 118 (1866).
16. Id. at 120. In Dana, the landowner erected a wharf along his waterfront lot,
causing accretion to adhere to the lot Id. The court found this to be a clear example
of artificial accretion and concluded the land does not belong to the upland owner,
but to the state. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 66, 900 P.2d at 657, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 403
(citing CAL. Cry. CODE § 1014 (1872)).
17. See*Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 64, 900 P.2d at 656, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407.
18. See Forgeus v. County of Santa Cruz, 24 Cal. App. 193, 202-03, 140 P. 1092, 1096
(1914).
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considered a similar case and resolved that the artificially accreted prop-
erty belonged to the State. 9 Subsequent case law reaffirmed the basic
rule that the State owns such property" and expanded the rule to in-
clude oceanfront property.2 ' In 1944, the California Supreme Court re-
fined the rule of accretion in Carpenter v. City of Santa Monica.'
"[A]ccretions formed gradually and imperceptibly, but caused entirely by
artificial means-that is, by the works of man. .. and by the dumping of
material into the ocean-belong to the state. . . ."' Any contrary rule
would permit the state to transfer tidelands held in public trust to private
landowners, a transaction which, if done directly, would violate "funda-
mental concepts of public policy."24 By 1960, the California Supreme
Court considered the Carpenter rule "well-established."25
Justice Arabian did not consider only California caselaw in the
Lovelace decision. He gave substantial credence to a 1947 opinion by the
Attorney General that, although not binding on the court, supported the
premise that artificially accreted property belongs to the state.26 The
majority further noted that, consistent with Carpenter, United States
Supreme Court cases and various treatise authorities all indicate that
most court decisions not granting title to the artificially accreted proper-
ty to the upland owner involve tidelands.27 In agreement with the Car-
19. Patton v. City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. 521, 536-37, 147 P. 141, 146 (1915); see
also 4 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 119 (9th ed. 1987)
(discussing the State's right to artificially accreted lands).
20. See City of Los Angeles v. Anderson, 206 Cal. 662, 668-69, 275 P. 789, 791-92
(1929) (ruling accreted lands, created when contractor dumped materials in bay, are ar-
tificial and belong to the state); see also Miller v. Stockburger, 12 Cal. 2d 440, 444-45,
85 P.2d 132, 134 (1938) (ruling accretions caused by the erection of railroad embank-
ments belong to the state); City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 31-32,
102 P.2d 438, 442 (1940) (ruling accretions resulting from nearby dredging operations
belong to the state or its successor in interest).
21. See Curtis v. Upton, 175 Cal. 322, 335-36, 165 P. 935, 93940 (1917); Strand Im-
provement Co. v. Long Beach, 173 Cal. 765, 772-73, 161 P. 975, 978 (1916).
22. 63 Cal. App. 2d 772, 147 P.2d 964 (1944).
23. Id. at 794, 147 P.2d at 984. For a review of California tidelands law, see 63 CAL.
JUR. 3D Water § 780 (1981) and 2 ARTHUR G. BOWMAN, OGDEN'S REVISED CAUFORNIA
REAL PROPERTY LAW § 26.56 (1975).
24. Carpenter, 63 Cal. App. 2d at 794, 147 P.2d at 984.
25. People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 837, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334, 343 (1960).
26. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 71, 900 P.2d at 660, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411 (1995) (cit-
ing 9 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 207 (1947)).
27. See id. at 71-72 & n.3, 900 P.2d at 660-61 & n.3, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 411-12 &
n.3; see also BOWMAN, supra note 23, § 26.55; supra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text.
penter decision, Justice Arabian reaffirmed the "continuing validity of
California's artificial accretion rule," stating that, although artificial accre-
tion may not be awarded to private landowners, no public policy pre-
vents the private ownership of natural accretion.'
3. The Fleeting Question of Federal Supremacy and Common Law
Rules
The court quickly rebuked the private landowners' contention that
federal law, not California law, controlled the ownership determination
of artificial accretion.' Federal law, explained Justice Arabian, may gov-
ern oceanfront property, but the Equal Footing Doctrine clearly vested in
the State the authority over in-state navigable waters and reclaimed
lands.3" Thus, California is free to determine its own law in this area,
unrestrained by the federal system."
Alternatively, the landowners argued that because California is a com-
mon law state and has been since 1850 when hydraulic mining initiated
this accretion process, common law principles should apply and the
artificial/natural distinction should be irrelevant, therefore, vesting title to
the lands in the upland owners.' Again the court disagreed, finding no
authority for the landowners' proposition and explaining that common
law is elastic, adapting to a contemporary legal landscape and affected
by case law. and statutory provisions.'
28. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 73, 900 P.2d at 661-62, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 412-13.
29. Id. at 73-75, 900 P.2d at 662-63, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 413-14.
30. Id. at 74-75, 900 P.2d at 662-63, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 413-14; see also Richard P.
Shanahan, Comment, The Application of California Riparian Water Rights Doctrine to
Federal Lands in the Mono Lake Basin, 34 -'mrINGS L.J. 1293, 1295-96 (1983) ("[TIhe
federal government has acquiesced in the states' right to control water use . . ").
The Lovelace court relied on Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977) ("[P]roperty ownership is not governed by a general fed-
eral law, but rather by the laws of the several States."), and Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 26 (1894) ("[Elach State has dealt with the lands under the tide waters within
its borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving its own control
over such lands . . ").
31. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 75, 900 P.2d at 663, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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4. State Acquisition of Accreted Land is Not a Taking
Next, the court addressed the landowners' argument that permitting
the State to retain artificially accreted land constitutes an uncompensat-
ed taking violating their due process rights.' The court noted that pre-
cedent supports the position that the California accretion rule did not
constitute an illegal taking in violation of due process.'
5. Proximity is the Key
Justice Arabian then defined the scope of the artificial accretion rule,
considering whether it applied to hydraulic mining activities of a century
past.' Relying heavily on the concurrence by Justice Scotland in the
court of appeal's treatment of this case, Justice Arabian concluded that
because the debris sent downstream from the hydraulic mining process
was originally natural, it could not transmute into an artificial accretion
simply by way of hydraulic mining. 7 Because it is virtually impossible
to determine how much of the accreted land accumulated as a result of
the hydraulic mining, as opposed to possible dredging or levees, which
are clearly artificial in nature, the court simplified the inquiry by
eliminating the need to fully analyze an old and questionable source.'
The key to determining whether accretion is natural or artificial is the
proximity between the source and the ultimate accumulation of the
deposits.' Thus, accretion is only artificial if it directly results from hu-
man activities in the "immediate vicinity of the accreted land."" The
34. Id. at 75-76, 900 P.2d at 663, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414. This argument is based on
dicta from a concurring opinion in a previously overruled case. Id. at 76, 900 P.2d at
663, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414; see Bonnelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 331-32
(1973), overruled by Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363. For a discussion of gov-
ernmental takings, see Patrick G. Kruse, Note, 72 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV. 669, 673-75
(1995).
35. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 76, 900 P.2d at 663-64, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 414-15 (citing
State v. Superior Court of Lake County (Lyon), 29 Cal. 3d 210, 231-32, 625 P.2d 239,
251-52, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 708-09 (1981)).
36. Id. at 76-80, 900 P.2d at 664-66, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415-17.
37. Id. at 76-77, 900 P.2d at 664, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 415.
38. Id. at 78, 900 P.2d at 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416. The court noted that a highly
scrutinized analysis of the California river system could theoretically find that the en-
tire system is artificial based on the effects of human activities such as dam building.
Id. Taken as such, however, the exception (that artificially accreted lands belong to
the state) would "swallow the rule" (that accreted lands belong to the upland owner).
Id.
39. Id. at 79-80, 900 P.2d at 666, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417.
40. Id. "Human activities" generally include "dredging, wing dams or levees." Id. at
hydraulic mining activities in this case were far too attenuated to fall
within the artificial accretion rule, therefore, the accreted land must be
characterized as natural and its title vests in the upland property own-
ers.
41
6. No Attorney Fees Awarded
Following their success in this case, the upland owners moved for an
award of attorney fees pursuant to the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure.42 Section 1021.5 provides for the award of attorneys fees, under
certain limited conditions, to the victorious party in a case concerning a
public interest.4 ' The court found that section 6461 of the Public Re-
sources Code, which prevents recovery in suits against the State to quiet
title in property related to navigable waters, precluded the owners from
recovering attorney fees." Although the statute does not explicitly cover
accretion cases, the court found section. 6461 clearly controlling and
declined the landowners' request.45
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Although Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's conclusion, he pro-
vided a five sentence concurrence in which he belatedly joined in Justice
Kennard's dissent from the 1992 majority opinion in Neary v. Regents of
the University of California.46
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard also agreed with the majority's reaffirmation and re-
finement of California's artificial accretion rule, but wrote separately to
reassert her dissenting position in Neary."7 According to Justice
79, 900 P.2d at 666, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417. "[Immediate vicinity" will be determined
on a case by case basis, but the more direct the human source, the greater the
probability it will be characterized as artificial. Id. at 80, 900 P.2d at 666, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 417. Also, "[tihe larger the structure or the scope of human activity . . . the
farther away it can be and still be a direct cause . . . although it must always be in
the general location of the accreted property to come within the artificial accretion
rule." Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1996).
43. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5.
44. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 80, 900 P.2d at 666, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417 (construing
CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 6461 (West 1977)).
45. Id. at 81, 900 P.2d at 666-67, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 417-18.
46. Id. at 81, 900 P.2d at 667, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418 (Mosk, J., concurring) (citing
Neary v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 3 Cal. 4th 273, 286-95, 834 P.2d 119, 127-32, 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 867-72 (1992)); see infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
47. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 81-84, 900 P.2d at 667-69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418-20
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Kennard, the Neary decision has created extra work for the court, be-
cause the court must now explain its denial of motions to suppress the
publication of court of appeal decisions in light of Neary.4 She recount-
ed her Neary dissent, stressing her position that the presumption should
be against reversal because a judgment is intended to "'administer the
laws of this state, and thereby do substantial justice.'"49 Judgments are
not to be destroyed at the whim of parties to a settlement.'
Since the Neary decision, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
the issue in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership,5
and supporting Justice Kennard's position, unanimously held that "set-
tlement of the parties is not a proper ground to vacate a prior judgment"
at either the trial court or appellate court level. 2 Like the Court in U.S.
Bancorp, Justice Kennard emphasized the legal value of judgments, free
from "collateral attack" by settlement.' Finally, Justice Kennard remind-
ed the majority of her now-realized prediction in Neary that, when given
a motion to nullify an appellate opinion as a condition of the parties'
settlement, the court would be forced to distinguish and sidestep
Neary.' Accordingly, the court was faced with the unusual predicament
"of having one rule for trial court judgments and a different and virtually
opposite rule for appellate judgments."'
(Kennard, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 82, 900 P2d at 668, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419 (Kennard, J., concurring). The
Neary decision, as Justice Kennard points out, deals merely with trial court decisions
which, unlike appellate courts, do not create precedent. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring);
see supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
49. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 83, 900 P.2d at 668, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419 (Kennard, J.,
concurring) (quoting Neary, 3 Cal. 4th at 286, 834 P.2d at 127, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
867).
50. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
51. 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994).
52. Lovelace, 11 Cal. 4th at 83, 900 P.2d at 668, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419 (Kennard, J.,
concurring) (quoting U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct.
386, 393 (1994)).
53. Id. at 83-84, 900 P.2d at 668-69, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 419-20 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring) (citing U.S. Bancorp, 115 S. Ct at 392).
54. Id. at 84, 900 P.2d at 669, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 420 (Kennard, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring).
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The ownership of accreted lands has endured a 150 year battle be-
tween the California State Lands Commission and private property own-
ers and has finally been resolved by the Lovelace decision.' Before the
California Supreme Court's decision in Lovelace, the scope of California's
definition of artificially accreted lands was ambiguous." Now, private
landowners situated along California's navigable waters have a more
lucid definition of their property rights to land created by the gradual
sedimentary buildup along the shores.' No longer will the State Lands
Commission be able to take advantage of a vague law to force upland
owners to settle their title claims. 9
A possibility for abuse still exists, however, due to the court's unwill-
ingness to provide a bright line definition of "immediate vicinity," pre-
'ferring to consider cases on an ad hoc basis.' As the State Lands Com-
mission took advantage of the unclear definition of artificial accretion,'
the State may similarly maintain that courts must construe "immediate
vicinity" broadly. Perhaps it will not be long before the court is forced to
revisit the definition of artificially accreted lands.
A secondary impact of the Lovelace ruling is the court's clarification of
its policies concerning judgment reversal and nonpublication.62 The
court clarified its decision in Neary concerning trial court judgments,
and recognized the importance of preserving appellate opinions for their
precedential value.' No longer will the State Lands Commission be able
to argue cases through the appellate level and then, if the law is decided
in a manner injurious to the State's position, simply settle with the land-
owner and have the opinion kept from publication, thus removing its
56. Id. at 57, 79-80, 900 P.2d at 651, 666, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 402, 417.
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
58. See Ronald A. Zumbrun, California Supreme Court Draws Line in the Sand for
State Lands Commission, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 19, 1995, at FO3.
59. Id.
60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
61. Zumbrun, supra note 58, at F03. ("[Tihe State Lands Commission has opposed
certainty concerning the law on accretion in order to abuse its powerful position and
manipulate individual private property owners. What the state's been doing is nothing
more than a modem form of claim jumping.").
62. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 8-10, 47-50 and accompanying text.
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precedential effect."4 Consequently, the decision may be characterized
as a victory for both upland property owners and appellate courts.5
JENNIFER COLE POPICK
64. Zumbrun, supra note 58, at F03.
65. Id.
SUMMARIES
I. Appellate Review
An appeal alleging disproportionate sentences in
comparison to those of codefendants following a
negotiated plea bargaiin directly attacks the
plea, not the sentence, and requires a certificate
of probable cause under California Penal Code
section 1237.5 and rule 31(d) of the California
Rules of Court.
People v. Panizzon, Supreme Court of California,
decided April 18, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 68, 913 P.2d
1061, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851.
Facts. The defendant, as part of a negotiated plea agreement, pled no
contest to kidnapping, anal rape by a foreign object, solicitation to dis-
suade a witness from testifying, and weapons use. The defendant agreed
to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, plus twelve years, and
the imposition of a restitution fine between $200 and $10,000. The defen-
dant and his attorney executed the plea agreement which specifically
contained a waiver of the right to appeal the sentence. In exchange, the
People agreed to dismiss counts of conspiracy, rape by foreign object,
sexual battery, and residential burglary. Pursuant to the plea agreement,
the trial court sentenced the defendant to life with the possibility of
parole, plus twelve years, and a restitulion fine of $400. Subsequently,
the defendant appealed his sentence alleging that it violated state and
federal constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment be-
cause his sentence was disproportionate in relation to those imposed on
his codefendants. The People requested the court of appeal to dismiss
the appeal on two grounds. First, on the grounds that the defendant had
failed to obtain a requisite certificate of probable cause as required by
California Penal Code section 1237.5 and rule 31(d) of the California
Rules of Court. Second, the People argued that the defendant waived his
right to appeal his sentence under the plea agreement.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the defendant's constitutional challenge to his sentence
was in substance a challenge to the validity of the negotiated plea, thus
subject to the requirement of a certificate of probable cause. The trial
court must therefore look to the substance of the appeal, and not the
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time or manner in which the appeal is made, when determining whether
a certificate of probable cause is required.
The court further held that trial courts may rely upon a validly exe-
cuted waiver as a substitute for the trial court's requirement to specifi-
cally admonish the defendant of the consequences of a plea. The court
stated that a valid waiver exists where both a defendant and his attorney
have signed a waiver form, which attests to the defendant's knowing, in-
telligent and voluntary relinquishment of his rights. Furthermore, the
court stated that a valid waiver requires that the trial court carefully
examine the executed waiver, and that such an examination raises no
further questions. The court concluded that even if a certificate was not
necessary in the instant case, the negotiated plea agreement contained a
valid waiver of the defendant's right to appeal the sentence despite the
absence of a specific admonishment by the trial court.
I. Automobiles and Traffic
In a Department of Motor Vehicles Hearing, a
duty to certify the facts of an apparent con-
tempt and to transmit the certification to a su-
perior court is imposed on the Department by
California Vehicle Code section 11525. The supe-
rior court assumes the burden of initiating the
contempt proceeding upon receipt of the certifi-
cation.
Parris v. Zolin, Supreme Court of California, decid-
ed March 4, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 839, 911 P.2d 9, 50
Cal. Rptr. 2d 109.
Facts. When the plaintiff was arrested for operating a motor vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant, his driver's license was suspended
by the arresting officer. After requesting a hearing before the Department
of Motor Vehicles, the plaintiff served the Department of Justice crim-
inalist who analyzed his blood sample with a subpoena to appear. The
criminalist did not appear, but the arresting officer's report and the docu-
mented results of the blood test were admitted into the record. The
plaintiff asked the hearing officer to take measures to have the crimi-
nalist held in contempt pursuant to California Vehicle Code section
11525, which provides for judicial determinations of contempt in admin-
istrative hearings. The hearing officer offered to provide the plaintiff with
any papers or documents necessary to initiate a contempt proceeding
himself, but never offered to prepare a certification of the facts and
transmit it to the superior court. The plaintiff concluded that the burden
of enforcing the subpoena was unreasonable and declined to enforce it.
The hearing officer then upheld the suspension of the plaintiffs driver's
license.
The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the superior court
seeking review of the hearing. The trial court set aside the decision and
remanded to the Department for a determination consistent with
Fitzpatrick v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 13 Cal. App. 4th 1771, 17
Cal. Rptr. 2d 110 (1993) (interpreting Vehicle Code section 11525), and
ordered the Department to compel the attendance of the criminalist and
rehear the matter. The Department appealed and the court of appeal
reversed, holding that Vehicle Code section 11525 only requires the ad-
ministrative agency to "certify the facts to the superior court," which the
court of appeal interpreted as simply preparing a statement of facts for
use by a party. The court further held that the burden of compelling
attendance is on the party instituting the contempt action.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that,
Vehicle Code section 11525 imposes on the administrative agency a duty,
to certify the facts to the superior court and to transmit the certification
to the superior court, not merely to provide the plaintiff with documents
or papers needed to initiate a contempt proceeding himself. The certifica.-
tion to the superior court need not be an affidavit; the hearing officer
"need only certify the fact of the apparent contempt to the superior
court." Furthermore, section 11525 does not impose the burden of initiat-
ing the court proceeding on either the party or the agency. Rather, upon
receipt of the certified statement transmitted by the agency, the burden
is on the superior court to initiate the contempt proceeding by issuing an
order to show cause to the contemner.
III. Criminal Law
A. Under Penal Code, section 1203.2a, if the defen-
dant has given written notification of his incar-
ceration to his probation officer, and the proba-
tion officer fails to notify the court imposing
probation that the defendant is incarcerated, the
court loses jurisdiction to impose sentence on
the initial offense.
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In re Hoddinott, Supreme Court of California, de-
cided March 25, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 992, 911 P.2d
1381, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706.
Facts. The defendant plead guilty to possession of a controlled sub-
stance in San Francisco. Approximately one month later, the defendant
plead guilty to a separate violation in Marin County. While awaiting sen-
tencing on the violation in San Francisco, the Marin County Superior
Court suspended the defendant's sentence and the defendant was placed
on three years probation. The San Francisco Superior Court subsequently
sentenced the defendant to sixteen months in state prison.
The defendant and defendant's attorney each notified the defendant's
probation officer in Marin County that the defendant was in prison. Both
asked that the court impose sentence in the defendant's absence under
Penal Code, section 1203.2a, which states that a probation officer must
report notice of commitment to the court within thirty days after being
notified by the defendant, and if the probation officer does not report
this information to the court within thirty days, or if the court fails to im-
pose sentence within the specified time limit, the court loses jurisdiction.
The defendant's probation officer failed to notify the court that the de-
fendant was incarcerated. The defendant was later released from deten-
tion in San Francisco and placed on probation.
The following year, the defendant was incarcerated in San Francisco
for violation of parole. While the defendant was incarcerated, the Marin
County Superior Court revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant
again notified his probation officer in Main County that he was incarcer-
ated and asked that sentence be imposed in his absence pursuant to
Penal Code, section 1203.2a. This time the defendant's probation officer
notified the court. Subsequently, the defendant was paroled in San Fran-
cisco. The Marin County Superior Court was unaware of this parole and
imposed a two-year sentence in the defendant's absence to be served
concurrently with his San Francisco sentence.
The defendant was again arrested in San Francisco for violation of
parole and began serving his two-year Marin County sentence. The defen-
dant claimed that the Matin County Superior Court had no jurisdiction to
impose sentence. The Marin County Superior Court denied the
defendant's habeas corpus petition. The defendant then filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeal. The court of appeal
granted the petition and vacated the sentence in Marin County.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that if, after written notification from the defendant, a proba-
tion officer fails to notify the court imposing probation that the defen-
dant is incarcerated, that court loses jurisdiction to impose sentence on
the initial offense. The supreme court found that the plain language of
the statute, the statute's amendment history, and the legislative intent
supported its interpretation.
The court concluded by disapproving prior appellate decisions which
indicated that the defendant must make a valid, formal request for ab-
sentee sentencing in order to start the time limits. The court held that a
defendant's notification to his parole officer does not need to be a formal
request; however, a defendant must still submit a formal request to the
court in order for the court to impose sentence in a defendant's absence.
B. A defendant who committed grand theft, but was
not convicted of or sentenced for the offense
prior to the effective date of the amendment to
Penal Code section 12022.6, which increases the
amount of loss required for one and two-year
sentence enhancements, is eligible for the lesser
enhancement applicable at the time of
defendant's sentencing.
People v. Nasalga, Supremne Court of California,
decided February 29, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 784, 910
P.2d 1380, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88.
Facts. The defendant, the office manager of a property management
company, was charged with felony grand theft for allegedly depositing
more than $100,000 in rent checks into her personal bank account. Upon
finding that the defendant had stolen $124,000 in rent checks, the trial
court convicted the defendant and sentenced her to the base term of
sixteen-months for grand theft. At the time of the defendant's offense,
Penal Code section 12022.6(b) provided: "If the loss exceeds [$100,000],
the court shall... impose an additional term of two years." However, be-
fore the defendant was sentenced, that section was amended to increase
the loss required for a one-year enhancement from $25,000 to $50,000
and to increase the loss required for a two-year enhancement from
$100,000 to $150,000. Applying the version of section 12022.6 that was
operative when the defendant committed the offense, the trial court
added a two-year sentence enhancement to the sixteen-month base term
it had already imposed. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, and
the supreme court granted review.
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Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the amended version of section 12022.6 should apply, and
concluded that the defendant was eligible for only the one-year enhance-
ment because the victim's loss did not exceed the amount required to
impose a two-year enhancement ($150,000). In reaching its decision, the
court adhered to the ruling in In re Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 948,
48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965), which held that "[ijf the amendatory statute
lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date the judgment
of conviction becomes final then.., it, and not the old statute in effect
when the prohibited act was committed, applies."
The supreme court further held that the legislature's failure, in
amending section 12022.6, to express its intent that the amendment apply
only prospectively permits the amendment to apply retroactively, thereby
bringing the sentence in the instant case within its provisions.
C. When a defendant has committed multiple of-
fenses incident to one objective, California Pe-
nal Code section 654 gives the trial court discre-
tion to sentence the defendant for any one of
such offenses, but does not provide the trial
court with discretion to mandate the sentence
with the greatest potential term of imprison-
ment.
People v. Norrell, Supreme Court of California, de-
cided April 11, 1996, 13 Cal. 4th 1, 913 P.2d 458,
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 429.
Facts. The defendants were charged with, among other crimes, "kidnap-
ing for robbery" and "robbery." Kidnaping for robbery is punishable by
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, while robbery is punish-
able by a term of two, three, or five years. California Penal Code section
654 states that when a defendant has committed multiple offenses which
are incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one
of such offenses, but not for more than one. The trial court, pursuant to
California Penal Code section 654, determined that the offenses of "kid-
naping for robbery" and "robbery" were incident to one objective. The
court then stayed the sentence for kidnaping for robbery, and imposed
on the defendants the lesser sentence for robbery. The People appealed,
contending that when multiple offenses are incident to one objective,
California Penal Code section 654 requires the trial court to impose upon
the defendants the sentence with the greatest potential term of imprison-
ment, thus taking away the trial court's discretion in such cases. The
court of appeal dismissed the appeal, and the supreme court granted
review.
Holding. Affirming the sentence imposed by the trial court, the supreme
court held that when a defendant has committed multiple offenses which
are incident to one objective, California Penal Code section 654 gives the
trial court discretion to sentence the defendant for any one of such mul-
tiple offenses, rather than to mandate the sentence with the greatest
potential term of imprisonment. The court reasoned that the language of
the Code clearly indicates that a defendant "may be punished under ei-
ther of such provisions." The court further reasoned that if it was the
legislature's intent to impose such a limitation on the trial court's dis-
cretion pursuant to this Code, the legislature would have been free to
amend this section at any time since its enactment in 1872. Thus, the
legislature's silence showed an intent on their part not to modify the
Code. The court maintained that it would leave the power to modify the
Code in the legislature's hands.
The supreme court further noted the importance of a trial court's dis-
cretion to impose a sentence which is most appropriate for the
defendant's conduct in a given case. The court reasoned that such dis-
cretion allows the sentencing judge to take into account many factors,
such as age, circumstances of a given crime, and personal culpability of a
defendant, in order to make a determination most appropriate for the
defendant's conduct in a given case.
D. For purposes of California Penal Code, section
192(c)(1), which provides that vehicular man-
slaughter is, among other things, "driving a vehi-
cle in the commission of an unlawful act, not
amounting to a felony, and with gross negli-
gence," the term "unlawful act" means any of-
fense that is dangerous according to the circum-
stances under which it was committed, rather
than an act that is intrinsically perilous.
People v. Wells, Supreme Court of California, decid-
ed March 26, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 979, 911 P.2d 1374,
50 Cal. Rptr. 699.
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Facts. The defendant was charged with vehicular manslaughter after his
car collided with another vehicle which resulted in the death of a passen-
ger. At trial, the evidence showed that the defendant was traveling at
speeds of up to eighty miles per hour on a windy mountain road. In at-
tempting to illustrate the "unlawful act" element of California Penal Code
section 192(c)(1) to the jury, the trial court stated that a violation of
Vehicle Code section 22349, or exceeding the maximum highway speed
limit of fifty-five miles per hour, constituted an "unlawful act." After the
jury convicted the defendant of vehicular manslaughter, the defendant
appealed, claiming that speeding is not an innately unsafe act. Agreeing
with the defendant, the court of appeal reversed the decision of the trial
court, and held that the "unlawful act" element "must be one that is dan-
gerous in the abstract."
Holding. Reversing the decision of the appellate court, the California
Supreme Court held that the term "unlawful act" as used in California
Penal Code section 192(c)(1) was intended by the legislature to mean
any act that is dangerous according to the circumstances surrounding its
commission. Furthermore, the court clarified its holding in People v.
Stuart, 47 Cal. 2d 167, 302 P.2d 5 (1956) by stating that the underlying
act does not have to be inherently risky to human life; it merely has to
be dangerous when coupled with gross negligence.
Finally, the supreme court noted that although the trial court instruct-
ed the jury that a violation of Vehicle Code section 22349 was an inher-
ently dangerous act, such error was harmless because the jury had deter-
mined that the defendant met all of the elements of vehicular man-
slaughter.
IV. Defenses
A defendant seeking to dismiss charges on the
basis of discriminatory prosecution is not re-
quired to show that the People acted with "spe-
cific intent to punish the defendant for [his/her]
membership in a particular class."
Baluyut v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, decided March 4, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 826, 911
P.2d 1, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101.
Facts. Petitioners were charged with violations of Penal Code, section
647(a), which prohibits solicitation of lewd conduct in a public place. In
their defense, petitioners argued that their arrest was the result of dis-
criminatory application of the statute, aimed particularly at eliminating
homosexual activity. Ten arrest reports were introduced into evidence to
prove that the arrests involved a "decoy officer" who approached other
males outside of an adult bookstore. The officer would continue conver-
sation until the person suggested going elsewhere to perform sexual acts,
at which time the person was arrested. Furthermore, other evidence
suggested that a "cruising pattern of homosexual men" was displayed,
which served to attract homosexuals to the "decoy officer." The munici-
pal court, relying primarily on People v. Smith, 155 Cal. App. 3d 1103,
203 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984), denied the motion to dismiss because petition-
ers failed to establish that the police acted with "specific intent to punish
the defendants for their membership in a particular class." Petitioners
argued that "intent to punish" was not one of the required elements of
discriminatory prosecution. The superior court denied a petition for writ
of mandate, but the court of appeal reversed and ordered dismissal of
the charges. At the Attorney General's request, the California Supreme
Court granted review to clarify the requisite showing for the defense of
discriminatory prosecution. The California Supreme Court affirmed the
substantive content of the decision of the court of appeal, but reversed
because the petition for writ of mandate was rendered moot.
Holding. The California Supreme Court held that "specific intent to pun-
ish the defendants for their membership in a particular class" is not a
necessary element of discriminatory prosecution. Looking to Murgia v.
Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 540 P.2d 44, 124 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975),
the court stated that the elements of a claim of discriminatory prosecu-
tion are (1) that the defendant was "deliberately singled out for prosecu-
tion on the basis of some invidious criterion," and (2) "the prosecution
would not have been pursued except for the discriminatory design of the
prosecuting authorities."
The People argued and the municipal court agreed that Smith was
controlling. The Smith court defined an "invidious purpose" as "one that
is arbitrary and thus unjustified because it bears no rational relationship
to legitimate law enforcement interests." While the supreme court in the
instant case agreed with the definition of "invidious purpose" as used in
Smith, the court stated that Smith departed from precedent by adding
the requirement that a defendant show "specific intent to punish." The
supreme court stated that the element of intent envisioned by Murgia
does not require a showing of "specific intent to punish," but rather
merely requires a showing that the defendant was intentionally singled
out for "disparate treatment on an invidiously discriminatory basis."
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V. Government Immunity
Government Code section 845.8's grant of immu-
nity to public entities and employees precluding
liability from injuries "caused by" an escaping
prisoner includes protection from liability when
a prisoner self-inflicts harm during an escape
attempt.
Ladd v. County of San Mateo, Supreme Court of
California, decided March 7, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 913,
911 P.2d 496, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309.
Facts. The fifteen-year-old plaintiff was being driven by two San Mateo
County Juvenile Hall employees to Butte County Juvenile Hall when, en
route, the plaintiff jumped out of the back seat of the automobile while it
was stopped at a red signal. With her hands handcuffed in front of her
body, the plaintiff ran up to and attempted to board a slow-moving
freight train. In the process, the plaintiff fell under the train's wheels,
and both her legs were destroyed. The plaintiff, sued the county for negli-
gently instructing its employees and for not providing a safe vehicle. A
negligence suit against the county employees was based on their alleged
failure to adequately control and care for the plaintiff. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendants based on Government
Code section 845.8 which shields government entities from liability when
an escaped or escaping prisoner causes harm, and section 846 which pro-
vides immunity when a government entity fails to retain a prisoner. The
court of appeal affirmed, basing their decision solely on Government
Code section 845.8.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that government immunity premised on Government Code
section 845.8(b), prohibiting liability when any injury is "caused by" an
escaping prisoner, encompasses injuries a plaintiff self-inflicts. The court
noted that by the statute's absolute grant of immunity and broad terms,
it was meant to apply to the widest range of conceivable injuries that
could be caused by persons being deprived of their liberty. Furthermore,
the court observed that the rationale for granting immunity, to ensure
that officers perform their duties unimpaired by thoughts of potential
personal liability, applies whether it is an injured third party bringing suit
or whether it is the actual prisoner bringing suit.
VI. Interest
The rate of postjudgment interest to be paid by
a local public entity is seven percent per annum,
as provided by the California Constitution, and
not ten percent per annum as prescribed by the
California Code of Civil Procedure.
California Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. City
of Los Angeles, Supreme Court of California, decid-
ed October 5, 1995, 11 Cal. 4th 342, 902 P.2d 297,
45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279.
Facts. In August 1983, California Federal Savings and Loan Association
sought a refund from the City of Los Angeles for business license taxes
and interest, alleging that the city's power to levy the business license
tax against it was nullified by section 23182 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code. Ruling against the city, the trial court held that California Federal
was entitled to recover business taxes paid for the three preceding years.
The trial court also ordered the city to pay postjudgment interest at a
rate of seven percent per annum. Disagreeing with the trial court, the
court of appeal held that the judgment should bear interest at a rate of
ten percent per annum.
Holding. Overruling the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the applicable rate of postjudgment interest to be paid by
local public entities is seven percent per anum. The court reasoned that
the City of Los Angeles is not required to pay the higher interest rate
prescribed by California Code of Civil Procedure, section 685.010(a),
because as a local public entity, the city is exempt under California Gov-
ernment Code, section 970.1(b). The court further stated that because the
statutory language of California Government Code, section 970.1, is clear
and unambiguous, it was unnecessary for the court to rewrite or amend
the code.
VII. Nuisances
In demonstrating that a nuisance is "temporary"
rather than "permanent," the plaintiff must
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present evidence that the contaminated condi-
tion is subject to cleanup and that the cost of
the cleanup is "reasonable."
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., Supreme Court of
California, decided April 4, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 1087,
912 P.2d 1220, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272.
Facts. In an action for nuisance, the plaintiffs claimed that Aerojet's
dumping of hazardous wastes on the land prior to the plaintiff s own-
ership of the land constituted a continuing nuisance. In 1960, Aerojet
leased the 2400 acres of land from the prior owner, Cavitt, during which
time hazardous materials were "dumped and burned" on the land by
Aerojet. Following the termination of the lease, Cavitt complained to
Aerojet that part of his land had been contaminated and that range grass-
es would not regenerate. Thereafter, in 1973, Cavitt signed a release dis-
charging all claims against Aerojet for $7500; this release was never re-
corded by either party. Two years later, the plaintiffs acquired the land
unaware that the land was contaminated. Plaintiffs became aware of the
contamination in 1984 and brought suit in 1988.
At the trial court, the jury returned a special verdict for $13.2 million.
Aerojet moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (or alternatively
for a new trial) on the grounds that plaintiffs had not established that the
nuisance could reasonably be abated at a reasonable cost. The trial court
denied the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but granted
a new trial. Both parties appealed.
Holding. Affinning the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that to show a continuing nuisance, plaintiffs must show "sub-
stantial" evidence that the contamination is capable of being abated at a
reasonable cost. Furthermore, the court defined an abatable nuisance as
one that can be practically removed considering both cost and hardship.
While the court did not require the plaintiffs to show that the nuisance
could be completely removed, the court held that the plaintiffs must
present evidence of what an acceptable level might be. Because plaintiffs
conceded that they did not know the extent of the contamination nor
how to remove it, they were unable to succeed on their continuing nui-
sance claim.
VIII. Preliminary Injunction
A municipal court and an appellate department
of the superior court have jurisdiction over a
collateral attack of the validity of an injunctive
order issued by a superior court.
People v. Gonzalez, Suprene Court of California,
decided February 29, 1996, 12 Cal. 4th 804, 910
P.2d 1366, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 74.
Facts. On May 28, 1993, the defendant was arrested for violating a pre-
liminary injunction issued by the Los Angeles Superior Court which re-
stricted the activities of gang members within a certain area of Los An-
geles. The municipal court convicted the defendant on four counts of
contempt, and denied a demurrer by the defendant which challenged the
validity of the injunction. The appellate department of the superior court
affirmed the municipal court's holding, stating that the municipal court
did not possess jurisdiction over such a claim. The court of appeal held
that since both the municipal court and the appellate department lacked
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the injunctive order issued by the
superior court, both had to accept the validity of the order. In order to
preserve equal protection rights, the court of appeal further held that the
validity of the order may be challenged when on appeal to the court of
appeal.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the municipal court and the appellate department of the
superior court possess the authority to determine the validity of an in-
junctive order issued by a superior court when challenged collaterally. In
California, void injunctive orders cannot be the basis for a contempt
conviction. California rejects the collateral bar doctrine and allows defen-
dants to collaterally challenge the validity of the injunctive order in
which they are charged. A collateral attack does not dissolve the injunc-
tive order, rather, it only enjoins enforcement of the order in respect to
the defendant at issue. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a deter-
mination of the validity of the injunctive order by a lower court.
The supreme court further held that neither courts have jurisdiction in
a direct attack to dissolve or overturn an injunction issued by a superior
court.
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IX. Public Utilities
California Public Utility Code section 453.5 pre-
vents the Public Utilities Commission from as-
sessing a rate refund against a public utility and
using the funds for a purpose other than to re-
imburse ratepayers.
Assembly of the State of California v. Public Utili-
ties Commission, Supreme Court of California,
decided December 18, 1996, 12 Cal 4th 87, 906 P.2d
1209, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54.
Facts. In 1982 the Federal Communications Commission ordered AT&T
to reimburse its ratepayers for cellular research expenses. Pursuant to
this order, -Pacific Bell received $7.9 million, but did not distribute the
funds to ratepayers. In 1993, the California Public Utilities Commission
decided that the reimbursement was intended to be distributed to
ratepayers and ordered Pacific Telesis, Pacific Bell's parent corporation,
to place $50 million, $7.9 million at 18% interest, in an account for future
distribution. The Commission noted that the intended beneficiaries,
ratepayers in the years 1974-1982, could not be identified, so the Com-
mission directed $7.9 million to be distributed to current ratepayers and
the rest to be allotted for public school telecommunications infrastruc-
ture. On rehearing, the Commission modified the disbursement and or-
dered $7.9 million plus 3.4% interest to be distributed to current rate-
payers and allotted the remainder to public school telecommunications
infrastructure. The State Assembly and ratepayers questioned the legality
of the Commission's order and petitioned for review.
Holding. The California Supreme Court annulled the Commission's order
and held that the Commission could not charge the utility company at
one rate of interest and reimburse customers at a different rate. The
court reasoned that section 453.5 of the California Public Utility Code
restricted the Commission's discretion with respect to the use of rate-
payer refunds. The court stated that section 453.5 prevents the Commis-
sion from refunding to ratepayers an amount which is less than what the
Commission assessed against a utility company for reimbursement.
Therefore, the court held that the California Public Utility Code preclud-
ed the Commission from exercising its discretion on the proper use of
refunds and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceed-
ings.
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